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GERDIE EVERAERT
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ABSTRACT: This chapter provides a general motivation for analysing the impact of public capital
on macroeconomic performance (section 1). It briefly outlines the hypothesised
impact of public capital on productivity and economic growth, labour market
performance and the result of fiscal consolidation programs (section 2) as well as the
corresponding research objectives related to these hypotheses (section 3). Further, it
presents the general outline of this dissertation together with a summary of its main
results (section 4). An analysis of the policy implications of the obtained results
(section 5) and a non-exhaustive outline of directions for future research (section 6)
close this chapter.
KEYWORDS: Public capital, economic growth, labour market performance, fiscal consolidation.
1. ORIENTATION
Over the last two decades macroeconomic policy in Europe has been inspired by the belief
that price stability and sound public finances are the cornerstones of a macroeconomic
environment supporting sustainable economic growth and low unemployment. In the 1990s,
this belief was formalised by the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and
Growth Pact, making low inflation, balanced government budgets and a strong currency the
prime objectives of European macroeconomic policy.
Regained macroeconomic stability. Taking stock at the outset of the 21st century, most
European countries have indeed succeeded in attaining the postulated objectives. First, most
governments have managed to bring down their budget deficit in line with the conditions for
entering the Monetary Union. Some countries are even expected to register a surplus in 2000.
Second, average inflation in Euroland has declined from 11.7% in the period 1974-82 to 2.1%
in the period 1995-99.
The argument that the created stable macroeconomic environment will (automatically) set
Europe on a sustainable higher economic growth path with low unemployment remains to be
proven, though. Admittedly, unemployment rates in Euroland have declined considerably in
recent years while economic growth will be no less than 3.75% in 2000. However, 9% of the
European labour force is still stuck in unemployment while only 60% of the population at
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working age is currently employed. This remains very weak, both from a historical and a
cross-sectional (i.e. compared to e.g. the US) perspective. Further, the excellent growth record
in 2000 cannot be taken as evidence that the economy has been set on a sustainable higher
growth path.
Double macroeconomic challenge. Despite the regained macroeconomic stability, most
European countries still face a double macroeconomic challenge. First, there is the enduring
need to reduce the high government debt ratios. Both social considerations – e.g. safeguarding
the Welfare State – and the prescriptions of the Stability and Growth Pact underpin this need.
Governments should be aware that the budgetary room created by the current upswing in
economic activity might disappear quickly as the economy slips into a new recession. Second,
there is the challenge to reap the fruits of the achieved macroeconomic stability in terms of a
further reduction in unemployment rates and an increase in employment rates.
Both challenges are clearly highly interrelated. On the one hand, labour market performance
affects the government’s financial balances through the amount of unemployment benefits,
social contributions and direct tax receipts. On the other hand, the state of the government’s
financial balances affects labour market performance through the level of taxes and transfers
and through the composition of public spending, i.e. consumption versus investment.
Adequate policy mix. Partly due to this mutual dependence, the success of the undertaking
relies heavily on an adequate policy mix. In this respect, we do not challenge the view that a
stable macroeconomic environment is a prerequisite for high economic growth and low
unemployment. In itself, it is not a sufficient condition, though. If the road to – for instance -
sound public finances is paved with policy actions that are unfavourable to the labour market,
one can hardly argue that employment will benefit from the created stable environment.
This dissertation is mainly concerned with one particular aspect of this policy mix, i.e. public
investment. Our apriori hypothesis is that public capital supports both labour market
performance and the long-run supply potential of the economy. Being supportive for
macroeconomic performance, public investment is also expected to cause positive feedbacks
on the government’s financial balances.
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Crumbling public infrastructures. Table 1 compares the level of public investment, as a
percentage of GDP, observed in the 1970s with the level attained in the 1990s for a number of
OECD countries. Given the expected positive contribution of public capital to both
macroeconomic performance and public finances, it is surprising to see that over the last two
decades public capital outlays have been drastically reduced in most OECD countries. In
Belgium, for instance, the rate of public investment dropped from an average of 4.84% of
GDP in the 1970s to a poor 1.77% in the 1990s. This implies a drop to 37% of the level
reached in the 1970s. A similar dilution of public investment shares is observed in Denmark,
Ireland and the UK. Somewhat less pronounced but still very significant reductions have
taken place in Austria, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Among the
countries reported in table 1, only Finland, Spain and Portugal are able to present an increase.
Table 1 Evolution in public investment (in % of GDP).
inv70 inv90 inv90/inv70 inv70 inv90 inv90/inv70
Austria 5.03% 2.78% 0.55 Japan 9.18% 7.95% 0.85
Belgium 4.84% 1.77% 0.37 Netherlands 3.84% 2.56% 0.67
Canada 3.58% 2.45% 0.68 Norway 4.62% 3.46% 0.75
Denmark 4.17% 1.86% 0.45 Portugal 2.53% 3.84% 1.52
Finland 2.13% 3.08% 1.45 Spain 2.42% 3.75% 1.55
France 3.55% 3.31% 0.93 Sweden 4.60% 2.73% 0.59
Germany 3.79% 2.30% 0.61 Switzerland 4.55% 3.49% 0.77
Ireland 4.85% 2.37% 0.49 UK 5.09% 2.08% 0.41
Italy 3.10% 2.61% 0.84 US 3.70% 3.32% 0.90
Note: inv70 (inv90) measures the average level of nominal public investment in 1970-1979 (1990-1999) in % of
nominal GDP.
Source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, 2000/1.
In itself, the observation that public investment relative to GDP has declined is no evidence
that public capital is currently undersupplied. This decline may be due to the simple fact that
the demand for publicly provided goods has declined. (e.g. smaller school-aged population,
fewer registered cars). A closer inspection of the exact timing of the reduction in public
investment suggests a different story, though. In Belgium for instance, almost 90% of the
global decline in public investment reported in table 1 has occurred during the period 1982-
87, a period characterised by strong fiscal consolidation. Also in other countries, strong
reductions in public investment appear to be situated in periods of contractionary fiscal
policy. 1 Consistent with this heuristic finding, de Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996) find
evidence that fiscal stringency is a key element in the explanation of the sharp decline in
                                                                
1 See Everaert (1999) for more details.
Non-technical summary and conclusions
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
0.4
public capital investment in a lot of OECD-countries. Similarly, Alesina and Perotti (1995)
argue that during periods of tight fiscal policy, cuts in government expenditures primarily
involve cuts in public investment. This is due to “the political reality that it is easier to cut
back or postpone investment spending than it is to cut current expenditures” (Oxley and
Martin, 1991), for investments are a less rigid component of public outlays.
As contractionary fiscal policy seems to be – to a large extent – responsible for the drastic
reduction of public investment in a large number of OECD countries, some authors have
criticised the composition of fiscal consolidation programs. The necessity of restoring public
investment at higher rates to support economic growth and employment has for instance been
stressed by the European Commission (1993) and in a policy initiative paper written by a
group of economists at the initiative of Drèze and Malinvaud (1994). In the US, new
infrastructures played a key role in Clinton’s economic plans. In Belgium, higher
expenditures on public investment – with special attention to enhancing mobility - were an
important aspect of the 1999 negotiations preceding the formation of the Flemish and the
Federal Government. However, the resistance in some countries against the proposed
European investment programs proves that their expected positive contribution to
macroeconomic performance is not evident and needs a stronger scientific background.
2. PUBLIC CAPITAL HYPOTHESIS
A large literature has studied the impact of public capital on the long-run growth potential of
the economy. Critics generally point at the well-known crowding-out effects of public capital
formation. To the extent that the government must borrow to finance its investments,
increases in real interest rates and displacement of private investments cannot be excluded.
Empirically, however, a lot of authors conclude that the net effect of public capital formation
is positive. Estimating an aggregate production function, Aschauer (1989a, 1989b, 1989c) for
instance found positive and highly significant effects of infrastructure on productivity growth
and private sector investment in the US and the G7.
Productivity and growth. In response to Aschauer’s seminal work, a huge literature has
studied the productivity and growth effects of public investment. Initially, similar results were
obtained. More recently, however, Aschauer’s work has come under serious attack. Most
authors still accept the underlying intuition but are highly critical concerning the concrete
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methodological development of the idea, both on theoretical and methodological grounds.
Major issues that have been raised concern the non-stationarity of the data, the direction of
causality, possible misspecification of the production function (i.e. the Cobb-Douglas
specification implies the substitution elasticities between factors of production to be equal to
one) and the endogeneity of other factors of production (i.e. private labour and capital).
Trying to come up with more justifiable approaches, the literature has proceeded along
several different lines (see e.g. Sturm et al., 1997, for a broad survey). As is well known by
now, the results of this literature are quite controversial. Some of these studies confirm
Aschauer’s ‘public capital hypothesis’, others reject it.
Labour market. Much less attention has been paid to the labour market implications of public
investment. Figure 1 is consistent with our hypothesis that there exists a positive long-run
relationship between public investment and labour market performance. This figure includes
cross-section data for 21 OECD countries. The upper part of figure 1 relates the average
employment rate (i.e. employment as a percentage of the population at working age) in the
1980s to the average level of public investment (in percent of GDP) in the 1960s and the
employment rate in the 1990s to the level of public investment in the 1970s. This yields 40
observations (two for each country, except for Australia and Switzerland where due to data
limitations we only have one). Although there appears to be quite some dispersal, one might
conclude that there is a positive correlation. Countries where public investment was high
during the 1960s and 1970s appear to do better in terms of employment during the 1980s and
1990s. The lower part of figure 1 relates the unemployment rate in the 1980s and the 1990s to
public investment in the 1960s and 1970s. Consistent with the previous results, a negative
relationship emerges.
Fiscal consolidation. In recent years a growing literature has tried to explain the success or
failure of fiscal consolidation programs. In this explanation, the composition of the
consolidation program usually plays a crucial role. One of the hypotheses states that in order
to be successful, i.e. lead to a permanent reduction in government debt and deficit ratios,
fiscal consolidation must not rely on cuts in government investment. As mentioned above
these cuts may erode the macroeconomic basis of a country, implying lower tax receipts and
higher social expenditures. Evidence supporting this hypothesis has been provided by –
among others - Alesina and Perotti (1995) and McDermott and Wescott (1996). Also own our
research has contributed to this conclusion (Heylen and Everaert, 2000).
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Figure 1 Public investment (in % of GDP) and (un)employment rate 20 years later.
Source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, 2000/1.
3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This dissertation intends to study the effects of public investment more closely. Our
contribution to the debate can be situated at four different levels:
(i) A number of methodological problems have not yet been adequately tackled in the
literature studying the effects of public capital on economic growth. A first potentially
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serious problem concerning the estimation of production and cost functions is that the
underlying rate of technological progress is not directly measurable. Some authors simply
ignore technological growth. Others have proceeded by including a linear time trend as a
proxy. To the extent that technological growth is a stochastic process, this approach is
doomed to yield biased estimates. Second, due to slow capital accumulation, the capital
stock series usually included in empirical analyses often exhibit I(2)-components,
implying that the conditions underlying the standard cointegrated VAR methodology are
not satisfied. Third, most studies stick to a single equation framework, making their
results vulnerable to simultaneous equation bias. Taking these problems as a starting
point, our first goal is to strengthen the methodological framework of Aschauer’s work.
(ii) The effect of public capital on labour market performance has received almost no
attention. To investigate whether the correlation shown in figure 1 is - at least partially -
due to a causal relation running from public capital to employment or whether it is a mere
coincidence, driven by the evolution of other variables, is our second objective.
(iii) Most studies that try to explain the success or failure of fiscal consolidation programs
have taken a cross-country perspective (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1995; McDermott
and Wescott, 1996; Heylen and Everaert, 2000). An interesting contribution would be to
check whether the finding that successful fiscal consolidations should not rely on cutting
public investment survives using time series data.
(iv) Concerning the possible relation between public capital and employment it is important –
especially from policy considerations – to understand the source of the high
unemployment persistence observed in many OECD countries. Two alternative
hypotheses are (full) hysteresis and convergence to an increased natural rate. Full
hysteresis (meaning that all changes in the unemployment rate are permanent) implies
that independent of the causes of the high unemployment rate, each policy measure, e.g. a
boost in public investment, that succeeds in reducing unemployment has permanent
effects. If the increase in the unemployment rate is due to adjustment to an increased
natural rate, however, effective policy measures require dealing with the causes of the
increase in the natural rate directly, among which possibly the reduction in public
investment.
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4. OUTLINE AND MAIN RESULTS
The remainder of this study consists of four chapters. The first two chapters contribute to the
debate on growth and productivity effects of public investment by explicitly dealing with
some of the problems currently encountered in the literature. The third chapter extends the
analysis to the labour market. Each of these chapters uses time series data for the Belgian
economy. The last chapter investigates the source of unemployment persistence in the OECD.
It employs time series data for 21 countries.
Productivity and growth. Conceptually, chapter 1 sticks to the production function approach
initially proposed by Aschauer. Methodologically, however, it differs in at least three crucial
respects. (i) Given the stochastic non-stationary behaviour of the variables traditionally
included in the analysis, we check whether the production function estimates constitute a
stable equilibrium relation using the residual-based Engle-Granger cointegration
methodology. (ii) As an alternative to fitting a deterministic trend we construct a proxy for the
stock of knowledge by accumulating data on granted patents. (iii) We check the direction of
causality from the estimates of an error-correction model. In contrast to standard Granger
causality tests, this approach allows for causality resulting from the estimated long-run
equilibrium. The estimates reveal a significant positive cointegrating relationship between
public capital and private sector productivity, with causality running from public capital to
multifactor productivity. The estimated output elasticity of capital lies around 0.29. In order to
check the robustness of our results, we change the set-up of the analysis in two different ways.
First, as a lot of critical assumptions underpin the construction of capital stock data (see
appendix A for a brief note on this subject), we construct new public capital stock series by
implementing some small adjustments in the original assumptions. Second, we use the
Philips-Hansen fully modified least squares estimation procedure to correct for possible
simultaneous equation bias in the production function. The results are found to be fairly
insensitive to both alternative specifications.
Using the cointegrated VAR methodology, the underlying idea in the second chapter is to
determine the rate of technological growth as a common stochastic trend in output, private
capital and public capital based on the balanced growth restrictions derived from a simple
neoclassical growth model. Due to slow capital accumulation, capital stock series often
exhibit a near I(2)-trend, especially in the small samples usually available to the applied
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researcher. These I(2)-trends introduce significant inertia in the system, implying slow
adjustment of output towards its long-run steady state. Moreover, the standard I(1)
cointegrated VAR methodology is no longer valid in the case of I(2)-trends. Therefore, capital
stock series enter the analysis in first differences. Inspired by the neoclassical growth model,
the balanced growth path of output is now being determined by private and public
investments, with private and public capital stock growth rates capturing the medium-term
slow adjustment towards this steady-state. Using Belgian data for the period 1953-96, the
analysis supports Aschauer’s hypothesis that the decline in public capital investment has
lowered the balanced growth path of real output. In contrast to Aschauer’s results, the output
elasticity of public capital is found to be only a fraction 0.4 of the output elasticity of private
capital. Assuming that the output elasticity of private capital is about 0.33, these estimates
imply an output elasticity of public capital of about 0.14.
The third chapter investigates the output and labour market effects of public capital formation
in Belgium within a broader structural model, explaining - among other variables - private
output, private employment and unemployment, private capital formation, wage bargaining
and price setting. From the supply side of the economy, which is modelled using a translog
cost function, we can derive the contribution of public capital to private sector production
capacity. The estimates of this cost function show that - for given output and wages - services
from public capital significantly reduce private sector total cost. An increase in the public
capital stock with 1 Euro reduces long-run private sector cost with 0.24 Euro. The output
elasticity of public capital implied by these estimates equals 0.31.
The main conclusion concerning our first research objective is that public capital has a
significant positive impact on productivity and economic growth. Although there is some
variation in the size of the output elasticity of public capital, this finding is robust over the
three alternative econometric techniques used.
Labour market. Our model in chapter 3 also allows us to analyse the impact of public capital
on labour market performance. In this respect, at least three different channels of influence of
public capital on private employment can be distinguished: (i) direct complementary or
substitution effects for given output and wages, (ii) indirect effects on real wages, due to
changes in labour productivity and/or the unemployment rate, (iii) indirect effects caused by
changes in aggregate demand.
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The estimates of the translog cost function allow quantification of the impact of public capital
on private sector inputs for given output and wages, i.e. direct complementary or substitution
effects. The results suggest that public capital and labour are substitutes. Public capital and
private capital are found to be complements. This means that public capital is labour saving in
the production function, i.e. a given level of output will be produced with less labour if the
government extends the public capital stock.
This substitutive relationship does not necessarily imply that labour demand actually
decreases with increasing public investment. Apart from the direct substitution effect in the
production function, public capital also affects the demand side of the economy and wage
bargaining between employers and unions. In addition to higher public investment spending,
positive demand side effects might stem from higher private investment spending and higher
private consumption due to an increase in the household disposable income. The impact of
public capital on real wages is uncertain. On the one hand, the increase in labour productivity
exerts upward pressure on bargained wages. On the other hand, the substitution of labour for
private and public capital should dampen union’s wage claims.
To find out whether the negative relationship between public capital and employment is
altered once demand and wage effects are taken into account, the model is simulated under an
alternative public investment policy. The simulations reveal a considerable rise in aggregate
demand in response to an increase in public investment. However, as labour demand is found
to be largely insensitive to changes in aggregate demand, the benefits in terms of employment
are very moderate, accounting for only a small decrease in the unemployment rate. One
should be very cautious in interpreting this result, though. Although the idea that in the long
run employment and output are independent is consistent with apriori expectations, one would
expect to find a (considerable) positive impact in the short run. The observed very small
impact of output on labour market performance is most probably due to an overestimation in
the dynamic cost function of the speed of adjustment of factor shares toward their long-run
equilibrium.
Further, due to a strong rise in labour productivity, also real wages increase in response to an
increase in public investment. As the employment share in total cost was found to be
independent of public capital, the productivity benefits resulting from an increase in the
public capital stock can - for given costs - only be incorporated in real wages at the expense of
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lower employment, though. Given the estimated low responsiveness of real wages to
unemployment, the increase in unemployment has offset only part of the rise in real wages.
Therefore, the increase in real wages has induced a further rise in the unemployment rate.
The combined effect of the three channels through which public capital affects private
employment is clearly negative. Simulating the model under the assumption that the strong
decline in Belgian public investment over the period 1982-89 did not occur 2, we observe a
3.8%-points increase in the 1996 unemployment rate compared to the benchmark simulation.
Direct substitution of labour for public capital contributes 3.3%-points to this overall increase
while the rise in real wages adds another 0.8%-points.
The answer to our second research objective is that public investments reduce private sector
employment and raise private sector unemployment.
Fiscal consolidation. Finally, our model in chapter 3 allows for a time series test of the well-
known hypothesis that in order to be successful, fiscal consolidation should not rely on
cutting public investment. From the above mentioned simulation we learn that the
government deficit widens considerably during the first years of the increase in public
investment, reaching a maximum increase in the deficit equal to 2.9% of GDP. As the positive
growth effects of a higher public capital stock slowly increase tax receipts, the increase in the
budget deficit shrinks to 0.8% of GDP in 1996. Although this is still a significant burden on
the government’s financial balances, extrapolation of the evolution of the government budget
suggests a (growing) decrease, relative to the benchmark simulation, in the deficit from about
1998 onwards.
Concerning our third research objective, the conclusion is that a structural reduction in
government debt and deficit ratios cannot be accomplished by cutting public investments.
Persistence in unemployment rates. The fourth chapter tests whether the high persistence in
unemployment rates observed in most European countries is due to (full) hysteresis against
the alternative hypothesis that it is caused by adjustment toward an increased natural rate. A
direct methodology for assessing the nature of unemployment persistence is analysing the
time series properties of the unemployment rate using standard univariate unit root tests.
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Usually, such tests cannot reject the presence of a unit root in the unemployment rate,
pointing to full hysteresis. Implicitly, the alternative hypothesis in these tests states that the
unemployment rate reverts to a constant natural rate, though. We investigate whether the
results change if we allow for a variable natural rate under the alternative hypothesis by
modelling infrequent level shifts, identified using an outlier detection algorithm. Once such
level-shifts are allowed for, univariate unit root tests strongly reject the null of a unit root in
almost all OECD-countries.
In terms of the alternative persistence perspectives, this result is in favour of the hypothesis
that the rise in OECD unemployment rates is due to adjustment to an increased natural rate.
Nevertheless, it would be hard to advocate that the identified level-shifts in the actual
unemployment rate coincide with shifts in the natural rate. More likely, infrequent large
shocks are caused by extreme adverse shocks to the unemployment rate – whatever their
cause - implying jumps in the direction of a natural rate, which might have increased years
before the upshot in actual unemployment.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) have developed a general equilibrium search model, which is
able to account for this feature. In this model workers accumulate skills on the job and lose
skills during unemployment. Its main implication is that even with unfavourable labour
market characteristics – implying an upward shift in the natural rate - low unemployment is
sustainable as long as the economy is not subject to any major adverse shocks. The intuition
behind this result is that the availability of a lot of ‘good jobs’ counteracts the adverse effects
of generous unemployment benefits. When the economy is hit by a severe adverse shock,
however, generous benefits erode the ability of the labour market to adjust. Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998) argue that in this interpretation, the smooth performance of the European
economies in the 1950s and 1960s concealed an inherent instability. Their model implies that
the gradual build-up of the welfare state – implying unfavourable labour market
characteristics like higher direct taxes on labour and generous unemployment benefits – was a
virtual ‘time bomb’ waiting to explode. The oil shocks of the 1970s caused the “explosion”.
Concerning our fourth research objective, the results show that the observed high persistence
in European unemployment rates is due to adjustment towards an increased natural rate.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 The 1996 hypothetical public capital stock would be 28.5% higher than the capital stock observed in reality.
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5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this section we present the main policy implications of the results outlined in section 4. As
the results concerning the impact of public capital are derived using Belgian data, the related
policy implications in principle apply to Belgium only. For other countries, they can serve as
a first indication, though. Before proceeding, it should also be stressed that the presented
material must not be considered to contain final results concerning the research questions put
forward in section 3. Improvements and extensions open plenty of room for future research.
Section 6 therefore contains a non-exhaustive research agenda.
Beneficial supply and demand effects. The results outlined in section 4 suggest that when the
route to macroeconomic stability relies on cutting government investment, economic growth
and productivity of private sector factors of production are structurally reduced. Taken at face
value, the alleged beneficial supply and demand effects of public capital suggest that the
Belgian government should raise public capital spending. We believe that this is the main
policy implication of our research. Despite its beneficial effects, we do not wish to advocate
an unconditional strong increase in government investment, though. Two arguments underpin
the need for some reticence. First, our results show that, ceteris paribus, public capital reduces
private sector employment. Second, increases in government investment should be balanced
against the enduring need to reduce the high government debt ratio. Each of these two
arguments is discussed in turn.
Adverse labour market effects. The empirical analysis in chapter three indicates that public
capital reduces private sector employment. This result implies that the positive correlation
between public investment and the employment rate observed in figure 1 is produced by the
evolution in a third factor, affecting public investment and employment simultaneously, rather
than resulting from a direct causal relation running from public capital to employment. One
possible candidate is the massive build-up of government debt since the 1970s, forcing the
government either to raise taxes or to cut spending, often investment spending (see e.g. de
Haan et al., 1996). The potential negative labour market consequences of higher taxes are
evident (see e.g. recent research by Daveri and Tabellini, 2000). Higher taxes can raise labour
cost, either directly (employer taxes) or indirectly when workers claim higher wages to
safeguard their net income (employee taxes, indirect taxes). To the extent that the increase in
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taxes coincides with cuts in public investment spending, a positive correlation between public
investment and employment may emerge.
Despite the negative relation between public capital and employment observed in the data, a
number of critical comments are called for. (i) As noted above, the impact on employment of
beneficial demand effects from higher public investment is probably underestimated in our
research. Therefore, we believe that - at least in the short-run – the relation between public
capital and employment is less unfavourable than our results suggest. (ii) The empirical
analysis relies on a broad public capital stock concept. The observed negative relation does
not imply that all investment projects bring about substitution of labour. Investments in
training facilities for the structural unemployed, sheltered workshops, mobility of low-class
workers, etc. are for instance expected to yield beneficial effects in terms of employment if
labour supply is successfully reallocated from sectors and/or regions with high unemployment
to sectors and/or regions with high labour demand. Further, infrastructure investment aimed at
structural conversion of weak regions might also yield an important contribution to
employment in these regions. (iii) Part of the rise in unemployment in the aftermath of higher
public investment is due to upward pressure on real wages prompted by an increase in labour
productivity. If the government wants to translate higher investment spending into higher
employment, it should see to it that the beneficial productivity effects of higher public
investments are not skimmed off by higher real wages. In this respect, investments aimed at
enhancing effective labour supply (supra) are an obvious choice as they can be expected to
exert downward pressure on real wages. Further, supplementary measures to moderate real
wage claims might be in place.
Structural reduction of government debt. The second argument for not unconditionally
increasing government investment results from the enduring need to reduce the high
government debt ratio in Belgium. Our empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis that an
increase in government investment implies no permanent worsening of the government
budget. As it takes quite some time, however, for the indirect positive output effect of an
increase in investment spending to feedback into the government budget, a significant short-
run increase in the deficit - raising government debt and interest payments - arises. This short-
run negative impact implies that - given the still very high public debt ratio in Belgium – the
government should be cautious if it wants to expand public investment spending. In the light
of the arduous consolidation of public finances over the last two decades, a considerable
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increase in public investment might even not be politically feasible. Moreover, since the
signing of the Stability and Growth Pact - requiring EMU Member States’ budgetary
positions close to balance or in surplus and a government debt ratio declining steadily to
about 60% of GDP - the room for new policy initiatives has been seriously reduced.
In order not to jeopardise the reduction of government debt, higher public investments should
therefore preferably be financed from the budgetary margin created by increases in the
primary surplus and declining debt interest payments. Even then, the long-run benefits of
public investments should still be balanced against the benefits – in terms of lower interest
payments for instance – of faster debt reduction. Moreover, the government should be aware
that the current budgetary room is partly created by a strong upswing in economic activity and
might disappear quickly as the economy slips into a new recession.
Structural labour market reform. Our findings in chapter 4 that high and persistent
unemployment in Europe is not due to strong hysteresis effects but more likely reflects
adjustment to an increased natural rate, suggests that the battle against unemployment can
only be won if governments focus on structural labour market reform aimed at bringing down
the natural rate. Often cited reform measures are (i) a more flexible employment protection
legislation, (ii) reduction of generous unemployment benefits, (iii) reduction of minimum
wages, (iv) decentralisation of wage bargaining, (v) training of structurally unemployed
workers, etc. (Calmfors, 1998; Wyplosz, 2000; Elmeskov et al., 1999). Based on the results
outlined in section 4, infrastructure investments appear to fail as a candidate in bringing down
the natural rate of unemployment. As noted before, however, these estimates are based on a
broad public capital stock concept. Carefully selected investment projects (supra) might be
beneficial in terms of employment.
Without the ambition to provide a thorough investigation of the route to go for labour market
reform to be successful – which is beyond the scope of this dissertation – public investment
can also play an important role as attendant measure. The main reason is that structural
reforms are unlikely to pay off in a negative macroeconomic environment. During a recession
for instance, the willingness of employees and unions to accept reform measures will be very
low since – at least in the short-run - the potential benefits do not outweigh the risks of a more
flexible labour market (see e.g. Allsopp and Vines, 2000; Wyplosz, 2000). In terms of the
analysis in chapter 4, structural reform brings down the natural rate of unemployment. A fast
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reduction in the actual rate of unemployment might require positive shocks to economic
activity as this speeds up convergence to the lower natural rate. In this respect, the growth
stimulating effect of public investment can be used to raise the short-run benefits of structural
reform. Increases in public investment are preferred over increases in current expenditures as
the former measure is expected to bring about – in addition to its direct aggregate demand
effect - indirect demand effects resulting from the increased productivity of private sector
factors of production.
6. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Finally, let us outline some possible directions for future research. First, concerning the
analysis in chapter 1, the calculation of multifactor productivity relies on the assumption that
technological progress is not biased towards certain factors of production, i.e. technological
progress is assumed to be Hicks-neutral. If this assumption fails to hold in reality – technical
progress is for instance labour augmenting – the calculation is obviously flawed. Note that
with Cobb-Douglas production, labour-augmenting, capital-augmenting and Hicks-neutral
technical progress are essentially the same. Allowing for factor-biased technical progress in
the calculation of multifactor productivity therefore requires specifying a more flexible
production function. Haskel and Slaughter (1998) for instance measure skill-biased technical
progress as the change in skilled labour’s cost share – derived from a translog cost function –
that is not explained by changes in factor prices.
Second, the ability of the analysis in chapter 2 to identify the proposed steady-state
relationship as a cointegrating vector relies on the observation that the impact on equilibrium
output of the upward shift in the private investment rate occurring in the 1980s has been
cancelled out by the negative shock to the public investment rate over more or less the same
period. In future research, it might be interesting to model these shocks endogenously by
including the driving factors behind private and public investment.
Third, as noted above the very small impact of output on labour market performance is most
probably due to an overestimation in the dynamic cost function of the speed of adjustment of
factor shares toward their long-run equilibrium. Therefore, modelling the short-run dynamics
of the cost function using alternative specifications is worth considering in future research. An
alternative dynamic specification is for instance proposed by Hall and Nixon (1999). They
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believe that firms face costs from adjusting the actual level of factor input rather than from the
adjustment of factor shares. Therefore, they create a dynamic model from costly adjustment of
factor volumes in stead of factor shares. A second available modelling strategy is the
restricted cost function approach of Allen (1994). In this approach, costs are minimised
conditional on a given capital stock. From these conditional estimates, the long-run optimum -
allowing for adjustment of all the factors of production - can be derived using the Le
Chatelier-Samuelson principle.
Fourth, chapter 4 suggests that the strong persistence in European unemployment rates is due
to persistence of infrequent large shocks rather than to full hysteresis. These infrequent large
shocks are interpreted as extreme adverse shocks to the unemployment rate, implying jumps
in the direction of an exogenous natural rate. An alternative interpretation would be that a
strong rise in actual unemployment – whatever its cause – may provoke a permanent rise in
the long-run equilibrium rate because it triggers fiscal and social policy responses that
negatively affect the structural characteristics of the labour market (see also Everaert and
Heylen, 1999). Fiscal policy responses may follow from the negative effects of
unemployment on the government’s financial balance, e.g. social security receipts and
expenditures. To the extent that these negative effects force the government to raise taxes, an
increase in the equilibrium rate of unemployment might arise. Further, observing the strong
rise in unemployment, the government may for social reasons enhance the generosity of the
unemployment benefit system or the early retirement system (OECD, 1994). Alternatively,
the government may create more public sector jobs. In the short run these policy actions
probably exert favourable effects. In the long run, however, the effects may be negative. Once
the more generous system has been introduced, it may for political reasons be very hard to
turn it back. Gradually, changes are then to be expected in the behaviour of private sector
wage bargainers (higher wage claims) and unemployed workers (reduced search intensity or
willingness to accept job offers) with potentially permanent adverse effects on employment.
These fiscal and social policy responses provide a new perspective on the observed high
unemployment persistence in Europe, a proposition worth further investigation in future
research.
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Public capital and productivity growth
- Evidence for Belgium, 1953-1996 -
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ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the impact of public capital on multifactor productivity in
Belgium making use of single-equation cointegration analysis on annual data for the
period 1953-1996. Instead of fitting a deterministic trend to capture the underlying
technological progress, patent statistics are used as a proxy. From the estimated long-
run equilibrium between public capital and productivity, we estimate an error-
correction model to check for the direction of causality. The results support a strong
positive relationship with causality running from public capital to productivity.
KEYWORDS: Public capital, multifactor productivity, technological progress, patents.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since Aschauer (1989a), the potential negative impact of reduced public investment on
productivity growth has been a hot topic in the economic literature. Observing that the US
productivity slowdown “is matched, or slightly preceded, by a precipitous decline in
additions to the net stock of public non-military structures and equipment”, Aschauer expands
the conventional aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function to include the public capital
stock. He provides empirical evidence that a 1% decrease in the ratio of public to private
capital decreases multifactor productivity in the US by 0.39%. Taking a panel of seven
countries, Aschauer (1989b) shows that this strong, positive correlation continues to hold in a
broader sample of countries.
Inspired by Aschauer, a large body of empirical research investigating the link between public
capital and private sector productivity has arisen1. Initially, Aschauer’s findings were
confirmed, see e.g. Munnell (1990a, 1990b). Later, however, they have come under severe
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attack for the estimated output elasticity of public capital implied an implausibly high return
to public capital (see e.g. Aaron, 1990). The rate of return to core infrastructure implied by
Aschauer’s (1989a) results equals almost 150%, while Munnell’s (1990a) results point to a
rate of return to all public capital of about 60% (Hurst, 1994).
Alarmed by these high figures, a lot of defects in Aschauer’s methodology have been
identified. A first important problem emerges from the observation that all variables included
in the production function show stochastic non-stationary behaviour. The finding of a unit
root makes Aschauer’s results, derived using level data, suspicious due to possible spurious
correlation (see e.g. Tatom, 1991). Second, it is often argued that the established positive
correlation could be evidence that multifactor productivity has a significant positive impact on
public capital rather than the other way around, i.e. reverse causation (Eisner, 1991). Third,
Hulten and Schwab (1993) argue that a production function is likely to be part of a system in
which both input and output variables are endogenously determined. This makes the results
from estimating a single-equation production function potentially liable to simultaneous
equation bias.
Despite the fact that many have identified these important problems, they have not yet been
properly taken care of. Using annual data for Belgium over the period 1953-1996, the goal of
this paper is to reconsider these problems in a production function approach similar to the one
initially applied by Aschauer. However, instead of following the traditional approach of
including a linear time trend to capture the underlying technological progress, we use patent
statistics as a proxy. To make sure that our results indicate a long-run equilibrium relationship
rather than follow from spurious regression, we run cointegration tests drawing on Engle and
Granger (1987). Since in a cointegrating framework, standard Granger causality tests are no
longer valid, we proceed to analyse the direction of causality by estimating an error-correction
model (ECM).
In order to check the robustness of our results, we have changed the set-up of the regression
analysis in two different ways. First, to correct for possible simultaneous equation bias, we
implement the fully modified least squares estimation procedure suggested by Phillips and
Hansen (1990). Second, we allow for changes in the construction of public capital stock data.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly outlines the
production function approach. Section three discusses the empirical methodology of the
paper. The results are presented in the fourth section. The final section summarises.
2. SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL
The analysis of the productivity impact of public infrastructures is usually done by adding
public capital (G) to private sector factors of production, capital (K) and labour (L), in an
aggregate production function,
( )Y A f K L Gt t t t t= , , (2.1)
where Y equals total private sector output and A captures technological progress. Assuming
the production function to be adequately described by a Cobb-Douglas specification,
Y A K L Gt t t
e
t
e
t
ek l g=  (2.2)
and rewriting in logarithms yields2:
y a e k e l e gt t k t l t g t= + + + (2.3)
By definition, multifactor productivity can be calculated as:
mfp y s k s lt t k t l t= - - (2.4)
with sk and sl denoting the shares of the private sector inputs, capital and labour respectively,
in private sector output. Under constant returns to private inputs and perfect competition,
profit maximisation implies that private factors of production earn their marginal products: el
and ek will be equal to sl and sk respectively. Constant returns over private sector inputs, and
therefore increasing returns over all inputs, are motivated from the possibility of considerable
economies of scale resting behind the provision of public capital (Aschauer, 1989a). The
expression for multifactor productivity can then be rewritten as:
mfp y e k e l a e gt t k t l t t g t= - - = + (2.5)
                                                                
2 Lower-case variables denote logarithms.
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However, if congestion effects are severe enough, they may lead to constant returns over all
inputs (Aschauer, 1989a). Since public capital is an unpaid factor of production, the
assumption of constant returns to all inputs implies that paying private factors of production
their marginal product would not exhaust total output. One possible way out of this problem is
to assume that all benefits from the contribution of public capital to production are distributed
among private factors of production proportionally to their output elasticities, i.e. factor
shares are proportionally related to output elasticities (Aschauer, 1989a):
sl = l e l and ke l=ks with l >  1 (2.6)
This assumption enables us to find a simple expression for multifactor productivity:
( )mfp a e g s k s lt t g t k t l t= + - - (2.7)
Note that the two alternative specifications are nested in the following ‘general’
specification which is a weighted average of (2.5) and (2.7):
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )
mfp a e g a e g s k s l
a e g e s k s l
t t g t g t k t l t
t g t g k t l t
= + + - + - -
= + - - +
g g
g
1
1
(2.8)
If g=0, the production function exhibits constant returns over all inputs, while g=1 points to
constant returns to private sector factors of production only.
3. DATA SELECTION AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
3.1. Data selection
Data concerning gross capital stocks over the period 1953-1996 were kindly provided by the
Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. The public capital stock includes roads, buildings,
educational facilities, etc. owned by federal, regional and local authorities as well as by the
semi-governmental social security institutions. It does not include public enterprises (e.g.
railways, harbours, ...). These are included in the private capital stock. Residential buildings,
owned by the households, are excluded from the private sector capital stock. Data on private
sector output and factor shares are drawn from the OECD's 'Economic Outlook'. Private sector
employment is taken from the OECD's 'Business Sector Data Base'. Since data taken from
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OECD sources are only available from 1960 onward, we have reconstructed these series for
1953-59 based on national accounts data provided by the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau.
3.2. Empirical specification
Before choosing the appropriate econometric methodology, it is very important to analyse the
non-stationary behaviour of the variables of interest. Besides the traditional Dickey-Fuller
tests, the order of integration is tested for applying an alternative testing procedure proposed
by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992).
The results from running these tests (see appendix A) clearly show that all variables exhibit a
unit root, making Aschauer’s results - derived using level data - suspicious due to possible
spurious correlation. A popular way to handle this kind of non-stationarity is to estimate the
model in first-differences. However, this approach only leads to very ambiguous results3.
Estimation in first-differences removes all trend components, putting heavy weight on high-
frequency disturbances. Essentially, one analyses the effect of public capital growth in one
year on productivity growth during the same year (Munnell, 1992). By contrast, economic
theory suggests the relationship between multifactor productivity and public capital to be at
much lower frequencies. First-differencing would remove this low-frequency component.
Much more relevant than simply taking first-differences is the concept of cointegration,
analysing the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between stochastic non-
stationary variables4. However, only some authors have actually elaborated on this view. On
the one hand, Tatom (1991) finds no evidence of cointegration in the US. Sturm and de Haan
(1995) come to the same conclusion for both the US and the Netherlands. On the other hand,
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993) find a clear cointegrating relationship in Spain.
Furthermore, there are some problems related to these studies. First, Tatom includes energy
prices in his specification of the production function. Since prices belong more to a cost than
to a production function, the interpretation of his results is not straightforward. Second,
sticking to Aschauer’s model, Sturm and de Haan include a linear time trend to capture
                                                                
3 See Sturm et al. (1997) for an overview of the main results.
4 Another clear advantage of cointegration over first-differencing is that the estimated coefficients converge
much faster to their true population values (the OLS estimator is said to be super consistent). This greater
power may be critical given the relatively small sample size.
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technological progress. They also include the capacity utilisation rate to capture short-term
disturbances. Besides the fact that within the context of cointegration, short-term disturbances
are adequately captured by an error-correction model, both variables simply cannot
cointegrate with multifactor productivity for they are not integrated processes (see Stock and
Watson, 1988)). Moreover, including time as one of the regressors implies looking for
cointegration in linearly detrended data. This is clearly in contradiction with the results from
the unit root tests5 and with the notion of long-run equilibrium. Third, besides including
capacity utilisation Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero also completely ignore the underlying
technological progress.
The studies mentioned above are all based on single-equation cointegration techniques.
Alternatively, some authors employ Johansen’s maximum likelihood procedure (Johansen,
1988), estimating cointegrating relationships in vector autoregressive error-correction models.
From a theoretical point of view, this system based approach is more satisfactory for besides
treating all variables endogenously it also allows for multiple cointegrating relationships. In
light of the unit root tests reported in appendix A, it suffers from a serious drawback though.
The results point to the presence of I(2) components in some of the variables. Although we
make a strong argument that these variables are in fact I(1), this does not take away the
problem that they might behave as I(2) processes in the small sample under investigation. Ho
and SÆrensen (1994) show that Johansen’s estimation procedure performs badly in the
presence of near-I(2) variables. The Engle-Granger methodology in contrast does not suffer
from this kind of anomaly.
Given the problems identified above, we revise the production function approach for Belgium
and check for cointegration using the single-equation Engle-Granger cointegration
methodology. A serious problem concerning the estimation of (2.8) is that technology (at) is
not directly measurable. For reasons outlined above, we cannot proxy this process by a linear
trend, as was originally proposed by Aschauer. Instead, we use patent statistics as an
approximation. Since patent data are readily available, related to inventive activity and based
on objective standards, they have been used extensively to get some intuition on the
underlying rate of technological change (see e.g. Griliches, 1990; or Verspagen, 1996).
                                                                
5 Nelson and Kang (1981) show that a “linearly detrended random walk is likely to exhibit spurious
periodicity”.
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Following a large body of research we opt for patents granted by the US Patent and
Trademark Office. The large outlet and objective standards used by this office are generally
thought to enhance the economic relevance of the data. Instead of using data on patenting to
Belgian firms only, we withhold patents granted to both domestic and foreign firms.
Underlying this choice are the ideas that (i) total patenting better reflects the world’s total
knowledge stock (Griliches, 1990) and (ii) that all economies, especially those very open to
international trade, have to a large degree access to this world knowledge pool (see e.g.
Mankiw, 1995; Coe and Helpman, 1995).
Data on the total number of granted patents are accumulated into stock data by applying a
perpetual inventory method with a quasi-logistic mortality function, assuming a fixed average
lifetime. Based on the statutory period for which a patent is granted, our first guess is to fix
the average patent lifetime at 18 years, p(18). Since a lot of patents may be scrapped before
they reach this age, we have constructed two alternative patent stock series. The first, p(18s),
continues to use a patent lifetime of 18 years but fits a right-skewed mortality function. This
imposes the restriction that a larger fraction of the patents are discarded before the expiring of
the patent grant. The second, p(10), reduces the average lifetime to 10 years.
Figure 1 provides some intuition about the possible relationship between multifactor
productivity and the three alternative patent stock measures. Especially p(18) seems to be a
relevant proxy for the rate of technological progress. A less strong relationship emerges for
the other two proxies.
It must be acknowledged though that the use of patent statistics as a proxy for the aggregate
stock of knowledge is not beyond dispute. In a recent survey article Keely and Quah (1998)
are highly critical. First, a significant fraction of research, e.g. research by academic and
government scientists, is not driven by the incentive to patent innovations for appropriating
rent. Second, patents are not the only form of appropriation (and thus not always necessary).
Alternative forms are e.g. secrecy, lead time and movement down the learning curve. Third,
there is no clear relation between the number of patents and their relevance for aggregate
production. Many patents are essentially worthless, they are never cited. Also, countries may
lack the ability to use the technology that has been developed internationally.
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Figure 1 The dynamics of the patent stock and multifactor productivity
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Alternative proxies for knowledge in the production function are (foreign and domestic) R&D
capital stocks. For example, Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister
(1997) use these variables in empirical analyses of the evolution of multifactor productivity in
OECD and developing countries respectively. R&D capital stocks may correct for the second
shortcoming of patent statistics and if public sector R&D is included also for the first6.
Further, domestic R&D may be a good indicator for a country’s ability to adapt (world-wide)
technology.
Our motivation to use patents, granted to both Belgian and foreign firms, rather than R&D
capital stocks is triple. First, R&D data availability is limited. To the best of our knowledge
no data are available for the 1950s and early 1960s. For many countries, e.g. Belgium, data
are available only since the 1970s (see also Coe and Helpman, 1995). Using R&D capital
stocks would thus seriously shorten our sample period. Second, although R&D data might be
preferable from a theoretical point of view, an empirical test discussed in appendix B suggests
that the patent stock p(18) is in the long-run related to the ‘world’ R&D capital stock. Third,
since Belgium is a very open economy with a highly educated workforce, it is undoubtedly
allowed to assume that the country - as such - is able to adapt world-wide technology. There
                                                                
6 Note though that the data used in many studies, e.g. Coe et al. (1995, 1997) only concern business sector
R&D.
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is as a consequence no need to include the domestic R&D capital stock as an explanatory
variable.
Assuming that patent statistics are proportional to the true technological process, we obtain
the following empirical specification:
( )( )mfp p e g e s k s lt p t g t g k t l t t= + + - - + +b b g m0 1 (3.1)
with p denoting the natural logarithm of the stock of patents.
Note that equation (3.1) does not allow the coefficients on kt and lt to be estimated freely.
Rather, both variables have been combined into one private sector input variable. This
approach, also applied by Ford and Poret (1991a), has been criticised for imposing theoretical
restrictions that are not tested for (see e.g. Sturm et al., 1997). However, the imposed
restriction is motivated from technical rather than economic considerations. An important
shortcoming of the Engle-Granger methodology is that it can only handle a single
cointegrating vector. However, in considering a five-dimensional system, which would be the
case if we included private sector inputs separately, the number of cointegrating relationships
may be up to four. The Engle-Granger methodology is then no longer valid 7. Therefore, we
have tried to restrict the dimension of the system as much as possible8.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1. Engle-Granger cointegration
Table 1 reports the results from using the Engle-Granger cointegration methodology. In order
to check the relevance of patent statistics as a proxy for technological progress, we first
estimate our model under four alternative specifications of the Cobb-Douglas production
                                                                
7 An alternative approach that deals with this problem is the Johansen cointegration technique (Johansen,
1988), which allows for multiple cointegrating vectors. However, if multiple cointegrating vectors are found,
one isolated equilibrium relationship does not necessarily have a direct economic interpretation for it is no
longer uniquely identified. In this case, economic theory has to be imposed in order to identify the
cointegrating space. Since these exactly identifying restrictions cannot be tested for, this approach also
implies imposing economic theory that cannot be tested for.
8 Tentative estimations based on the unrestricted model indeed yielded estimates that did not allow a
straightforward economic interpretation, raising our suspicion about the ability of the Engle-Granger
methodology to identify a production function in the larger system.
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function (regressions (1)-(4)). The estimation method is non-linear least squares (NLLS).
Simply regressing productivity on the bundle of private sector inputs and public capital
(regression (1)) yields a clear example of the spurious regression problem. Although we
obtain highly significant estimates, the residuals from the cointegrating regression are clearly
non-stationary, invalidating the NLLS results.
Table 1 The productivity effect of public capital in Belgium (1953-96) a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  Dependent var. mfpt mfpt mfpt mfpt mfpt mfpt
  constant 1.44 1.57 1.85 2.41 1.18 1.80
(3.60) (5.05) (5.94) (6.17) (8.27) (7.27)
  bp(18) 0.52 0.45 0.62
(5.29) (5.26) (11.50)
  bp(18s) 0.33
(5.58)
  bp(10) 0.22
(4.57)
  eg 0.54 0.31 0.44 0.56 0.30 0.29
(11.52) (5.63) (10.87) (14.49) (5.41) (5.49)
  g 1.29 0.47 0.62 0.46 1.00r 0.00r
(4.80) (1.26) (2.52) (1.94) - -
Adj. R2 0.988 0.993 0.993 0.992 0.993 0.993
DW b 0.37 0.81 0.80 0.70 0.73 0.85
Cointegration tests DF DF DF DF DF DF
t-statistic c -2.18 -4.05 -3.31 -2.87 -3.54 -4.34
5% critical values -3.94 -4.36 -4.36 -4.36 -3.94 -3.94
10% critical values -3.60 -4.05 -4.05 -4.05 -3.60 -3.60
Testing constant returns to scale in regression (2)
g=0 g=1
t-statistic 1.26 -1.41
Bootstrapped critical values 5% 2.07 -1.47
10% 1.64 -1.03
Bootstrapped value of g 0.40 1.20
Notes: a t-statistics in parentheses.
b DW denotes the Durbin-Watson d-statistic.
c critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1991).
r restricted coefficients.
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The results improve significantly when the patent stock, based on a lifetime of 18 years,
p(18), is added as an additional explanatory variable (regression (2)). The residuals are found
to be stationary at the 10% level of significance, giving weak evidence in favour of a
cointegrating relationship. Both the patent stock constructed by fitting a right-skewed
mortality function (regression (3)) and the one based on a lifetime of 10 years (regression (4))
yield spurious results. We therefore opt to work with p(18).
As a further step in analysing the impact of public capital on private sector performance, we
test whether constant returns to scale prevail over all inputs (g=0) or over private sector inputs
(g=1) only. Unfortunately, the point estimate of 0.47 for g in regression (2) does not allow us
to discriminate between the two alternative specifications as 0.47 is not significantly different
from zero (tg=0 = 1.26) nor from one (tg=1 = -1.41).
Note that the standard critical values from the t-distribution are derived from asymptotic
theory, which might be invalidated in the small sample currently at hand. In order to
investigate the small sample properties of the t-statistic, we bootstrapped cointegrated
regression (2) following a procedure proposed by Maddala and Kim (1998). This procedure
amounts to generating 10  000 mfp series - using an error resampling method - under the
hypothesis that g=0. In each replication, we estimate regression (3.1) based on the generated
series and calculate the t-statistic for g=0. Ordering the obtained t-statistics results in the small
sample distribution of g=0 relevant to the data set used. The same procedure is repeated for
the hypothesis g=1. The critical values for a one-sided test for g=0 against g>0 and g=1 against
g<1 obtained from this bootstrapping procedure are reported at the bottom of table 1. The
hypothesis of constant returns to scale to all inputs (g=0) can clearly not be rejected while
constant returns to private sector inputs (g=1) can be rejected at about the 6% level of
significance. The reason why the asymptotic distribution does not allow for a straightforward
discrimination between the two alternative hypotheses can be found in the small sample bias
of the estimate for g. Even with g=0 imposed in generating mfp series, the median value of g
from the bootstrapped sample equals 0.40 (see table 1). Note that this value is remarkably
close to our estimate of g in regression (2). A similar - although smaller - upward bias is found
under the hypothesis that g=1.
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As a final check, the model is estimated under both alternative restrictions. Imposing constant
returns to private inputs (regression (5)) yields spurious results, i.e. the NLLS results are
invalidated since the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. Imposing
constant returns to all inputs in contrast (regression (6)) gives strong evidence in favour of a
positive cointegrating relationship between multifactor productivity and public capital. A unit
root in the residuals can now be rejected well below the 5% level of significance. The
estimated output elasticity of public capital equals 0.29 and is highly significant.9 The average
rate of return10 from public capital investment implied by regression (6) lies around 27%.
Although this estimate is still higher than the values usually obtained for the return to private
sector investments, it is clearly more plausible than the estimates obtained by Aschauer
(1989a) and Munnell (1990a).
4.2. Robustness of the results
Underlying regressions (1)-(2) in table 2 is the Phillips-Hansen (1990) fully-modified least
squares estimation procedure, which is explicitly designed to correct for the joint dependence
between aggregate time series. As argued by Hulten and Schwab (1993), the fact that a
production function is likely to be part of a larger system in which both input and output
variables are endogenously determined makes the results from single-equation regressions
potentially liable to simultaneous equation bias. The Phillips-Hansen estimation procedure
deals with this kind of bias through semi-parametric corrections for serial correlation and
endogeneity, yielding asymptotically median-unbiased estimators (Phillips and Hansen,
1990). As shown in table 2, the results from implementing this procedure are highly similar to
the results from the Engle-Granger methodology, suggesting that there is no significant
simultaneous equation bias.
Regressions (3)-(6) in table 2 follow from using revised estimates of the public capital stock.
These estimates implement some small changes to the assumptions underlying the perpetual
inventory method used by the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau.  In most cases, the outcome of
                                                                
9 The results from bootstrapping regression (6) to obtain the small sample distribution of eg=0 are not reported
for (i) no small sample bias was detected and (ii) the small sample critical values were found to be somewhat
lower compared to the asymptotic ones, leaving the conclusions from table 1 unaffected.
10 If the rate of return to public capital is set equal to its marginal product, it can be calculated as
¶ ¶    Y G e Y Gg= .
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Table 2 Productivity effect of public capital in Belgium, robustness tests (1953-
96)a
Phillips-Hansen
procedureb
Longer lifetime of
public assets
Shorter lifetime of
public assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  Dependent var. mfpt mfpt mfpt mfpt mfpt mfpt
  constant 1.71 1.88 1.58 1.75 1.46 1.35
(6.18) (7.04) (4.83) (6.94) (5.42) (9.75)
  bp(18) 0.65 0.61 0.57 0.63 0.41 0.38
(7.25) (10.38) (5.82) (11.57) (4.17) (4.85)
  eg 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.34
(5.48) (5.19) (5.20) (5.19) (6.74) (6.80)
  g -0.02 0.00r 0.33 0.00r 0.84 1.00r
(-0.05) - (0.81) - (2.61) -
Adj. R2 0.994 0.994 0.993 0.993 0.994 0.994
DWc 0.99 1.00 0.79 0.82 0.89 0.86
Cointegration tests DF DF DF DF DF DF
t-statistic d -3.72 -3.97 -4.01 -4.24 -4.15 -4.00
5% critical values -4.36 -3.94 -4.36 -3.94 -4.36 -3.94
10% critical values -4.05 -3.60 -4.05 -3.60 -4.05 -3.60
Notes: a t-statistics in parentheses.
b the truncated lag is set equal to 3. The results are insensitive to alternative lag values.
c DW denotes the Durbin-Watson d-statistic.
d critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1991).
r restricted coefficients.
such an inventory method is very sensitive to the choice of the period during which assets are
kept in the capital stock. This choice concerns two assumptions: one about the average service
life of assets and one about the distribution of liquidations around this average. Usually, the
latter problem is adequately tackled by simulating retirement patterns based on some kind of
mortality function. In Belgium, retirement distributions are compiled using a quasi-logistic
bell-shaped mortality function. Fitting alternative, equally plausible mortality functions 11
leads to highly similar results (not reported). In contrast, the size of the public capital stock is
found to be very sensitive to alternative specifications of average service lives. Unfortunately,
reliable information on this matter is hardly available (OECD, 1993). A simple comparison of
                                                                
11 Plausible alternatives are delayed-linear retirement, simultaneous exit and a wide range of bell-shaped
mortality functions. Linear retirement and declining-balance functions suffer some important drawbacks and
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service lives used in a number of OECD countries (see e.g. OECD, 1993) reveals a
considerable variability, raising doubts about the reliability of the assumed lifetimes.
Therefore, we construct two new public capital stock series. Regressions (3)-(4) are derived
from assuming longer service lives, while regressions (5)-(6) are based on a shorter average
lifetime. The results are found to be fairly insensitive to these alternative specifications. Only
in the case of shorter asset lifetimes, the output elasticity of public capital is somewhat higher.
Note that, again using bootstrapped small sample distributions 12, the estimates of g still point
to constant returns to all inputs in regression (3) (tg=0 = 0.81; tg=1 = -1.64) but to constant
returns to private sector inputs in regression (5) (tg=0 = 2.61; tg=1 = -0.50). Regressions (4) and
(6) are therefore estimated under the restrictions g=0 and g=1 respectively.
4.3. Causality tests from error-correction models
The most recurrent criticism states that the results from estimating a single-equation
production function in no way guarantee causality to run from public investment to private
sector productivity. In fact, the direction of causality might very well run the other way
around, i.e. reverse causation (Eisner, 1991; Tatom, 1991). Public capital is argued to be a
normal good, giving rise to the expectation that the public capital stock increases with society
growing wealthier, i.e. with increasing multifactor productivity (Hurst, 1994). Alternatively,
the levelling off in productivity growth implies a reduction in GDP growth, which in its turn
negatively affects the budgetary position. To the extent that fiscal contraction is called for,
public investment might by the first victim, reflecting “the political reality that it is easier to
cut back or postpone investment spending than it is to cut current expenditures.” (Oxley and
Martin, 1991).
Performing a standard Granger causality test, Tatom (1993) indeed finds evidence that
multifactor productivity growth uni-directionally causes public capital formation in the US.
Granger causality tests try to detect the direction of causality between variables based on the
analysis of lead-lag relationships. This boils down to estimating a vector autoregression
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
should therefore not be used (see e.g. OECD, 1993).
12 The critical values from bootstrapping regressions (3) and (5) in table 2 are highly similar to the ones
reported in table 1 and are therefore not repeated here.
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(VAR) and testing whether lags of one variable enter significantly into the equation for the
current value of the other.
The issue is somewhat more complicated in a cointegrating framework, though. Although
there exists a long-run equilibrium, the system does not need to be in equilibrium at any
instant of time, i.e. in the short-run there may be disequilibrium as measured by the error term
from equation (3.1). The Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987) states
that the fact that a set of variables is cointegrated implies that there must exist a valid error-
correction mechanism that drives the variables back to equilibrium. A simple version of such
an error-correction model (ECM) is given by:
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(4.1)
Besides pure innovations and autoregressive components, the short-run dynamics of at least
one of the variables is influenced by deviations from long-run equilibrium ( $mt -1). In this
context, a11 and a21 can be interpreted as speed of adjustment parameters. Large values of
these adjustment parameters imply high responsiveness to equilibrium errors.
Since at least one of the adjustment parameters must significantly differ from zero when
variables are cointegrated, the standard Granger causality test is inappropriate to conduct
causality tests for it omits an important part of the true data generating process. Even more
important to note is that the error-correction representation allows for causality between
public capital and multifactor productivity resulting from their long-run equilibrium
relationship. Causality will run from public capital to multifactor productivity if a11 is
significantly different from zero. In this case, part of the change in multifactor productivity is
generated by the need to move into alignment with the trend in public capital, as implied by
the cointegrating relationship. Clearly, such a causality relationship cannot be detected by the
standard Granger test procedure.
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Table 3 reports the results of causality tests based on estimates of an error-correction model.
A lag structure of one13 was found to be optimal in all specifications. Regressions (1)-(2) take
the residuals from regression (6) in table 1 as equilibrium errors. Regressions (3)-(4) are
based on regression (2) from table 2, which implements the Phillips-Hansen estimation
procedure. Regressions (5)-(6) finally, are based on regression (6) from table 2, which was
derived using a shorter average lifetime of public assets.
Table 3 Causality tests from error-correction specifications (1953-1996) a
From Engle-
Granger procedure
From Phillips-
Hansen procedure
Assuming a shorter
public asset lifetime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. D mfpt D gt D mfpt D gt D mfpt D gt
constant -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00
(-2.43) (-0.85) (-2.39) (-0.96) (-2.54) (-0.99)
$m t -1 -0.67 -0.08 -0.66 -0.09 -0.76 -0.09
(-3.90) (-1.62) (-3.97) (-1.99) (-4.31) (-1.62)
D mfpt-1 -0.10 -0.03 -0.11 -0.03 -0.08 -0.04
(-0.62) (-0.76) (-0.67) (-0.68) (-0.49) (-0.83)
D g t-1 1.06 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.07 1.02
(4.09) (14.53) (3.90) (14.74) (4.97) (15.09)
D p(18)t-1 -0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.13 0.04
(-0.29) (0.75) (-0.11) (0.85) (-0.67) (0.67)
D (skkt-1+sllt-1) 0.79 0.08 0.75 0.09 0.67 0.09
(2.29) (0.84) (2.22) (0.96) (2.12) (0.85)
Adj. R2 0.42 0.91 0.42 0.91 0.46 0.91
DWb 2.10 1.85 2.11 1.92 2.09 1.88
Notes: a t-statistics in parentheses.
b DW denotes the Durbin-Watson d-statistic.
The results clearly show that the critique of reverse causation does not hold within the
cointegrating framework. Causality from public capital to multifactor productivity derives
from both the adjustment towards long-run equilibrium and short-run dynamics in all
specifications. Multifactor productivity is found not to cause public capital.
                                                                
13 The lag structure was determined starting we a maximum lag length of 4. Lags were then eliminated using F-
tests and system specification tests.
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5. CONCLUSION
This paper analyses the impact of public capital on private sector productivity in Belgium
over the period 1953-1996. Three important problems have been addressed. First, given the
stochastic non-stationary behaviour of the variables traditionally included in the analysis, the
estimates are based on cointegration techniques. Second, technology is not simply taken to
follow some deterministic trend. Instead, an alternative proxy is constructed by applying a
perpetual inventory method to the total number of patents granted by the US Patent and
Trademark Office. Third, the direction of causality is tested for by using an error-correction
model. In contrast to standard Granger causality tests, this approach allows for causality
resulting from the estimated long-run equilibrium.
The estimates reveal a significant positive relationship between public capital and private
sector productivity. The estimated output elasticity of capital lies around 0.29. In our ‘best’
specification, the results point to a cointegrating relationship. The results are shown to be
fairly insensitive to corrections for a possible endogeneity bias and to small changes in the
assumptions underlying the construction of public capital stock data. Moreover, the results
from estimating an error-correction model show that causality runs from public capital to
multifactor productivity.
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APPENDIX A: UNIT ROOT TESTS
We test for the order of integration of the variables by means of two alternative testing
procedures, i.e. augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and Kwiatkowski et al (KPPS) tests.
The first test takes a unit root as the null hypothesis, the second has (trend-) stationarity as the
relevant null hypothesis.
Table 4 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test (1953-96)a
Series ttb tmc Series ttb tmc
mfp p=0 -0.16 -2.23 D mfp p=0 -6.83* -6.20*
g p=1 -1.18 -2.63 D g p=0 -1.63 -0.33
(skkt+sllt) p=1 -2.28 -0.52 D (skkt+sllt) p=0 -3.71* -3.75*
p18 p=2 -2.70 -2.04 D p18 p=0 -2.64 -2.60
p18s p=2 -2.64 -2.57 D p18s p=0 -2.52 -2.44
p10 p=1 -2.82 -1.40 D p10 p=0 -2.25 -2.23
gi p=0 -1.00 -1.90 D gi p=0 -5.76* -5.15*
pi p=0 -3.06 -1.38 D pi p=0 -8.87* -8.97*
Notes: a The lag length is denoted by p.
b Based on regression D Dx x x tt t i t i t
i
= + + + +- -åa q b g e   1 . The MacKinnon critical values for the
rejection of a unit root equal -3.52 and -3.19 at the 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively.
c Based on regression D Dx x xt t i t i t
i
= + + +- -åa q b e 1 . The MacKinnon critical values equal -
2.93 and -2.60 at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.
* Significant at the 5% level.
The results14 from running ADF tests clearly point to the presence of a unit root in the levels
of all variables (see the upper part of table 4). First-differencing the series removes the non-
stationary components in the case of multifactor productivity and the bundle of private sector
factors of production. However, the public capital stock and patent stock measures appear to
remain non-stationary after taking first-differences15.
                                                                
14 In order to pin down the appropriate number of lagged differences, we started with a relatively long lag
length and then used traditional t-tests and/or F-tests to assess whether lags could be omitted. After having
selected a tentative specification, additional tests to check for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity were
conducted.
15 Since standard ADF unit root tests are based on the assumption of at most a single unit root, one should in
fact start with testing the null hypothesis of a unit root in the first-differences (I(2)-ness in levels), conditional
on the fact that the series is at least I(1) in levels. If the null hypothesis is rejected the next step should be to
test for I(1)-ness with I(0) as the alternative (Dickey and Pantula, 1987). This means that in order to be
theoretically correct, table 4 should be read from the right to the left.
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The finding of different orders of integration, i.e. I(1) and I(2), seems to rule out the
possibility of cointegration between some of the variables. However, the results from the
ADF unit root tests should not necessarily be taken for granted. Capital stock data are
constructed based on a perpetual inventory method, implying:
x s It i t i
i
m
= -
=
å
0
(A.1)
with xt denoting a capital stock measure, si the share of assets installed in period t-i that are
still productive at time t, It-i the investments in period t-i and m the maximum lifetime of the
asset. Backward substitution yields:
x I s x xt t t i t i
i
= + +- -
=
¥
å1 1
2
F (A.2)
with Fi being some complex function of s, constituting the parameters of a stable
autoregressive process. Equation (A.2) shows that the process generating capital stock series
equals the sum of a stationary auto-regressive (AR) process and the process generating
investments. The bottom part of table 4 provides clear evidence that public sector investment
(gi) and the number of granted patents (pi) are both I(1), i.e. first-differences are stationary.
This ‘proofs’ that the processes generating public capital and patent stock measures should be
I(1) as well16.
A possible reason why non-stationarity of the first-differences of some of the variables cannot
be rejected can be seen from rewriting equation (A.1). Assuming that It is generated by a unit
root process:
I I et t t= +-1 , (A.3)
it follows from (A.1) that:
x x s et t i t i
i
m
= +- -
=
å1
0
. (A.4)
Equation (A.4) shows that the data-generating process of capital stock data contains important
moving average (MA) components, potentially causing a bias in the results reported above.
Since any MA model with an invertible polynomial can be represented by an infinite AR
                                                                
16 For a similar argument, considering the process generating the change in the private sector capital stock, see
Ford and Poret (1991b).
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model, the ADF test can easily be extended to allow for such processes17. However, including
a long lag length may seriously reduce the power of the test. A useful alternative in this case
is the Phillips-Perron test. Rather than including lagged differences, Phillips and Perron
(1988) allow serially correlated and heteroscedastic errors but adjust Dickey-Fuller t-statistics
based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (Newey-West) standard errors. The
main advantage of this procedure is that it does not require the estimation of additional
autoregressive parameters, which consumes a larger number of degrees of freedom. The
results (not reported) are however not fundamentally different from the ADF tests.
An important shortcoming of ADF and Phillips-Perron tests is that a unit root is taken to be
the null hypothesis. Since both tests generally have low power against possible alternatives, a
unit root is only rejected if there is considerable evidence against it. Kwiatkowski et al.
(1992) have developed an alternative test which takes (trend-) stationarity as the null
hypothesis. The idea is to express a series as the sum of a deterministic trend, a random walk
and a stationary error term. The null hypothesis can be rejected if the variance of the random
walk component is significantly different from zero. In order to correct for serial correlation
in the error terms, Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) proceed along the lines suggested by Phillips
and Perron (1990).
Table 5 reports the results of the KPSS test under two alternative null hypotheses, i.e.
stationarity around a linear trend and level-stationarity. Following Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)
we consider values of q (needed in the calculation of Newey-West standard errors) up to
eight, which is a compromise between size and power of the test18. The upper part of table 5
clearly shows that none of the variables is stationary in levels. With a lag truncation parameter
set equal to four, we can also reject the null hypothesis of trend-stationarity at the 5% level of
significance for all variables except the bundle of private sector factors of production for
which trend-stationarity can only be rejected at the 10% level. For higher values of q, the
evidence in favour of a unit root is weaker. Given the low power of the test for high values of
q, it seems not unreasonable to use a significance level higher than the usual 5%, though. The
lower part of table 5 provides evidence that the first-differences of all variables are trend or
                                                                
17 In a finite sample, an AR(¥) can be approximated by an AR(n) model with n appropriately large.
18 In a sample of about 50 observations, the test has reasonable power for q=4, while in order for the test to
have more or less correct size, q should be raised to about 12.
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level stationary. Only for the differences of the public capital stock, this evidence is weak, i.e.
level-stationarity is only rejected in specifications with q larger than 4.
Table 5 Kwiatkowski et al. unit root test (1953-96)
H0 = Trend-stationarity a H0 = Level-stationarity b
Lag Truncation parameter Lag Truncation parameter
0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8
mfp 0.95* 0.35* 0.23* 0.18* 0.15* mfp 4.29* 1.51* 0.95* 0.71* 0.58*
g 0.89* 0.32* 0.21* 0.17* 0.14 g 4.40* 1.54* 0.97* 0.72* 0.59*
(skkt+sllt) 0.47* 0.17* 0.12 0.10 0.09 (skkt+sllt) 4.27* 1.52* 0.97* 0.73* 0.61*
p18 0.89* 0.31* 0.20* 0.15* 0.13 p18 4.28* 1.50* 0.94* 0.71* 0.58*
p18s 0.96* 0.33* 0.21* 0.16* 0.14 p18s 4.11* 1.46* 0.92* 0.70* 0.58*
p10 0.77* 0.27* 0.18* 0.14 0.13 p10 3.81* 1.38* 0.90* 0.69* 0.58*
D mfp 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 D mfp 0.64* 0.53* 0.43 0.38 0.34
D g 0.93* 0.34* 0.22* 0.18* 0.15* D g 2.18* 0.78* 0.50* 0.38 0.32
D (skkt+sllt) 0.15* 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 D (skkt+sllt) 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08
D p18 0.48* 0.20* 0.14 0.12 0.11 D p18 0.52* 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.10
D p18s 0.40* 0.17* 0.12 0.10 0.10 D p18s 0.51* 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.12
D p10 0.42* 0.18* 0.13 0.11 0.11 D p10 0.59* 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.14
Notes: a Asymptotic critical values at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance are respectively equal to
0.119, 0.146 and 0.176 (see Kwiatkowski et al., 1992).
b Asymptotic critical values at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance are respectively equal to
0.347, 0.463 and 0.574 (see Kwiatkowski et al., 1992).
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APPENDIX B: RELATION BETWEEN PATENT AND R&D CAPITAL STOCKS
Without the ambition to provide a thorough analysis of the relationship between R&D and
patents, we show that our patent stock variable p(18) is strongly correlated with the ‘world’
R&D capital stock. The latter variable, rd(w), is calculated as the natural logarithm of the sum
of business sector and government R&D capital stocks of the US, Germany, France, the UK
and Japan. R&D capital stocks are calculated from R&D expenditure data (Source: OECD’s
Basic Science and Technology Statistics) following the methodology of Coe and Helpman
(1995). Data on R&D expenditures are available for all five countries from 1970 onward. The
relationship between the two measures of technological progress is estimated using
cointegration analysis. Instead of the commonly used two-step (Engle-Granger, 1987)
procedure, which relies on low power DF unit root tests, we use the single-step procedure that
checks for cointegration based on the t-ratio of the error-correction term in a conditional
error-correction model. This single-step procedure has been shown to be much more efficient
(see e.g. Kremers et al., 1992). Especially in the small sample under investigation (1970-
1995), this might be an important advantage over the two-step procedure.
Estimating an ECM(1) yields the following results (with t-values in parentheses),
( ) ( )( ) ( )D D Dp p rd w p rd wt t t t t18 0 92 0 29 18 0 0 08 18 1141 1 1 1= - - + -- - - -. . .44 ( ) . . ( ) (B.1)
(4.66) (-4.85) (25.34) (0.47) (-3.75)
R²=0.87  DW=2.23
The t-value (-4.85) of the error-correction term is highly significant, pointing to a
cointegrating relationship between our patent stock variable and the ‘world’ R&D capital
stock.
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Balanced growth and public capital
- An empirical analysis with I(2)-trends in capital stock data -
GERDIE EVERAERT*
August 2000
ABSTRACT: In the large literature that tries to estimate the contribution of public capital formation
to economic growth, two potentially serious problems have remained largely
unaccounted for. First, technological progress, which is one of the most important
determinants of long-run growth, is mostly ignored or improperly modelled. Second,
due to slow capital accumulation, the capital stock series usually included in the
empirical analysis often exhibit I(2)-components, implying the conditions underlying
the standard cointegrated VAR methodology to be unsatisfied. This paper uses the
long-run growth properties of the neoclassical model to identify the rate of
technological growth as a common stochastic trend in the data. The I(2)-trends in
capital stocks are being used to model the medium-term adjustment path towards the
long-run steady-state of output which is determined by private and public investment
behaviour. Using Belgian data for the period 1953-96, the analysis supports
Aschauer’s hypothesis that the decline in public capital investment has lowered the
balanced growth path of real output. In contrast to Aschauer’s results, the output
elasticity of public capital is found to be only a fraction 0.4 of the output elasticity of
private capital.
KEYWORDS: Public capital, economic growth, cointegration, I(2).
1. INTRODUCTION
In a series of influential papers Aschauer (1989a, 1989b, 1989c) shows that the decline in
public capital observed in a major part of the OECD countries since the early 1970s may be,
to a large extent, responsible for the slowdown of productivity growth, which set in at about
the same time. Expanding the conventional aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function with
the public capital stock, Aschauer provides empirical evidence that a 1% decrease in the ratio
of public to private capital decreases US multifactor productivity by 0.39%.
In the large literature that sprung from Aschauer’s work, a lot of possible defects in the initial
methodology have been identified. One major problem emerges from the fact that all
variables included in the production function show stochastic non-stationary behaviour. The
finding of a unit root makes Aschauer’s results, derived using level data, suspicious due to
possible spurious correlation (see e.g. Tatom, 1991).
                                                                
* I’m grateful to Anders Vredin, Freddy Heylen, Glenn Rayp, Rudi Vander Vennet and the participants at the
‘VVE-dag 1999’ (Ghent University, March 31, 1999) for useful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts
of this paper. Remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author.
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In trying to deal with this kind of non-stationarity, some authors have proceeded to check for
cointegration in the production function estimates using the residual-based ADF method in
the sense of Engle and Granger (1987) or the maximum likelihood estimation procedure
developed by Johansen (1988). Unfortunately, the results point in opposite directions. On the
one hand, Tatom (1991) finds no evidence of cointegration in the US. Sturm and de Haan
(1995) come to the same conclusion for both the US and the Netherlands. On the other hand,
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993) find a clear cointegrating relationship in Spain.
Applying the Johansen technique on data for the US, the UK, France and Germany, Clarida
(1993) also finds a strong impact of public capital on multifactor productivity.
One problem that has been unremittingly ignored in all these studies is the treatment of the
underlying rate of technological progress, which is an important determinant of economic
growth. In fact, from the neoclassical growth model we learn that the per capita growth rates
of output and capital are exclusively determined by the rate of technological progress once the
economy has reached its balanced growth path. Therefore, direct estimation in a cointegration
framework of a production function omitting technology yields coefficients that cannot be
interpreted as output elasticities, i.e. the coefficients on capital stocks will be biased upwards
for in the long-run capital and output grow at more or less the same rate.
Note that this remark is closely related to the critique that the strong result reported by
Aschauer might be caused by reverse causation. This argument relies on the assumption that
public investment is an endogenous variable, i.e. the public capital stock grows with
increasing output. To the extent that technological shocks are first reflected in higher
economic growth, which in its turn affects the accumulation of factors of production, omitting
technological growth may indeed induce an important reverse causation problem, reflected in
an upward bias on the coefficient of public capital.
The reason why technological progress is easily omitted is that it is not a directly measurable
variable. Some authors, e.g. Sturm and de Haan (1995), try to capture technological progress
by including a linear trend in the production function. However, this implies that
technological progress is modelled as a purely deterministic process, which is clearly in
contradiction with the results from unit root tests, indicating a stochastic rather than a linear
long-run trend in output. In an attempt to deal with this problem, Everaert and Heylen (2000)
use patent statistics – cumulated into a stock variable - as an approximation. Including this
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measure, they find a cointegrating relationship between output, private factors of production
and public capital with an output elasticity of public capital around 0.29 and causality running
from public capital to output. However, an important defect of this approach is the sensitivity
of the results to the choice - to some extent arbitrary - of patent lifetime that one has to make
to accumulate patent stock data.
Crowder and Himarios (1997) have proposed an alternative approach that relies on the
neoclassical ideas that (i) technological progress determines the long-run growth of output
and capital stocks and (ii) the production function is a ‘period-by-period’ constraint that
describes the short- to medium-term behaviour of the variables. Empirically, the approach
boils down to analysing whether output and capital stocks cointegrate subject to the balanced
growth restrictions from the neoclassical model, i.e. capital/output ratios are stationary
stochastic processes. If the restrictions are valid, the common stochastic trend in the data can
be identified as technological progress. After filtering out this common trend from output and
capital stock series, the production function can be estimated from the stationary data as a
short-run constraint. Applying this methodology to US data, the authors find a strong
confirmation of Aschauer’s result.
Although the feature that technological progress is determined endogenously from the long-
run behaviour of data is very appealing, the approach has a number of drawbacks. A first
potential problem is the implicit assumption that the economy is on - or moves to - a fixed
balanced growth path. Shifts in investment behaviour imply shifts in the steady-state of the
economy, though. If a structural reduction in public investment has indeed occurred, the
public capital/output ratio will fail to be a stationary stochastic process. A second problem –
also present in other studies using cointegrating analysis - is caused by the time series
properties of capital stock data. The smooth adjustment of the capital stock to its steady-state
level implies that the growth rate of the capital stock exhibits non-stationary behaviour in the
relatively small samples usually available. Although the perpetual inventory method used in
their construction implies that capital stock series should be I(1) in theory, it might therefore
be statistically more appropriate to treat them as I(2).
The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the drastic reduction of public investment in
Belgium during the fiscal consolidation episodes of the 1980s and 1990s has reduced the
long-run output capacity of the Belgian economy. We use data for the period 1953-96. The
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analysis is inspired by the methodology proposed by Crowder and Himarios in that the long-
run growth properties of the neoclassical model are being used to identify the rate of
technological growth as a common stochastic trend in the data. The empirical development of
this idea differs in three crucial respects, though. First, instead of trying to test/impose the
restriction that capital/output ratios are stationary stochastic processes, we test a more general
balanced growth relation between output, investments and capital stock growth rates implied
by the neoclassical growth model. Second, the output elasticities do not need to be estimated
from a short-run production function in a second step but can be calculated from the long-run
equilibrium relation. Third, the analysis takes into account the smooth adjustment of capital
stocks series by modelling them as I(2) variables.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the
implications of a simple neoclassical growth model with stochastic technological progress in
terms of cointegrating relations and common trends driving the variables and briefly confronts
these implications with the data. Section 3 outlines the cointegrated VAR methodology both
under the assumption of I(1) and I(2) processes being present in the data vector. Section 4
investigates the integration and cointegration properties of a VAR including output and
capital stock series. Section 5 transforms the system into an I(1) equivalent including output,
investments and capital stock growth rates and discusses its properties. The final section
summarises and outlines some directions for future research.
2. AN ECONOMETRIC REPRESENTATION OF THE NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL
One of the nice features of neoclassical growth models is that they have strong implications
concerning the long-run behaviour of the economy. It is a well-known result that once the
economy has converged to its steady-state growth path, the growth rates of per capita output,
investment, consumption and capital stocks should all be equal to the exogenous rate of
technological progress. This common deterministic trend makes the ‘great ratios’ of
consumption, investment and capital to output constant along the balanced growth path. King
et al. (1991) point out that when uncertainty is added to the long-run behaviour of the
economy - i.e. technological progress has a stochastic rather than a deterministic data
generating process - output, consumption, investment and capital stocks exhibit common
stochastic trends, implying the ‘great ratios’ to become stationary stochastic processes.
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Figure 1 Data in levels and first-differences (Belgium, 1953-96)
Sources: OECD statistical compendium 1998/1 and Belgian Federal Planning Bureau.
Figure 1 plots the logarithms of real output (Y), gross real private capital (K), gross real public
capital (G), real private investment (Ik) and real public investment (Ig). At first sight output
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and capital stocks share a broadly similar upward trend. Investments are clearly more volatile.
The left hand part of figure 2 plots the private capital/output ratio (ln(K)-ln(Y)) and the public
capital/output ratio (ln(G)-ln(Y)). Neither ratio shows strong signs of mean reverting
behaviour. Since the neoclassical growth model only predicts stationarity when the economy
is on its steady-state growth path, this finding should not necessarily be interpreted as a
falsification of the model, though. One possible explanation for the apparent non-stationarity
of capital/output ratios is that the economy has been hit by shocks causing permanent shifts in
the steady-state.
In order to fix ideas about which variables may cause the steady-state to move, this section
first outlines a simple neoclassical growth model with stochastic technological growth. The
implications of this model are then interpreted in terms of cointegrating relations and common
trends driving the variables.
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function, characterised by constant returns
to scale over all inputs and diminishing returns to private and public capital:
( ) baba --= 1tttt ALGKY , 0 < a+b  < 1, a > 0, b  ³ 0, (2.1)
with Y, K and G  as defined above and L and A denoting labour input and labour-augmenting
technological progress, respectively. Uncertainty is introduced by assuming that effective
labour (ALt) is generated by the following logarithmic random walk with drift:
( ) ( ) tAtt ALgAL ,1lnln e++= - . (2.2)
The drift term g determines the average rate of growth in AL1. Temporary deviations from this
average are captured by the error term e t. Given that K and G are generated as:
tktt KIkK d-ºD and tgtt GIgG d-ºD , (2.3)
with dk and dg denoting depreciation rates, it is straightforward to show that for given levels of
investment, the steady-state capital stocks – for which is required that Dln(K/AL) = Dln(G/AL)
= Dln(Y/AL) = 0 - should satisfy2:
( ) ( ) ( )ktt gIkK d+-= lnlnln * and ( ) ( ) ( )gtt gIgG d+-= lnlnln * (2.4)
                                                                
1 For simplicity, the rate of growth in effective labour will be called technological progress in the remainder of
the paper.
2 Steady-state values of variables are indicated with a *.
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Private and public investment are assumed to be generated as:
( ) ( ) ( )ttt YSkIk lnlnln += and ( ) ( ) ( )ttt YSgIg lnlnln += (2.5)
where Sk and Sg denote private and public investment rates, respectively, which are given by
the stochastic processes:
( ) ( ) tSktt SkSk ,1lnln e+= - and ( ) ( ) tSgtt SgSg ,1lnln e+= - (2.6)
Inserting (2.5) in (2.4) shows that in the steady-state the economy should satisfy:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )kttt gSkYK d+-=- lnlnlnln ** and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )gttt gSgYG d+-=- lnlnlnln ** (2.7)
Equation (2.7) shows that shocks to technology (eA,t) have a ‘balanced’ impact on output and
capital stocks, leaving the equilibrium ratios of capital to output unaffected. Possible sources
of a permanent upward (downward) shift in the steady-state capital to output ratio are (i) a
positive (negative) shock to the investment rates (eSk,t and eSg,t) and (ii) a lower (higher)
average growth rate of technology (g). The positive effect of positive shocks to investment
rates on capital/output ratios derives from the model’s assumption of diminishing marginal
products to private and public capital. In this case, higher investment raises output less than it
raises the capital stock. A lower average growth rate of effective labour increases the
equilibrium capital stocks for given level of investments (see equation (2.4)), implying higher
capital/output ratios.
Figure 2 Private and public capital/output ratios and investment rates (Belgium, 1953-96)
Sources: See figure 1.
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Equation (2.7) now allows us to interpret the apparent non-stationary behaviour of
capital/output ratios. During the 1960s, weak upward trends in investment rates (see figure 2,
right hand side) counteract an increase in the average rate of productivity growth, leaving
capital/output ratios more or less constant. In the mid 1970s a significant shift in the steady-
state occurs. Combined with more or less stable investment rates, the productivity slowdown
has induced a strong increase in both the private and the public capital/output ratio. The
further increase in ln(K)-ln(Y) results from a very strong increase in the private sector
investment rate over the period 1984-90. The strong decline in ln(G)-ln(Y) in contrast is
caused by a significant reduction in public investment from the early 1980s onward, caused
mainly by the drastic fiscal consolidation programs of the 1980s and the 1990s.
Due to the shifts in the steady-state of the economy, capital/output ratios clearly fail to be of
any guidance as equilibrium relations in the subsequent cointegrating analysis. Alternatively,
the steady-state level of output ln(Y*) can be expressed as a function of steady-state capital
stocks by substituting out effective labour from the production function (2.1) using the
standard neoclassical growth model’s result that once the economy has converged to its
steady-state growth path, output grows at a rate equal to the rate of growth in effective labour,
i.e. ( ) ( )ALY lnln * -  is constant (w*) along the balanced growth path:
( ) ( ) ( )**** lnln1ln ttt GKY ba
b
ba
a
w
ba
ba
+
+
+
+
+
--
-= (2.8)
Equivalently, steady-state output can be expressed as a function of investments by
substituting out ln(K*) and ln(G*) from (2.4):
( ) ( ) ( )ttt IgIkY lnlnln ** ba
b
ba
a
p
+
+
+
+= (2.9)
with ( ) ( ) ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+
--
++
+
++
+
-= **
1
lnln w
ba
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d
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b
d
ba
a
p gk gg
Equations (2.8) and (2.9) assume that capital stocks are at their steady-state level. Since
capital takes time to accumulate, these equilibrium relations will only hold in the (very) long
run. A medium term equilibrium relation can be derived (see appendix A) as:
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]gG
g
gK
g
YY t
g
t
k
tt -D+
--D
+
-= lnlnlnln *
d
b
d
a
(2.10)
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Equation (2.10) states that the medium term production capacity equals the long-run
production capacity if the economy is on its balanced growth path, i.e. Dln(Kt)=g and
Dln(Gt)=g. If the economy is outside its steady state, the medium-term production capacity
will converge towards the equilibrium with each period’s equilibrium error being proportional
to (Dln(K)-g) and (Dln(G)-g). If the public capital stock for instance is below the steady-state
level implied by the government’s investment behaviour, the growth rate of the public capital
stock will exceed its steady-state growth rate, Dln(Gt)>g, implying ln(Yt)<ln(Y*t).
Notice that – like the capital/output ratios - the long-run and medium-term equilibrium
conditions in (2.9) and (2.10), respectively, fail to be stable cointegrating relations in the
presence of shocks shifting the steady-state of the economy. Both shocks to investment rates,
i.e. eSk,t and eSg,t, and shifts in the average rate of productivity growth imply shifts in the
constant term p*. Anticipating the empirical analysis in section 5, the impact on equilibrium
output of the upward shift in the private investment rate occurring in the 1980s appears to
have been cancelled out by the negative shock to the public investment rate over more or less
the same period, leaving p* unaffected. In fact this implies that eSg,t » - a/b  eSk,t. Shifts in the
average rate of productivity growth will be modelled by allowing for a broken linear trend.
Inspired by the ‘scenario analysis’ introduced in Juselius (1999), the remainder of this section
interprets the implications of the model in terms of cointegrating relations and common trends
driving the variables. Two distinct cases, corresponding to the long-run equilibrium under
(2.8) and the medium-term equilibrium under (2.10) respectively, are considered.
Case 1: Capital stock series are I(1). In the (very) long run, capital stocks converge towards
their steady-state level, implying Dln(Kt) and Dln(Gt) to be stationary processes around a
constant level g. Equation (2.8) shows that in this case, conditional on the fact that w* is
constant, there exists a stable long-run relation between output and capital stocks, i.e. (ln(Yt) -
b1ln(Kt) - b2ln(Gt))~I(0). With three variables and one cointegrating relation, two common
trends are driving the system (see e.g. King et al., 1991). This data generating process can be
represented as:
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The linear growth in the data is accounted for by the trend component t while X0 captures the
constant terms and interventions in the system.
The most obvious interpretation of (2.11) is that the two common trends represent a trend in
technology and a trend in investment. In this case, we expect to find d11=d21=d31=1 and d12=0.
The latter condition states that output does not load on the trend in investments, i.e. the impact
on output of shocks to private and public investment rates have cancelled out to leave output
unaffected. This interpretation of the common trends specification implies that private and
public capital are complements, i.e. a reduction in public investment for instance has no
impact on output as the private sector reacts by increasing its investments. An alternative
possibility is that Sm1i and Sm2i represent independent I(1) trends in private and public
investments, respectively. Equation (2.5) shows that in this case Sm1i and Sm2i are
combinations of technological shocks (eA,t) and shocks to the private (eSk,t) and the public
(eSg,t) investment rate respectively. In this interpretation, shocks to technology must affect
both Sm1i and Sm2i in the same way. The unit long-run impact of technological shocks on
output than implies that d11 + d12 = 1. As output must be unaffected by opposite shocks to
private and public investment rates for (2.8) to be a cointegrating relationship, d11eSk,t should
be equal to -d12eSg,t. This interpretation therefore implies d11=a/(a+b), d12=b/(a+b), d21=d32=1
and d22=d31=0.
Case 2: Capital stock series are I(2). The plots of Dln(Kt) and Dln(Gt) in figure 1 show that
capital stock growth rates are not characterised by strong mean reverting behaviour. This slow
adjustment of capital stocks towards their steady-state levels makes it statistically more
appropriate to treat ln(Kt) and ln(Gt) as I(2)-processes in the relatively short sample under
investigation. In this case, cointegrating analysis is unable to pick up the long-run equilibrium
under (2.8) or (2.9) as a cointegrating relationship. The data generating process can now be
represented as:
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The slow adjustment of capital stocks introduces two I(2) components in the system, i.e.
SSm3i and SSm4i being the I(2) trends in private and public capital stocks respectively. In this
case (ln(Yt) - b1ln(Kt) - b2ln(Gt)) ~ I(2) and (ln(Yt) - b1ln(Ikt) - b2ln(Igt)) ~ I(1). As the two I(2)
components are essentially independent, there is no linear combination of the variables that is
able to ‘kill’ the I(2)-trends. Therefore, capital stocks have to enter the model in first
differences. Substituting ln(Y*) in equation (2.10) from the long-run equilibrium condition in
(2.9) yields a stable (medium-term) cointegrating relationship:
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Important to note here is that investments and capital stocks cannot both enter the model as
endogenous variables for the capital stock can be calculated from its past realisation using
identity (2.3) and the current level of investments. Therefore Dln(K) and Dln(G) enter the
model as exogenous variables.3 Implicitly, this implies that Dln(K) and Dln(G) are assumed to
be two driving trends in the system from the outset.
From equation (2.12), it is clear that the I(1)-trends in Dln(K) and Dln(G), i.e. Sm3i and Sm4i
respectively, capture shocks to investment rates and technology that, due to slow capital
accumulation, are not yet transmitted into output, i.e. we expect to find d13=d14= 0. Therefore,
Sm1i and Sm2i must now be interpreted as the accumulation of shocks that have already been
transmitted in output. As the contemporaneous effect of investments on the capital stock is
very small, shifts in investment rates enter the system mainly through shocks to Dln(K) and
Dln(G). As capital accumulates, Dln(K) and Dln(G) slowly return to the average rate of
productivity growth g, ‘forcing’ Sm1i and Sm2i to accumulate to the long-run I(1)-trends in
investments and output once Dln(K)=Dln(G)=g. Shocks to technology have both a direct and
an indirect effect on output. The direct effect stems from the term (1-a-b)ln(ALt) in the
production function while the indirect effect again results from the slow adjustment of capital
stocks to the new long-run trend in investments. Essentially, the system in (2.12) equals the
long-run structure described in (2.11), augmented with a medium-term adjustment path which
has been modelled by introducing Dln(K) and Dln(G) as additional stochastic trends.
                                                                
3 Equivalently, one can choose to model Dln(K) and Dln(G) endogenously, treating ln(Ik ) and ln(Ig) as
exogenous variables.
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3. COINTEGRATED VAR METHODOLOGY
Our baseline empirical model is a p dimensional VAR of order q:
( )S==
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(3.1)
where Xt is a p´ 1 data vector, Dt contains intervention dummies and m0 is a constant. A
particularly useful methodology for analysing long-run relationships in a system like (3.1) has
been suggested by Johansen (1988) and extended in Johansen and Juselius (1990). They
propose a reparameterization of the VAR under (3.1) in a vector error-correction model
(VECM):
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Since Xt-1 is the only level term in equation (3.2), P is the only matrix that contains
information about the long-run relationships among the variables. Three cases can be
distinguished. First, if P has full rank all variables are stationary. Second, if P=0, all
variables are integrated of order one but they are not cointegrated. Third, if P has reduced
rank r (0<r<p), there exist r independent linear combinations that transform the data from I(1)
to I(0), i.e. there are r cointegrating relationships. In this case, P can be written as the product
of a p´r matrix a and a r´p matrix b’:
'ab=P (3.3)
with b’Xt-1 representing the r cointegrating relationships and a measuring the speed of
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. In a p-dimensional system with r cointegrating
relations, (p-r) common stochastic trends determine the long-run behaviour of the variables.
Since Xt is very likely to contain I(2) variables, a more convenient reparametrization of (3.1)
is (see also Johansen, 1992):
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where .  and 
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jk  The hypothesis that Xt is I(2) consists of two reduced
rank conditions (Johansen, 1992):
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where h and V are (p-r)´s1 matrices and (p-r) > s1. Johansen (1995) shows that as in the I(1)
model, the reduced rank of P implies that there exist r independent linear combinations that
are stationary while the remaining (p-r) relations can only become stationary by differencing.
The crucial difference is that the r stationary combinations can now be decomposed in r0
direct cointegrating vectors and r1 polynomial cointegrating vectors. Direct cointegrating
vectors are linear combinations of the levels of the data that reduce the order of integration
from two all the way down to zero while polynomial cointegrating vectors involve
combinations of the levels of the data that only transform the process from I(2) to I(1) but
cointegrate with linear combinations of the differenced process DXt to achieve an I(0) process.
Direct cointegrating relations can be interpreted as static long-run equilibria while polynomial
cointegrating vectors correspond to dynamic long-run steady-state relations (Juselius, 1999).
The (p-r) non-cointegrating relations can be decomposed in s1 first order and s2 second order
non-stationary relations. If s1=(p-r), ^^ Gba '  is of full rank so that there are no I(2) trends in
the data.
4. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
The heuristic analysis in section 2 suggested that slow capital accumulation might cause the
cointegration analysis to fail picking up equation (2.8) as a stable long-run equilibrium
relationship. In this section this hypothesis is tested more formally by analysing the
integration and cointegration properties of the data vector:
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tt GKYX ln,ln,ln= ,  t = 1953-1996,
using the cointegrated VAR methodology outlined in section 3. The VAR model is estimated
with an unrestricted constant to allow for linear growth in the data and two unrestricted step
dummies to account for possible breaks in this linear growth rate. Given a mild increase in the
average rate of productivity growth (g) in the beginning of the 1960s, the first step dummy
(D60) is specified to be 1 in 1960-1973, 0 otherwise. In order to capture the strong slowdown
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of productivity growth in the mid 1970s, the second dummy (D74) is 1 in 1974-1996, being 0
otherwise.
Specification tests. Prior to the cointegrating analysis, the appropriate order (q) of the VAR
needs to be determined. To do so, the unrestricted VAR under (3.1) was estimated starting
with a relatively long lag-length (q=5) and then applying system specification tests (not
reported) to assess whether lags can be eliminated. The results of these tests point out that a
reduction of the system to q=2 cannot be rejected. To check the statistical adequacy of the
maintained specification, table 1 reports some multivariate and univariate misspecification
tests. The results show that the normality condition of the residuals is not violated with no
clear signs of autocorrelation nor ARCH effects.
Table 1 Specification tests and rank determination
Multivariate diagnostic tests
Residual autocorrelation LM1 c²(9) = 8.17[0.52]
LM4 c²(9) = 4.22[0.90]
Normality LM c²(6) = 3.66[0.72]
Univariate diagnostic tests and descriptive statistics
Ln(Y) Ln(K) Ln(G)
ARCH c²(2) = 0.05[0.98] 1.06[0.59] 0.75[0.69]
Normality (Jarq. Bera) c²(2) = 1.97[0.37] 3.55[0.17] 2.46[0.30]
Skewness -0.390 -0.180 0.050
Excess Kurtosis -0.511 -1.095 0.459
Standard deviation 0.017 0.003 0.003
R² 0.457 0.870 0.940
Cointegrating rank tests
Eigenvalues of the P-matrix 0.614 0.122 0.084
Trace test 49.14 9.19 3.70
Roots of the companion matrix R unrestricted r = 2 r = 1
r1 0.991 1.000 1.000
r2 0.991 0.894 1.000
r3 0.833 0.894 0.855
r4 0.833 0.791 0.787
r5 0.011 0.049 0.031
r6 0.011 0.049 0.031
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Cointegrating and integrating properties. The next step is to determine the number of
cointegrating vectors. If capital stock series have a near I(2) component, we expect to find
(r=0, s1=1, s2=2). The cointegrating rank (r) equals the number of characteristic roots or
eigenvalues of the P-matrix that differ from zero. While the number of unit roots in the P
matrix equals p-r=s1+s2, each I(2) trend produces an additional root in the full model, i.e. the
number of unit roots in the characteristic polynomial of the VAR equals s1+2s2. Therefore, a
comparison of the number of roots of the characteristic polynomial with the number of roots
in the P matrix gives a first indication about whether I(2) components are present in the data
(Juselius, 1997).
Table 1 reports the estimated eigenvalues of the P matrix together with the characteristic
roots of the process for the unrestricted VAR and the VAR under the restrictions r = 2 and 1.
Whatever the value chosen for r, at least one and possibly two large roots remain in the
system. This evidence supports the suggestion in section 2 that the slow adjustment of capital
stocks introduces two I(2) components in the model.
Table 2 Testing the joint hypothesis H(s1,r)
p-r r Q(s1,r) Q(r)
3 0 99.88 44.21 37.30 37.01
70.87 51.35 38.82 29.68
2 1 22.90 12.68 11.58
36.12 22.60 15.41
1 2 11.03 2.51
12.93 3.76
s2 3 2 1 0
Note: critical values are printed in italics.
With possible I(2) trends in the data, a formal test procedure for the joint determination of the
number of cointegrating vectors and the number of I(2) trends among the p-r common trends
can be found in Paruolo (1996). Since in the I(2) specification an unrestricted constant
cumulates twice to obtain quadratic trends in the levels of the series, the constant enters the
empirical model with a zero restriction on the quadratic component. Likewise, an unrestricted
step dummy cumulates twice to obtain a broken quadratic trend in Xt. In order to obtain the
desired broken linear trend, D60 and D74 enter in first differences. The test statistics are
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reported in table 2. The 95% quantiles, taken from Paruolo (1996), are given in italics. Note
that these critical values can only serve as a rough approximation for they were generated for
a model without dummies. Therefore, they are very unlikely to be exact in our case. The
standard test procedure starts reading from the upper left-hand corner of table 2 to the right,
continuing on the subsequent rows until one finds the first clear acceptance. Consistent with
our a priori hypothesis, (r=0, s1=1, s2=2) is the first acceptable case, i.e. the near I(2)
component in capital stock series prevents the cointegration analysis to pick up the long-run
equilibrium condition (2.8) as a stable cointegrating vector.
5. TRANSFORMATION TO AN I(1) MODEL
Given the I(2) component in capital stock series, the model is transformed along the lines
suggested in section 2. The data vector now becomes:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tt GKIgIkYX ln ,ln ,ln ,ln ,ln DD= ,  t = 1953-1996.
Since investments and capital stocks cannot both enter the model endogenously, Dln(K) and
Dln(G) enter the model as exogenous variables. This exogeneity restriction is imposed by
letting Xt be partitioned as Xt=(X1,t, X2,t), with X1,t containing the 3 endogenous variables and
X2,t the 2 exogenous driving trends, i.e.
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tt IgIkYX ln ,ln ,ln,1 = ,
( ) ( )[ ]tt GKX ln ,ln,2 DD= ,
and reformulating the system under (3.2) in a conditional error-correction model:
tttt
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where a1 is a (3´r) matrix of error-correction coefficients and G1,j and W are parameter
matrices of order (3´5) and (3´2) respectively. The VAR model is again estimated with an
unrestricted constant and two unrestricted step dummies (D60, D74).
Specification tests. The results of the system specification tests (not reported) to determine
the appropriate lag length of the VAR point to q=2. The univariate misspecification tests
reported in table 3 show that this specification is statistically acceptable. Moreover, the
considerably higher R²-value of the output equation - compared to the original model in
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section 4 - shows that the transformed model is now much more able to explain the variation
in output.
Table 3 Specification tests and rank determination
Multivariate diagnostic tests
Residual autocorrelation LM1 c²(9) = 6.97[0.64]
LM4 c²(9) = 2.98[0.96]
Normality LM c²(6) = 7.22[0.30]
Univariate diagnostic tests and descriptive statistics
Ln(Y) Ln(Ik) Ln(Ig)
ARCH c²(2) = 1.37[0.50] 0.40[0.82] 2.37[0.31]
Normality (Jarq. Bera) c²(2) = 1.65[0.44] 3.00[0.22] 4.45[0.11]
Skewness 0.374 -0.572 -0.420
Excess Kurtosis 0.201 -0.118 0.937
Standard deviation 0.012 0.005 0.029
R² 0.756 0.993 0.941
Cointegrating rank tests
Eigenvalues of the P-matrix 0.610 0.385 0.114
Trace test 63.44 24.89 4.96
Roots of the companion matrix R unrestricted r = 2 r = 1
r1 1.008 1.000 1.000
r2 0.887 0.969 1.000
r3 0.119 0.136 0.356
r4 0.119 0.136 0.113
r5 -0.009 0.056 0.113
r6 -0.386 -0.330 -0.112
Cointegrating properties. The estimated eigenvalues of the P matrix together with the
characteristic roots of the process for the unrestricted VAR and the VAR under the
restrictions r = 2 and 1 are reported in the bottom of Table 3. The critical values of the trace-
test are not reported as they are not correct in the case of breaks in the deterministic
component of the model. From the analysis in section 2, we expect to find one cointegrating
relationship. The two large roots in the characteristic polynomial on the one hand support this
choice of r=1. The relatively large value of the trace test on the second eigenvalue on the
other hand suggests that there might be two cointegrating relations (r = 2). Under the choice r
= 2 a large root remains present in the system, though. Restricting r = 1 removes all unit roots.
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Consistent with the scenario analysis in section 2, these findings support one cointegrating
vector.
As noted in section 2, the medium-term equilibrium condition in (2.13) fails to be a stable
cointegrating relation in the presence of shocks shifting the steady-state of the economy.
While shifts in the average rate of productivity growth have been modelled by including two
step dummies, the finding of a stable cointegrating relation suggests that the impact on
equilibrium output of the upward shift in the private investment rate - occurring in the 1980s -
has been cancelled out by the negative shock to the public investment rate over more or less
the same period. Modelling intervention dummies at the timing of the shifts in investment
rates did only yield minor improvements and are therefore left out.
Time series properties of the data. Table 4 includes tests that serve as an investigation of the
time series properties of the data and as an exploratory inspection of the role of the variables
in the system under the maintained hypothesis that r = 1. The test for stationarity checks
whether variables are I(0) by testing whether the corresponding unit vector is included in the
cointegrating space. The test is c²-distributed with (p-r) degrees of freedom. The results
indicate that none of the variables is stationary by itself.
Table 4 Time series properties of the data for r = 1
5% cv. ln(Y) ln(Ik) ln(Ig) Dln(K) Dln(G)
Test for stationarity c²(4) 9.49 33.63 34.32 35.51 25.53 32.91
Test for long-run exclusion c²(1) 3.84 18.34 17.81 14.74 12.33 4.42
Test for weak exogeneity c²(1) 3.84 7.25 3.91 5.01 - -
The null hypothesis in the test for long-run exclusion is formulated as a zero row in b ,
implying the absence of a long-run relationship between the variable under consideration and
the remaining variables in the system. The test is c²-distributed with r degrees of freedom.
The test statistics in table 4 show that the null-hypothesis can be rejected for all variables,
meaning that none of the variables can be excluded from the cointegrating space without loss
of information. The significance of Dln(K) and Dln(G) again shows that the slow adjustment
of capital stocks blurs the long-run equilibrium relation between output and investment,
making the cointegrating analysis unable to detect it in the small sample under investigation.
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Finally, the test for long-run weak exogeneity investigates whether a variable does not adjust
to equilibrium errors. The null-hypothesis is formulated as a zero row restriction on a
(Johansen and Juselius, 1990). The test is c²-distributed with r degrees of freedom. Using the
5% critical value, weak exogeneity must be rejected for each of the three variables that are
allowed to be endogenously determined. Note that the test statistic for private investment is
close to its critical value, though, suggesting that ln( Ik) might be an exogenous trend.
Cointegrating properties. With r = 1, there is no need to impose identifying restrictions on
the cointegrating space. The unrestricted cointegrating vector and the adjustment coefficients
are reported in table 5. Equation (2.13) shows that the coefficients in the cointegrating vector
cannot straightforwardly be interpreted in terms of output elasticities of private and public
capital as they only provide us with estimates of the relative size of output elasticities. The
results suggest that the output elasticity of public capital is about a fraction 0.4 of the output
elasticity of private capital. Assuming that the output elasticity of private capital is about 0.33,
these estimates imply an output elasticity of public capital of about 0.14. Given the relative
value of a and b , the coefficients on Dln(K) and Dln(G) indicate that dk » g+2dg which is
broadly consistent with the values observed in reality, i.e. dk » 3% and dg » 0.5%. Notice that
although 0.642+0.270 » 1, the restriction implied by equilibrium condition (2.13):
H1 ( )[ ]* *, ,1- , ,1' aa +=b ,
is rejected by the data (c²(1) = 9.19 [0.00]), indicating that on average investments have
grown somewhat faster than output.
Table 5 The normalised cointegrating vector and adjustment parameters
Equation Weights a Eigenvectors b  ’
Variables ln(Y) ln(Ik) ln(Ig) Dln(K) Dln(G)
Dln(Y) -0.588 (0.179) 1.000 -0.642 -0.270 4.537 4.452
Dln(Ik) 0.164 (0.076) - (0.047) (0.066) (1.189) (2.304)
Dln(Ig) 0.943 (0.418)
Note: standard errors are printed in parentheses.
The estimated cointegrating relationship is graphed in figure 3. Taking into account the shifts
in the constant of the cointegrating relationship (the dashed lines in the graph) due to shifts in
the average rate of productivity growth, this vector appears to be very stationary.
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Figure 3 The estimated cointegrating relationship (Belgium, 1953-96)
Moving average representation. In a system with three endogenous and two exogenous
variables, the choice of r = 1 implies that four common trends are determining the medium-
term behaviour of the variables. These common trends and the variable’s loadings to these
trends can be extracted from the VECM by inverting (5.1) to obtain the moving average
representation:
( ) ( ) ttttt XLBXDLCX ,21,2'2110,1,1,1 )( D+-F++=D -bame (5.2)
where C(L) and B(L) are infinite lag polynomials and b2 a (2´1) vector including the
coefficients in the cointegration vector b  related to the exogenous variables. Provided
^^ G 11
'
1 ba  has full rank (p-r), the process X1,t has the representation:
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with X1,0 capturing the initial conditions, ( ) ^-^^^ G= '1111'11 ababC  being the matrix of long-
run multipliers and ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )L-11CLCLC1 -=  (see Johansen, 1991). Since a^ and b^ are the
p´(p-r) orthogonal complements to a and b , the long-run impact matrix C has reduced rank
(p-r) and can be rewritten as the product of two p´(p-r) matrices, ^^=
'
11
~ abC , with
( ) 111'111~ -^^^^ G= babb . å
=
^
t
i
i
1
' ea  can now be interpreted as the (p-r)=2 common stochastic
trends in the system, with ^1
~b  being the weights to these common trends.
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The moving average representation of the process in (5.3) shows that besides the two
endogenously determined common trends, the medium-run stochastic behaviour of the
endogenous variables is also influenced by the exogenous trends in X2,t, representing the slow
adjustment of capital stocks, with weighting matrix equal to the matrix of long-run multipliers
of the lag polynomial ( )( )LLCLB '21 )( ab- .
Table 6 Common trends, trend-loadings and the long-run impact matrix
Common Trends
Loadings Coefficients
Ln(Y) 0.19 0.84 2.52 2.26 0.93 -0.26 0.63 - - Sey
ln(Ik) -0.12 1.00 14.10 0.34 0.36 1.27 0.00 - - SeIk
ln(Ig) 1.00 0.73 -7.38 24.06 - - - 1.00 - SeIg
- - - - 1.00 Dln(K)
Dln(G)
Long-run impact matrix
Ln(Y) 0.480 1.014 0.122 Sey
(0.166) (0.390) (0.081)
ln(Ik) 0.246 1.302 -0.073 SeIk
(0.126) (0.296) (0.061)
ln(Ig) 1.192 0.662 0.628 SeIg
(0.413) (0.972) (0.203)
Note: standard errors are printed in parentheses.
The coefficients of the common trends and the loadings to these trends by the three
endogenous variables are reported in the first part of table 6. Before turning to the
interpretation of these trends, it should be noted that due to the inclusion of Dln(K) and Dln(G)
as exogenous driving trends, a straightforward interpretation of the two endogenous common
trends might be very arduous. As noted in section 2, shifts in investment rates and shocks to
technological growth enter the system mainly and/or partly through shocks to Dln(K) and
Dln(G). As capital accumulates, Dln(K) and Dln(G) slowly return to the average rate of
productivity growth g, ‘forcing’ Sm1i and Sm2i to accumulate to the long-run I(1)-trends in
investments and output once Dln(K)=Dln(G)=g. In fact this specification implies that shocks
to investments have been exogenously introduced in the system. Subsequently, the long-run
trends are allowed to build up endogenously. Clearly, it can be discussed whether shocks to
for instance the public investment rate that were introduced in the system through exogenous
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shocks to Dln(G) will also give rise to subsequent shocks to public investments to cumulate
into the long-run trend I(1) trend.
Insofar as a sensible interpretation is possible, the two endogenously determined common
trends seem to represent the long-run trends in public and private investment respectively4.
The driving trend in public investments, the first common trend, is essentially a combination
of shocks to output and public sector investments while the driving trend in private
investment, the second common trend, is dominated by shocks to private investments. Notice
that public investments also have a high loading on the trend in private investment. The long-
run impact matrix C reported in the lower part of table 6 indicates that the long-run impact of
shocks to private investments on public investments is not statistically significant, though.
Consistent with the exogeneity tests in table 4, the C-matrix shows that private investments
are mainly exogenously driven with only a minor impact of shocks to output. Public
investments are both ‘endogenously’ determined by output movements and ‘exogenously’ by
shifts in the public investment rate. The loadings of output to the trend in private and public
capital equal 0.84 and 0.19 respectively. The long-run impact of shocks to public investment
on output appears to be only borderline significant, though.
The third and the fourth common trend reported in the upper part of table 6 are the medium-
term exogenous trends in Dln(K) and Dln(G) respectively. Recall that in Dln(K) and Dln(G)
capture the proportion of shocks to investments that, due to slow capital accumulation, are not
yet transmitted into output. Consistent with this interpretation, the trend loadings in table 6
show that Dln(K) and Dln(G) are the medium-term driving trend in ln(Ik) and ln(Ig)
respectively. The small loading of output on these medium-term trends is probably due to
business cycle fluctuations. The higher loading of ln(Ig) on its driving trend Dln(G) is due to
the lower depreciation rate of public capital, implying public capital accumulation to take
more time, i.e. a larger proportion of shocks to public investments is not yet transmitted into
output. Notice also the negative loading of ln( Ig) on Dln(K), which might suggest that there is
some medium-term complementary between public and private investments. Nevertheless, the
long-run impact matrix C reported in the lower part of table 6 suggests that the long-run
trends in private and public investment are largely independent.
                                                                
4 Notice that instead of normalising on the vectors in ^a , we normalised on the loading matrix ^1
~b  to obtain
a unit loading of private and public investments on their driving trend, i.e. the second and the first common
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Parameter constancy. As a final specification check, figure 4 reports recursively calculated
test statistics for the stability of the b  vector. The first model is estimated using the first 24
years (1953-1976) of the sample. The model is then repeatedly re-estimated adding one extra
observation at a time. Beta_Z is constructed using recursive estimates of both short-run and
long-run parameters. Beta_R only uses recursive estimates of the long-run parameters. Both
test statistics were scaled such that 1 corresponds to the 5% critical value. The results show
that, holding short-run parameters fixed at their sample values, the coefficients in the
cointegrating vector can be considered stable over the sample period.
Figure 4 Recursive test statistics for the test of a constant cointegration space
Note: 1 is the 5% critical value.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
trend respectively.
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper asks the question of whether the drastic reduction of public investment in Belgium
during the fiscal consolidation episodes of the 1980s and 1990s has reduced the long-run
output capacity of the Belgian economy. Two potentially important problems in the literature
that tries to estimate the contribution of public capital to long-run economic growth have been
addressed. First, most studies estimating production functions including public capital as one
of the explanatory variables ignore or misspecify the underlying rate of technological
progress. Standard neoclassical growth models show that the long-run growth in most
macroeconomic series is primarily determined by technological progress, though. As
technology is not a directly observable variable, I follow the underlying idea in the
methodology proposed by Crowder and Himarios (1997) to let the rate of technological
growth be endogenously determined as a common stochastic trend in the data using the long-
run growth properties of the neoclassical model.
Second, slow capital accumulation implies that capital stock series include a near I(2)-
component in the small samples usually available to the researcher. The standard I(1)
cointegrated VAR methodology is no longer valid in this case. Moreover, as the I(2)-trends in
private and public capital are independent, no linear combination of the variables is able to
kill these I(2) components in an I(2) cointegrated model. Therefore, capital stock series enter
the analysis in first differences. Inspired by the neoclassical growth model, the balanced
growth path of output is now being determined by private and public investments with private
and public capital stock growth rates capturing the medium-term slow adjustment towards this
steady-state.
Using Belgian data for the period 1953-96, the analysis supports Aschauer’s hypothesis that
the decline in public capital investment has lowered the balanced growth path of real output.
In contrast to Aschauer’s results, the output elasticity of public capital is found to be only a
fraction 0.4 of the output elasticity of private capital. Assuming that the output elasticity of
private capital is about 0.33, these estimates imply an output elasticity of public capital of
about 0.14.
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APPENDIX A.
Equation (2.1) and its steady-state counterpart imply:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]*** lnlnlnlnlnln tttttt GGKKYY -+-=- ba . (A.1)
Substituting out ln(K*) and ln(G*) from (2.4) yields:
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equation (A.2) can be rewritten as:
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Rearranging terms:
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and substituting for Dln(Kt) and Dln(Gt) from equation (2.3) yields:
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]gG
g
gK
g
YY t
g
t
k
tt -D+
--D
+
-= lnlnlnln *
d
b
d
a
. (A.6)
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Public capital and labour market performance in Belgium
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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the output and labour market effects of public capital
formation in Belgium. In earlier work Everaert and Heylen (2000) have found
significant, positive effects of public capital on multifactor productivity within a single
equation production function framework. In this paper we revisit and extend this work
within a broader model. This model explains - among other variables - private output,
private employment and unemployment, private capital formation, wage bargaining
and price setting. For each of these endogenous variables we specify error correction
processes, to be estimated simultaneously. Model simulations show (strongly) positive
effects of public investment on private sector output and capital formation. Public
infrastructures and private employment are found to be substitutes. The simulations
also show that the initial strong negative impact of higher public investment spending
on the government budget is largely undone as the increase in the public capital stock
starts feeding through into higher economic growth.
KEYWORDS: Public capital, structural model, employment, output growth, government budget.
1. INTRODUCTION
Following Aschauer (1989a) a huge literature has studied the macroeconomic effects of the
decline in public investment that has taken place in most OECD countries since the early
1970s. Most research has concentrated on output and productivity effects. As is well known
by now, the results of this literature are quite controversial. Estimating an aggregate
production function, Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) found highly positive and significant effects of
infrastructure on productivity growth in the US and the G7. In more recent work, however,
many authors have criticised these results both on theoretical and methodological grounds.
Major issues that have been raised concern the non-stationarity of the data, the direction of
causality, possible misspecification of the production function, the endogeneity of other
factors of production (i.e. private labour and capital) and the correct empirical proxy for
technical progress. Dealing with (some of) these issues some authors confirm Aschauer’s
‘public capital hypothesis’, others reject it (see e.g. Sturm et al., 1997, for a broad survey)1.
                                                                
* The authors are grateful to the participants at the conference on “Macroeconomic Transmission Mechanisms:
Empirical Applications and Econometric Methods” (18-20 May, 2000, Copenhagen).
1 Another wave of criticism on Aschauer’s seminal work concerns the correct way to model the relationship
between public capital and output and productivity. Instead of adding public capital as an additional input
variable in a production function, some have included public capital in cost or profit functions. Others have
estimated VAR’s or included government investment spending in cross-section growth regressions. Still
others have estimated multi-equation structural econometric models.
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Also taking a production function approach, Everaert and Heylen (2000) confirm the public
capital hypothesis for Belgium. They find a significant output elasticity of public capital equal
to 0.29.
The focus of this paper is on the relationship between public capital formation and the labour
market, in particular employment, in Belgium. Figure 1 shows a remarkable correlation. The
figure depicts the evolutions of the trend yearly growth rate of the real public capital stock
and of the private sector employment rate, i.e. the percentage of people at working age with a
private sector job. In line with observations for many other countries, one can see that the
former peaked around 1970, after which a substantial reduction set in. Quite remarkably, with
a lag of only a few years the private employment rate made almost the same dive. It fell from
about 41% in 1973-75 to 33% ten years later. Since 1987 the employment rate has shown a
weak upward trend, disturbing the correlation with the growth rate of public capital. To a very
important extent, however, this upward trend is due to a growing share of part time
employment. Redefined in full-time equivalents, the employment rate was not higher in 1996
than it was in 1986 (Nationale Bank van België, 1999).
Figure 1 Public capital and employment in Belgium, 1961-1996
Sources: OECD statistical compendium 1999/1 and Belgian Federal Planning Bureau.
Whether the correlation shown in figure 1 is - at least partially - due to a causal relation
running from public capital to employment or whether it is a mere coincidence, driven by the
evolution of other variables, is the main research question in this paper. In contrast to its
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economic growth and productivity effects, the influence of public capital on employment has
received much less attention in the literature. If there were relevant findings, these generally
resulted from the estimation of private sector cost functions and/or factor share or input
demand equations from which can be derived whether labour is a substitute or a complement
to public capital. Most studies find that public capital reduces private sector costs. Many - but
certainly not all - studies find that public capital acts as a substitute for intermediate inputs
and often also labour. As for the relation between public and private capital most studies
conclude that it is complementary (see again Sturm et al., 1997, for a survey).
The perspective of this paper is broader. We specify a simple structural model for the Belgian
economy explaining - among other variables - private sector output and costs, private
employment and unemployment, private capital formation, wage bargaining, price setting and
aggregate demand. The model allows for three channels of influence of public capital on
private employment: (i) direct complementary or substitution effects for given output, (ii)
indirect effects on real wages, due to changes in labour productivity and/or the unemployment
rate, (iii) indirect effects caused by changes in aggregate demand and the output level. Once
estimated, the model is used to simulate private sector performance under an alternative
public investment policy. More specifically, we analyse how the economy would have
evolved if the strong decline in public investment during the period 1982-89 had not occurred.
Two other motivations underlie this paper. First, in recent years a growing literature has tried
to explain the success or failure of fiscal consolidation programmes. Most often, this literature
has taken a cross-country perspective (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1995; McDermott and
Wescott, 1996; Heylen and Everaert, 2000). This paper allows a time series test for Belgium
of the well-known hypothesis that to be successful, fiscal consolidation should not rely on
cutting public investment. Second, the estimated model provides a robustness cheque on our
findings for the output elasticity of public capital in Everaert and Heylen (2000).
Some, but not much, similar work has been done before. Westerhout and van Sinderen (1994)
estimate a model for - among other variables - output growth, employment growth and the
private investment ratio in the Netherlands in 1958-89. Their results show that the decrease of
government investment spending since the 1970s has undermined each of these three
dependent variables.
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The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our long-run structural model.
Section 3 introduces dynamics through error-correction specifications. Section 4 presents the
estimates of the dynamic model for the Belgian economy using annual data for 1965-96. In
order to detect the effects of public capital formation on economic growth and the labour
market, section 5 reports the results of a simulation experiment. Section 6 concludes and
outlines directions for future research.
2. THE MODEL
Our model describes a representative, imperfectly competitive firm, operating in a small open
economy. This firm decides on its required input volumes (labour, capital and materials) to
produce a certain level of output, taking factor prices, the current state of technology and the
public capital stock as given. The output level is determined by expected demand, which is
itself a function of the prices set by the firm on the domestic market and abroad. To maximise
its profits, the firm determines these prices as mark-ups on marginal cost. As far as costs are
concerned, the cost of capital and the price of materials are exogenous. Wages, however, are
endogenous. They are bargained between unions and employers. Finally, depending on prices,
actual demand will be determined through the demand side of the economy. The following
subsections describe production, input prices (mainly wage formation), output price setting
and the aggregate economy’s supply and demand side.
2.1. Production technology and factor demand
Imagine a small open economy consisting of N identical private sector firms. We consider one
of these firms. Its real gross output (X) is produced by services from private capital (K),
employed labour (E), imported intermediate inputs (materials, M) and public capital (KG).
The production function is of the form
  ,,, ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ=
++++
MKGEKAFX (1)
with A representing the stance of technology. The firm minimises total cost
MPKPEPC MKE ++=
subject to the production function under (1). This results in a cost function of the type
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with Pi the vector of variable factor prices. Public capital and the stock of technology are
treated as unpaid fixed inputs2.
Consider the translog flexible functional form as an adequate approximation of the cost
function under (2).
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with i and j ranging over the domain of variable inputs (E, K, M) and I and J ranging over the
domain of gross output (X) and fixed inputs (KG, A). The translog cost function captures all
relevant characteristics of the underlying production function (i.e. duality) only if a number of
conditions are satisfied:
(i) Symmetry
a a a a a aij ji iI Ii IJ JI= = =, ,    (4)
(ii) Linear homogeneity in factor prices
Factor price homogeneity ensures that - holding fixed inputs and output constant - a
proportional increase in factor prices does not affect factor shares, i.e. only relative prices
matter in the optimisation process.
å åå ===
j i
iIij
i
i  0  ,0  ,1 aaa (5)
Symmetry and linear homogeneity in factor prices ensure that the sum of factor shares in
total cost adds up to unity (aE+aK+aM=1).
(iii) Positivity
The cost function must be positive for positive input prices and a positive level of output.
                                                                
2 Public capital is provided by the government and is mostly financed through taxes. Since tax payments are
not related to the quantity of public capital that a firm uses, public capital is essentially an unpaid input.
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(iv) Monotonicity
The cost function must be increasing in input prices and in the level of output.
(v) Concavity in Factor Prices
Concavity in factor prices requires negative semi-definiteness of the matrix of second order
partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to prices, which ensures that we are
minimising – instead of maximising - cost.
Since globally imposed curvatory conditions imply strong restrictions on the elasticities of
substitution (Diewert and Wales, 1987), only restrictions (i) and (ii) are imposed in the
estimation of the translog function. The results are checked for conformity with restrictions
(iii)-(v) after estimation.
Assumptions concerning returns to scale in the underlying production function imply a further
set of restrictions on the cost function. As shown by Conrad and Unger (1987), if the
production function under (1) is homogeneous of degree l in all tangible factors - variable
(E,K,M) and fixed (KG) - the cost function is almost homogeneous of degree 1/l in X and KG.
In case of homogeneity of the production function, this statement implies (see Conrad and
Unger, 1987, for proof):
( )
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(vi) Homogeneity of the underlying production function and constant returns to scale
From equation (6), it can be derived that homogeneity of the underlying production
function is ensured by the following set of restrictions
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(7)
Constant returns to scale over all inputs require the further restriction that l=1. Note that
the homogeneity restrictions under (7) imply l to be constant over the sample period. If
these restrictions are not satisfied, l can still be calculated but varies with prices and
output. Homogeneity of the production function and constant returns to scale are not
imposed but tested for after estimation.
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Using Shephard’s lemma, factor demand equations for variable inputs can straightforwardly
be derived by taking partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to factor prices.
( )
( ) ( ) ( )   ln+ ln+=     ln 
ln .
S            
 
 
 
I
IE,
i
iE,EE ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
==<=>= åå IPP
C
C
PE
P
C
E i
E
E
E
aaa
¶
¶
¶
¶
(8a)
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) úû
ù
ê
ë
é
==<=>= åå  ln+ ln+=   ln 
ln .
S           
 
 
I
IK,
i
iK,KK IPP
C
C
PK
P
C
K i
K
K
K
aaa
¶
¶
¶
¶
(8b)
( )
( ) ( ) ( )  ln+ ln+=ln 
ln .
S          
 
 
I
IM,
i
iM,MM ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
==<=>= åå IPP
C
C
PM
P
C
M i
M
M
M
aaa
¶
¶
¶
¶
(8c)
with Si (i=E, K, M) denoting the cost shares of variable input factors. The adding-up property
of factor shares (restrictions (i) and (ii)) implies that one of the factor demand equations is
redundant and must be deleted from the system. The parameters of the deleted equation can
be recovered after estimation from the restrictions placed on the system.
Under conditions (i)-(v), the cost function is dual to the production function and all relevant
characteristics of the latter can be derived from (3). A first important aspect is the elasticity of
substitution between input factors. A commonly used concept, measuring the elasticity of
substitution between inputs i and j, is the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution, sij. This
elasticity turns out to be the ratio of the cross-price elasticity, e ij, and the factor share, Sj,:
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with Ci being the derivative of the cost function with respect to the input price Pi and Cij the
derivative of Ci with respect to the input price Pj. Blackorby and Russell (1989) argue that (9)
is not a measure of the ease of substitution in the case of more than two inputs. They propose
to use the Morishima elasticity of substitution instead, which is defined as the derivative of
the optimal quantity ratio (i/j) with respect to the appropriate price ratio (Pi/Pj) under the
requirement that only the ith price in the ratio Pi/Pj varies:
i ijM i ii
ij ji ii
j i
PC PC
C C
s e e= - = - , (9’)
In contrast to the Allen-Uzawa elasticities, the Morishima elasticity is asymmetric. This
asymmetry results from the fact that the log derivative of the ratio of inputs (j/i) with respect
to Pi/Pj depends on whether D(Pi/Pj) is due to DPi or DPj. The Allen-Uzawa concept does not
take this feature into account.
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Next, we can determine the willingness-to-pay for public capital by calculating its shadow
price as:
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The shadow price SKGP measures the reduction in the representative firm’s total cost due to one
additional unit of public capital. Further, the elasticity of variable input factors with respect to
public capital equals
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The first term on the right-hand side measures the so-called bias of public infrastructure on
factor cost shares. If ai,KG > 0, the cost share of variable input i is increasing with the
provision of public capital. If ai,KG < 0, public capital is factor i saving. The second term of
equation (11) can be labelled the shadow cost share of public infrastructure (SKG). For a
positive shadow price, it measures the decline in all private input quantities (and thus the
firm’s costs) to produce a given output X when public infrastructure increases.
The output elasticity of public capital, eX,KG, can be calculated as
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X
,
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, ln
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e
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= (12)
where eC,X measures the cost flexibility of output: ( ) ( )XCXC lnln, ¶¶=e .
In a similar way, the output elasticity of a variable input factor i can be calculated by dividing
its cost share (Si) through by eC,X.
2.2. Input price formation
When the firm decides on the volume of inputs to be used in production, input prices PM, PK
and PE are given. PM concerns the price level of imported intermediate inputs, expressed in
domestic currency. It is assumed exogenous. The nominal user cost of capital is a function of
the real long-term interest rate (R), the depreciation rate for private capital (dk) and the price
of capital goods (Pinv). Each of these three determinants are assumed to be exogenous.
invkK PRP )( d+= (13)
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The nominal user cost of labour is a function of the nominal gross wage (W), which has been
bargained ex-ante with a union, and taxes on labour to be paid by the firm/employer (tbs).
( )WtP bsE += 1 (14)
The nominal gross wage is assumed to result from the maximisation of the following Nash-
bargaining maximand:
P=W zU (15)
with: U the union’s utility function, P the firm’s real profit and z the relative bargaining
power of the union. The union’s utility typically depends on employment and the real
consumption wage to be earned in the firm (in excess of its outside counterpart). Taking this
into account, equation (15) can be rewritten as
P÷÷
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with E employment, r the union’s relative preference for employment (versus real income), tw
the tax rate on the gross wage to be paid by workers and Pc the aggregate consumer price
level. The variable H is the nominal gross value of the expected outside income of a worker
who loses his job in the firm3. It is defined as
[ ] BufWufH )()(1 +-=
-
with: 0 < f(u) < 1, f ’(u) > 0 (16)
with:
-
W the aggregate nominal gross (private sector) wage, B the nominal unemployment
benefit and u the aggregate unemployment rate. f(u) indicates the probability that a worker
who loses his job in the firm remains unemployed within the relevant period, 1-f(u) indicates
the probability that he finds another job. The probability to remain unemployed is a positive
function of the aggregate unemployment rate (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991, and Nixon and
Urga, 1999, for highly similar specifications).
As we show in appendix B, maximising W with respect to the wage W (both in logs) and
assuming that in long-run equilibrium W=
-
W , allows to derive the following equilibrium wage
equation4:
                                                                
3 It is assumed that there is no hiring by the public sector.
4 For other assumptions underlying this equation, see appendix B.
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where Q is the productivity of labour, p  is the profit rate, PX the firm’s output price and B/W
the unemployment benefit replacement rate. The productivity of labour is measured as real
value added (Y) per worker, the profit rate as real profit per unit of real value added.
Algebraically
MXYwith
E
Y
Q -== (17’)
Y
P
=p (17”)
Finally, z reflects the union’s bargaining strength. For the long-run, it is theoretically expected
that bq=b tbs=1. Further, given that in Belgium wages are automatically indexed to consumer
prices, we also expect bp =1. All other parameters are expected to be positive.
2.3. Price setting
The representative firm sells its real output (X) on both the domestic market (Xd) and abroad
(Xf) at prices Pd and Pf respectively. Prices are set to maximise the (nominal) profit function:
( )AKGPXCXPXP iffddn ,,,-+=P (18)
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Equations (19) and (20) indicate the demand functions for output. The output levels Xd and Xf
that the firm can (and will) produce are determined by expected demand and relative prices.
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EXPde is expected real aggregate domestic demand, EXPwe stands for expected real world
imports. Further, P is the aggregate price of goods sold on the domestic market. It is a
weighted average of the aggregate domestic price level of domestic producers (
-
dP ) and the
price of imported final products (Pim). Finally, P* is the price of foreign final products on the
world market. Both Pim and P* are expressed in domestic currency.
The crucial assumption that we make is that the representative firm has market power. Profit
maximising price setting on the domestic and world markets leads to the well-known mark-up
conditions, where ed and e f  denote the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand for output
at home and on the world market. Algebraically,
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Theoretically, there are good reasons for the price elasticity of demand - and thus the mark-up on
marginal cost - to depend on the business cycle. The sign of this relation is unclear, however.
Further, there may be a positive effect from competitiveness (relative prices) on the mark-up
(Layard et al., 1991). We shall come back to this in the empirical section.
Once Pd and Pf are known, the firm’s (weighted average) output price PX can be defined as:
fdX )P-(1P  P yy += with: 
fd
dd
XX
X
X
X
+
==y (23)
2.4. Aggregate supply and demand
The assumption of identical firms makes it relatively easy to move to the aggregate economy.
For many variables the ‘aggregate’ level is equal to what has been determined at the level of
the representative firm. This is the case for wages (W) and prices (Pd, Pf, PX). Other variables
like private sector output, value added, employment and input volumes are at the aggregate
level equal to N times their size decided by the individual firm. For these variables, where
ambiguity could arise, we shall indicate the aggregate variable with a bar. So,
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For other variables, which typically belong to the aggregate level, like real aggregate domestic
demand, real private consumption, real government consumption, real imports of goods and
services, the unemployment rate, aggregate labour supply, etc. confusion seems quite
unlikely. To keep notation simple, we will not add bars for these variables.
Equation (26) indicates the equilibrium of supply and demand for aggregate private output.
)( IMXEXPX fd -+=
--
(26)
where IM stands for the imported aggregate volume of final goods and services.
Supply has been identified earlier in equations (1), (19)-(22) and (24). Firms produce output
in response to expected demand, given relative prices. When planned actual demand deviates
from the level expected by the firm (and thus from produced output), stocks will change,
forcing ex-post actual demand to adjust.
Equation (27) identifies (ex-post) real aggregate domestic demand (EXPd) as the sum of real
private consumption expenditures (Cp), real non-wage government consumption (Cg) and real
aggregate gross investment (I).
ICCEXP gpd ++= (27)
Among the demand variables, non-wage government consumption will be considered
exogenous. The other variables are endogenous. Real private consumption (Cp) is assumed
mainly (i.e. in the long-run) to be a function of real household disposable income (Ydis/Pc).
)(
c
dis
pp P
Y
CC = (28)
In the short-run changes in consumer confidence, which we consider to be determined by the
evolution of the (lagged) aggregate unemployment rate, may also matter.
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Assuming that wages and unemployment benefits face the same tax rate, Ydis can be specified
in greater detail as
( ) ccgsggwddis YtBEELWEWEtYY )1()()(10 -+úû
ù
êë
é --++-+=
----
(29)
with: Ls aggregate labour supply
-
gE government employment
Wg nominal gross government wage
Yc capital income received by households
tc tax rate on capital income
In this equation Yd0 is a function of – among others – transfers other than unemployment
benefits and self-employment income. Assuming for simplicity that (i) households use their
savings to invest in shares and in long-term bonds and (ii) households receive a fixed fraction
(G1) of after-tax business sector profits as dividends, capital income received by households
can be calculated as:
( ) ( ) 11c 1 bd n n HY G t R B -= - P + (30)
with tbd direct taxes on business sector profits, Rn the nominal long-term interest rate and BH
the stock of bonds held by households. BH is calculated as BH = (BH)-1 + G2(Ydis-CpPc), with G2
capturing the share of households’ savings invested in bonds.
The consumer price level is a weighted average of the domestic output price level and the price
of imported goods and services.
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where tind indicates the rate of indirect taxes. Real aggregate gross investment includes real
fixed capital formation by the private business sector (Ik), the government (Ig) and households
(Ih), as well as changes in stocks (Is).
shgk IIIII +++= (32)
Household and government investments are taken to be exogenous. Changes in stocks are due
to the differences between output and planned actual demand. Finally, and most importantly,
Ik follows from the aggregate version of equation (8b) and from equation (33):
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Equation (34) explains real aggregate imports of final goods and services (IM) as a function
of real domestic demand EXPd and the relative price Pd/Pim. Imports are expected to rise in
both arguments.
),(
im
d
d P
P
EXPIMIM = (34)
Equation (35) describes total real imports.
MIMMt += (35)
The model for the demand side is closed by assuming that real exports are determined by real
world imports (EXPw) and by the price of exports (Pf) relative to the price of foreign
competitors on the world market (P*).
),(
*P
P
EXPXX fwf =
-
(36)
2.5. Government budget balance
The three equations in (37) describe the nominal government budget balance as the difference
between nominal revenues (T) and nominal expenditures (G). The former are mainly
determined by the sum of taxes on gross wages in the business sector, taxes on the
unemployed, indirect taxes on nominal domestic demand, direct taxes on business sector
profits and taxes on households’ capital income. The latter mainly reflect government wages,
nominal public non-wage consumption, nominal public investment, unemployment benefits
and interest payments on the outstanding debt. T0 captures other revenue categories, e.g. taxes
on other capital income, taxes on wages earned in the government sector. G0 captures other
spending categories, e.g. transfers other than unemployment benefits.
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(37)
with GD (=GD-1-Budget) denoting nominal gross government debt.
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3. DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION OF THE SYSTEM5
The long-run static model described in section 2 relates n = 25 endogenous variables to k = 31
conditioning variables through n1 = 9 long-run equilibrium relations and n2 = n-n1 = 16
identities. The parameters of the identities are known and do not need estimation. The
empirical implementation of the stochastic long-run equilibrium relations requires a model of
disequilibrium adjustment. Ideally one would like to estimate a vector error-correction model
(VECM) - treating all variables endogenously - and then test whether exogeneity restrictions
and restrictions on the long-run cointegrating vectors implied by the n1 structural equations
are valid in practise. Given the large dimension of the system (n1+k = 40) relative to the small
dimension of the sample (32 yearly observations), estimation of the full VECM or even a
conditional ECM – i.e. conditional on the k exogenous variables - is infeasible though.
Moreover, the conditions for integrability of the factor demand system impose a rather
specific structure on the dynamic cost function and dynamic factor demand equations.
Greenslade et al. (1999) provide Monte Carlo evidence that in a situation where a fairly rich
model needs to be estimated with a limited data set, imposing exogeneity restrictions at the
earliest possible stage through the use of economic theory – rather than treating the model as a
pure statistical artefact – can yield enormous benefits. Therefore, we specify separate error-
correction models for each of the four sectors of the economy – i.e. factor demand and price
setting by firms, wage bargaining, total domestic demand and the external sector –
conditioning on the k exogenous variables and the endogenous variables determined in the
other sectors of the economy. By doing so, we implicitly impose a recursive structure on a
more general conditional VECM for the n1 endogenous variables.
In subsection 3.1, we introduce a dynamic cost function that allows for a consistent derivation
of a set of inter-related dynamic factor demand equations in general error-correction form. 6
Subsection 3.2 presents single equation ECMs for the remaining endogenous variables (Pd, Pf,
W, Cp, Xf, IM).
                                                                
5 From now on, all variables are aggregate measures. For notational purposes, the ‘bars’ that we have
introduced in equations (24)-(25) are dropped.
6 Alternatively, the short-run cost function can be specified conditional on a given capital stock, i.e. the
restricted cost function approach of Allen (1994). From these conditional estimates, the long-run optimum –
allowing for full adjustment of all the factors of production - can be derived. In this approach, dynamics are
not explicitly modelled, though.
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3.1 Dynamic Cost Function
Assuming that St and S*t are three-dimensional vectors containing effective and equilibrium
cost shares respectively, a generalized error-correction mechanism for the short-run actual
cost shares St can be expressed as:
( )( )1* 1* -- -++D=D tttt SSBASAS , (38)
where A and B are three-dimensional square matrices containing adjustment parameters.
The singularity of the system of factor demand equations requires a number of restrictions on
the adjustment parameters. Sufficient conditions under which the adding-up property of factor
demands is satisfied are (i) '' ii mA =  and (ii) '' ii bB = , where i is a unit vector and m and b
are scalars. Notice that if one wants to estimate the dynamic system under (38), the adding-up
property of factor shares again implies that one of the share equations is redundant and should
be deleted from the system. As a result, the short-run adjustment parameters in B are not
individually identified, i.e. as b is not known, only the ratios of b11/b21 for example are
identified. In order to solve this problem, Urga (1996) and Allen and Urga (1999) suggest to
estimate a dynamic cost function - which satisfies the necessary conditions for integrability of
the factor demand system - of the type:
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jointly with the system of factor demand equations. Notice that cost functions may vary in the
specification of the time-varying constant term. Applying Shephard’s lemma once more, the
corresponding dynamic factor demand equations can straightforwardly be derived from (39)
as:
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1
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,, , i = E,M,K (40)
where å
¹
=-+=
ij
ijijjiii bkbbmk .  and   The adding-up property of factor shares again implies
that one of the share equations is redundant and should be deleted from the system.
Identification of the 9 parameters in the B-matrix requires 2 additional restrictions. Without
loss of generality, we shall impose ii bB = .
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Differentiating the short-run factor demand equations with respect to input prices yields the
short-run (Allen-Uzawa) substitution elasticities:
( )
2
1
i
iiiisr
ii S
SSm --
=
a
s ,
ji
jiijsr
ij SS
SSm +
=
a
s (41)
The Le Chatelier principle states that, in absolute values, the short-run own price elasticities
must be smaller than their long-run counterparts. Using (9) and (41), this condition can be
reformulated as aii(m-1)>0 (Allen and Urga, 1999). For long-run factor demands being
sufficiently elastic (i.e. ½sii½>(1-Si)), we have that aii<0 which requires m < 1. Otherwise, if
½sii½<(1-Si), aii > 0 implies m > 1 for the Le Chatelier principle to hold.
By differentiating the dynamic cost function with respect to output, one can also derive short-
run marginal cost, which could be assumed to form the basis of the firms’ short-run domestic
pricing behaviour. Following Allen (1997) we did not put any restrictions, derived from the
dynamic specification of the cost function, on the dynamics of the price setting equation for
besides marginal cost short-run prices are very likely to be affected by other elements like for
instance price adjustment costs. The condition that prices are set as a mark-up on marginal
cost has been imposed on the long-run structure though. The specification of the ECM for Pd
and Pf can be found in section 3.2.
3.2. Single equation ECMs
The single equation conditional error-correction model that we estimate for domestic prices,
wages, private consumption, imports and exports is of the type:
( ) ( ) [ ] tititiitiiti xyxLyL ,1,1,,2,1 ' ebadmd +-+D+=D --  i =(Pd, Pf, lnW, Cp, lnXf-lnIM) (42)
where yi,t is the endogenous variable under consideration, xi,t is a vector of explanatory
variables assumed to be relevant for explaining yi,t, e i,t is a stationary error term and d1(L) and
d2(L) are lag polynomials of order p and q respectively. Note that to eliminate the impact of
the steady increase in openness of the Belgian economy, we estimate the ratio of exports over
imports of final goods and services (i.e. Xf/IM) instead of equations (34) and (36) separately.
The implicit assumption underlying this choice is that the increasing openness of the Belgian
economy affects imports and exports with the same magnitude.
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Following Kremers et al. (1992), we test the null-hypothesis of no cointegration in the long-
run equations by testing whether ai = 0 in (42). Under the null-hypothesis of no cointegration
the t-test for ai = 0 has a non-normal distribution. Kremers et al. (1992) suggest using the
MacKinnon critical values associated with the comparable Dickey-Fuller test (DF) in the
Engle-Granger two-step procedure as a first approximation.
One obvious possible severe drawback of the single-equation ECM-estimator is that it is
necessary to assume that xt is weakly exogenous. In the current setting, this boils down to
imposing from the outset (i) weak exogeneity of the k conditioning variables and (ii)
recursiveness of the conditional ECM for the endogenous variables. Although this assumption
results in empirical tractability of the model outlined in section 2, it should be stressed that
inference from the conditional ECM may be invalid if this assumption were violated in
practise. A Monte-Carlo study by Inder (1993) suggests however that even in the presence of
endogenous explanatory variables, the ECM-estimator might give good estimates and valid t-
statistics.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The dynamic model outlined in section 3 has been estimated for the Belgian economy using
three-stage least squares (3SLS). The data are annual from 1965 to 1996. Data sources are
described in appendix A. Note that as a measure for the stock of knowledge (A) we use
cumulated data for patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (for details and
justification, see Everaert and Heylen, 2000). The maximum lag length of the error-correction
models was fixed at two.
4.1. Dynamic cost function and dynamic factor demands
Parameter estimates of the dynamic cost function and related dynamic factor share equations
are presented in table 1. The results show that the cost function is theoretically well-behaved,
i.e. the conditions that it should be positive for positive input prices and positive output,
monotonically non-decreasing in input prices and output and concave in input prices are
satisfied. Note that symmetry and linear homogeneity in factor prices were imposed from the
outset. The restriction of homogeneity of the production function stated in equation (7) was
rejected by the data and therefore not imposed. Further, the residual diagnostics reported in
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the right-hand side of table 1 show that the cost function is also empirically well-behaved, i.e.
the residuals from the cost function and the factor share equations do not show clear signs of
non-normality or autocorrelation. The high R²-values show that the model is able to explain
most of the variance in the data.
Table 1 Parameter estimates (3SLS) and residual diagnostics of the dynamic cost function
and factor share equations (1965-96) a,b
Long-run parameters   Short-run adjustment
Coef Variable Value stdv   Coef Variable Value stdv
 a0 Cst 14.890 (0.003)   m ( )tC *lnD 1.02 (0.05)
 aE ln(PE/PK) 0.47 (0.01)   b ( ) ( )( ) 1* lnln -- tCC 1.24 (0.19)
 aM ln(PM/PK) 0.41 (0.01)   BE,M (S
*
M,t-1-SM,t-1)ln(PE,t) 0.55 (0.11)
 ln(Pk) 1.00 -   bE,K (S*K,t-1-SK,t-1) ln(PE,t) 0.93 (0.12)
 aX ln(X) 0.92 (0.03)   bM,E (S
*
E,t-1-SE,t-1) ln(PM,t) 0.74 (0.09)
 aKG ln(KG) -0.28 (0.05)   bM,K (S
*
K,t-1-SK,t-1) ln(PM,t) 0.60 (0.12)
 aA ln(A) 0.04 (0.11)   bK,E (S
*
E,t-1-SE,t-1) ln(PK,t) 0.74 (0.07)
 aE,E ln²( PE/PK) 0.14 (0.04)   bK,M (S
*
M,t-1-SM,t-1)ln(PK,t) 0.78 (0.07)
 aM,M ln²( PM/PK) 0.09 (0.05)
 aX,X ln²(X) 0.48 (0.31)
 aKG,KG ln²(KG) -1.41 (0.67)
  Residual diagnostics c
 aA,A ln²(A) -2.92 (1.78) Cost function R² =0.998
 aE,M ln(PE/PK).ln(PM/PK) -0.08 (0.04) Normality c²(2) =1.86[0.39]
 aE,X ln(PE/PK).ln(X) -0.32 (0.05) Serial correlation c²(4) =3.36[0.50]
 aE,KG ln(PE/PK).ln(KG) -0.02 (0.08)
 aE,A ln(PE/PK).ln(A) 0.38 (0.16) Employment cost share R² =0.918
 aM,X ln(PM/PK).ln(X) 0.35 (0.07) Normality c²(2) =0.69[0.71]
 aM,KG ln(PM/PK).ln(KG) -0.07 (0.07) Serial correlation c²(4) =5.60[0.23]
 aM,A ln(PM/PK).ln(A) -0.35 (0.15)
 aX,KG ln(X).ln(KG) -0.10 (0.36) Material cost share R² =0.837
 aX,A ln(X).ln(A) -0.70 (0.45) Normality c²(2) =0.68[0.71]
 aKG,A ln(KG).ln(A) 2.55 (1.01) Serial correlation c²(4) =5.19[0.27]
a Standard errors in parentheses, p-values between square brackets.
b All variables are normalised by subtracting their sample mean.
c Jarque-Bera test for residual normality and Box-Pierce test for fourth-order serial correlation.
The adjustment parameters are reported in the right-hand side of table 1. The main coefficient
of adjustment (m) is estimated to be 1.02. Given the positive sign of the aii’s, m being
numerically larger than 1 ensures that the Le Chatelier principle is satisfied. Note that m is
statistically not greater than one, though, implying that there is only a small difference
between short-run and long-run elasticities. Basically, this means that there is not much
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rigidity in factor shares, implying short-run costs to be only a small fraction above optimal
long-run costs in the aftermath of shocks shifting the factor shares. A similar result was
obtained by Nixon and Urga (1999). They conclude that despite the fact that the dynamic
specification allows for different speeds of adjustment in individual factor shares, the
common immediate adjustment coefficient m imposes a significant element of common
response to shocks. Although the long-run cost function was found to be both theoretically
and empirically well-behaved, m not being significantly larger than one suggests that there
might be some misspecification in the short-run structure of the system.
Table 2 Price elasticities, Allen-Uzawa and Morishima elasticities of substitutiona
Price elasticities ( ije )
Row(i) wrt col( j) E M K
E -0.23 (0.09) 0.26 (0.09) -0.02 (0.08)
M 0.24 (0.09) -0.36 (0.11) 0.29 (0.11)
K -0.01 (0.03) 0.10 (0.04) -0.27 (0.08)
Allen elasticities of substitution ( Aijs )
Row(i) wrt col( j) E M K
E -0.53 (0.20)
M 0.58 (0.21) -0.87 (0.27)
K -0.05 (0.18) 0.71 (0.27) -1.90 (0.53)
Morishima elasticities of substitution ( Mijs )
Row(i) wrt col( j) E M K
E - 0.48 (0.17) 0.23 (0.10)
M 0.62 (0.20) - 0.46 (0.14)
K 0.25 (0.10) 0.57 (0.18) -
a Evaluated at the sample mean, standard deviations in parentheses.
Given that the duality conditions hold, the parameter estimates in table 1 can be utilised to
uncover the characteristics of the underlying production function. Table 2 presents own- and
cross-price elasticities, Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution and Morishima elasticities of
substitution, all evaluated at the sample mean. As the differences between the short- and long-
run elasticities are very small, only the long-run values are reported. The own-price
elasticities are all negative, being about -0.25 for labour and capital and -0.36 for imported
materials. The elasticities of substitution show that all variable input factors are Allen
substitutes except for capital and labour which appear to be independent. Table 2 also
includes estimates of the Morishima elasticities, for it was argued that they are a more
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accurate measure of substitutability. These elasticities are reported such that each row i shows
how the ratio of inputs (j/i) responds to a change in the price Pi. All variable input factors are
now shown to be substitutes.
Table 3 reports output elasticities, a measure of returns to scale, the shadow price of public
capital and the elasticities of variable inputs with respect to public capital, all evaluated at the
sample mean. Let us start with the impact of public capital on private sector production cost
and factor demand. The statistically significant positive shadow price of public capital shows
that public infrastructure is cost saving. The estimates imply that an increase in the public
capital stock by 1 EURO reduces long-run private sector cost by 0.24 EURO. The negative
sign of aE,KG in the labour demand equation suggests a negative bias of public capital on the
labour cost share. The positive shadow price of public capital enlarges its negative impact on
private employment. As a result, an increase in the public capital stock by 1%, for a given
output, reduces private sector employment by about 0.32%, indicating a substitutive
relationship. At first sight, this substitution effect may appear large. Note, however, that in
1996 a 70% increase in public investment was required to raise public capital with 1%. The
private capital cost share on the other hand is clearly increasing in the public capital stock
( aK,KG = -aE,KG -aM,KG =0.09 >0). The net effect of public capital on private capital remains
positive, i.e. an 1% increase in the public capital stock raises private sector capital by 0.33%.
Note that the large standard error suggests that this effect is not very accurately measured,
though.
Noting that the shadow cost share of public capital (SKG) equals the elasticity of private cost
with respect to public capital, a measure of returns to scale (l) can be calculated by inserting
the cost elasticities eC,X and eC,KG in equation (6). The estimates show that, evaluated at the
sample mean, the production function is characterised by increasing returns over all inputs,
including public capital (i.e. l=1.40). The individual output elasticities of private inputs are
very much in line with expectations while the obtained output elasticity of public capital
(eX,KG = 0.31) confirms the result in Everaert and Heylen (2000).
The insignificant term aA in the cost function further reveals that our proxy for knowledge
accumulation (A) does not capture the steady decline in costs over time due to technological
progress. Notice that 1/eC,X being larger than one implies increasing returns to private sector
factors of production. Increasing returns might arise from a number of reasons, e.g. learning-
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by-doing, external or internal economies of scale. Clearly, increasing returns to private inputs
provide an alternative explanation – other than knowledge accumulation - for multifactor
productivity growth as measured by the traditional Solow residual. The positive output
elasticity of public capital mentioned above further contributes to multifactor productivity
growth.
Table 3 Characteristics of the underlying production function a
Output elasticities, cost flexibility and
returns to scale
Shadow cost and factor biases with respect
to public capital
eX,E 0.51(0.03) eC,X 0.92(0.03) P
s
KG 0.24(0.05) ee,KG -0.32(0.17)
eX,M 0.45(0.02) 1/eC,X 1.09(0.04) eC,KG -0.28(0.05) em,KG -0.46(0.18)
eX,K 0.13(0.01) l 1.40(0.07) ek,KG 0.33(0.29)
eX,KG 0.31(0.05)
Factor biases with respect to output Factor biases with respect to technological
progress
eE,X 0.19(0.09) eE,A 0.90(0.23)
eM,X 1.77(0.10) eM,A -0.80(0.28)
eK,X 0.69(0.24) eK,A -0.23(0.52)
a Evaluated at the sample mean, standard deviations in parentheses.
Finally, the lower half of table 3 reports the factor biases to output and to our proxy for
knowledge accumulation. Although the knowledge stock was found not to contribute to
multifactor productivity, it has significant effects on private sector inputs. Demand for labour
appears to be increasing in knowledge while imported materials are decreasing. The private
capital stock is mainly unaffected by knowledge accumulation. Both materials and the capital
stock were found to be increasing in output.
The factor biases can be used to calculate the growth in real wages warranted by output
growth and knowledge accumulation. Assuming that the warranted real wage is the one that,
ceteris paribus, holds the labour cost share constant, the growth in this wage can be calculated
as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )AX EEAEEEXE lnln ,,,, D-D- aaaa . Evaluated at the sample mean, the estimates
imply a warranted yearly real wage growth of 2.4%. Important to note is that the employment
share in cost does not depend on public capital (aE,KG » 0). Therefore, the productivity
benefits resulting from an increase in the public capital stock can - for given costs - only be
incorporated in real wages at the expense of a lower employment.
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4.2. Price setting
The estimated equilibrium domestic price setting equation is specified as:
96
9333
1
210 dX
C
oil
P
P
bcP dd
im
d
dddd mmmmm -¶
¶
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
+÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
++=
-
.
Besides the business cycle (bc) and relative prices (Pd/Pim) as measure of competitiveness, the
mark-up on marginal cost (md) in the long-run specification is also a function of the evolution
of oil prices (oil)7. The motivation for including oil prices in the mark-up stems from the
observation that firms appear to be reluctant to transmit oil price shocks fully in domestic
prices. Notice that we have also included a level-shift dummy, being 1 in the period 1993-
1996, in the cointegrating relationship. The motivation for including this dummy is that the
price indices used were no longer available from 1993 onwards. The extension of the series
over the period 1993-1996 was done at the National Bank of Belgium using a slightly less
sophisticated methodology, resulting in a possible break in the series in 1993.
The estimated long-run relation and the equilibrium adjustment parameters of the domestic
price equation are reported in table 4. As relative prices (Pd/Pim) are found to be insignificant,
they are not included. Insignificant short-run variables are also dropped in the estimation
process. The high significance of the error-correction term (tECM = -5.11) suggests that the
reported long-run relation is indeed a cointegrating vector. The results show that in the long
run, when the business cycle is neutral (bc=0) and oil prices are at their average value (oil=0),
firms set domestic prices 46% higher than the marginal cost of production. Note that the
positive coefficient on bc implies that the mark-up is pro-cyclical. The significant negative
coefficient on oil confirms that oil price increases are not fully transmitted in the domestic
price level but partly absorbed by firms’ profit rates.
Although graphical inspection reveals a close relation between export prices and marginal
cost, we are unable to detect a stable causal relation running from marginal cost to export
prices. Rather, export prices are found to exert some feedback on marginal cost. This
observation suggests that – in contrast to the theory presented in section 2 - exporting firms
are price takers on the international market. In order to safeguard profitability, (marginal) cost
has to adjust to changes in prices on the export market (this adjustment for instance occurs
                                                                
7 Oil prices have been included as deviations from the average oil price over the sample period.
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through changes in labour productivity). Although deviations appear to be long lasting, a
tentative exploration of the relation between Pf and P* indeed shows a close connection in the
long run. In the remainder of this paper export prices (Pf) are therefore assumed to be
exogenously determined on the world market.
4.3. Wage bargaining
The estimated long-run cointegrating wage bargaining relation is specified as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) )ln(ln)1ln(
)ln(lnln)ln(ln1ln 0
bszbstbs
rrbuqcpXp
Ut
BuQPPW
bpbb
bbbbbb
+++-
+-++-+=
where Ubs measures union bargaining strength, defined as union membership as a percentage
of the labour force, and Brr is the gross benefit replacement rate. The results are reported in
table 4. The ECM statistic shows that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected
at the 5% level of significance. Since the results from estimating an unrestricted wage
function show that there is no significant long-run effect of taxes to be paid by the firm (tbs)
and the real profit rate (p) on the bargained wage, we only report results imposing b tbs = bp =
0. Note that taxes to be paid by the firm have a strong short-run impact on the bargained
wage. Next, the observation that bp is not statistically different from 1, is consistent with
wages being automatically indexed to consumer prices. However, we did not impose bp = 1 as
this slightly deteriorated the fit of the model. Further, the coefficient on labour productivity is
significantly smaller than one, indicating that – at least over the sample period - productivity
growth is not fully transmitted into wages. The remaining coefficients all have signs
confirming theoretical predictions. Unemployment appears to exert only a moderate
downward pressure on real wages, though. Union membership in contrast has a strong
positive impact on the bargained real wage.
4.4. Aggregate consumption function
The results from estimating the private consumption function (table 4) show a long-run
marginal propensity to consume equal to 0.82. Further, we note that in the short-run
consumption falls in response to a rise in unemployment. The underlying idea is that a rise in
unemployment negatively affects consumer confidence. The ECM statistic being significant
at the 1% level strongly suggests cointegration.
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Table 4 Parameter estimates (3SLS) and residual diagnostics for price setting, wage
bargaining, aggregate consumption demand and the external sector (1965-96)a
Price Setting
P*d,t =(1.464 +3.403 bct –0.008 oilt) ( )tt XC ¶¶  +0.321 9693d
(0.063) (0.797) (0.002) (0.048)
DPd,t =-0.273 (Pd,t-1 - P*d,t-1) +0.374 DPd,t-1 +0.194 ( )tt XC ¶¶D  -0.195 ( )11 -- ¶¶D tt XC  +0.033 9693dD
(0.053) (0.138) (0.047) (0.067) (0.009)
Wage Bargaining
ln(W*t) =2.564 +0.708 ln(Pc,t) +0.292ln(Px,t) +0.743 ln(Qt) -0.112 ln(ut) +0.262 ln(B/Wt)
(1.260) (0.196) (-) (0.092) (0.035) (0.068)
+1.030 ln(Ubs,t)
(0.112)
Dln(Wt) =-0.526(ln(Wt-1) - ln(W*t-1)) -0.093Dln(W)t-1 +0.407Dln(Pc)t +0.503Dln(Q)t
(0.092) (0.110) (0.103) (0.181)
-0.869Dln(1+tbs)t + 0.263Dln(Ubs)t
(0.314) (0.160)
Aggregate consumption function
C*p,t = 251 491 +0.822 (Ydis,t/Pc,t)
(155 864)(0.024)
DC*p,t =-0.305 (Cp,t-1 – C*p,t-1) +0.260 D(Ydis/Pc)t – 4 974 024Dut + 3 166 849Dut-1-3 233 668Dut-2
(0.051) (0.136) (687 758) (646 876) (1 024 098)
The coverage rate of exports over final imports
ln(Xf/IM)*t =7.518 -0.197 ln(Pd/PIM)t -0.425ln(Pf/P*)t -0.413ln(EXPd)t
(1.099) (0.081) (0.169) (0.071)
Dln(Xf/IM)t =-0.670 (ln(Xf/IM)t-1 - ln(Xf/IM)*t-1) -0.692 Dln(Pd/PIM)t +0.978Dln(EXPw)t
(0.116) (0.188) (0.417)
Cointegration tests
Pd,t ln(Wt) Cp,t ln(Xf/IM)t
tECM -5.11 -5.72 -5.92 -5.76
MacKinnon 1% critical value -5.74 -6.16 -4.28 -5.29
MacKinnon 5% critical value -4.90 -5.29 -3.55 -4.48
R² and residual diagnostics b
DPd,t D ln(Wt) DCp,t Dln(Xf/IM)t
R² 0.88 0.97 0.90 0.61
Normality c²(2) = 0.77 [0.68] 0.52 [0.77] 1.77 [0.41] 0.57 [0.75]
Serial correlation c²(4) = 4.60 [0.33] 3.71 [0.45] 2.84 [0.58] 4.93 [0.30]
a Standard errors in parentheses, p-values between square brackets.
b Jarque-Bera (JB) test for residual normality and Box-Pierce (BP) test for fourth-order serial correlation.
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4.5. The coverage rate of exports over final imports
Turning to the coverage rate of exports over final imports, both higher domestic demand and
higher domestic prices and export prices reduce exports relative to imports. Higher import
prices and higher prices on the world market have the opposite effect. Note that we have
imposed price homogeneity by including ln(Pd/Pim) and ln(Pf/P*). Real foreign expenditures
did not have any significant effect on Xf/IM and were therefore dropped from the
cointegrating vector. Again the null of no cointegration is clearly rejected.
5 SYSTEM SIMULATIONS
In this section, we explore the impact of changes to the public capital stock on – among other
variables - unemployment, economic growth, nominal wages, prices, productivity and the
government budget deficit by simulating the model estimated in section 4 under an alternative
public investment policy. More specifically, we analyse how the economy would have
evolved if the strong decline in public investments during the period 1982-89 had not
occurred. Taking the evolution of the exogenous variables as given, section 5.1. tests the
ability of the estimated model to capture the actual evolution in the endogenous variables by
dynamically simulating the model over the period 1970-1996. In section 5.2., we compare the
simulation results under the alternative public investment policy with this benchmark
simulation.
5.1. Benchmark simulation8
Figure 2 compares the actual evolution in total cost (C), the cost share of labour (SE), the cost
share of capital (SK), the cost share of materials (SM), real output (X), productivity of labour
(Q), the nominal gross wage (W), the consumer price level (PC), the unemployment rate (u)
and the government budget (Budget) with the evolution of these variables obtained from the
dynamic simulation over the period 1970-96.9 Endogenous variables calculated from the
benchmark simulation are indicated with ‘_bench’. Generally spoken, our model is able to
capture the major movements in the endogenous variables. The fit is not perfect, though. The
model  appears  to  slightly  overestimate  economic  activity  in  the  period  1981-85 while
                                                                
8 Due to lack of data, G2 is assumed to be equal to 1.
9 The model was simulated over the period 1970-96 since no data were available from 1965 onward for some
of the variables included in the identities.
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Figure 2 Benchmark simulation (1970-96)
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underestimating it in the period 1990-93. As a result output, total cost, the cost share of labour
and nominal wages are overestimated in the first period and underestimated in the second
period. The unemployment rate, the government deficit and the cost share of materials in
contrast are underestimated in the period 1981-85 while being overestimated in the period
1990-93
5.2. Alternative public investment policy
Since the beginning of the 1970s, a lot of OECD countries have witnessed a massive build-up
of government debt.  In Belgium for instance, the gross government debt ratio exceeded 100%
of GDP in 1982, whereas ten years earlier it was less than 65%. The explosion of the
government debt and deficit forced the Belgian government to adopt two long-lasting fiscal
consolidation programmes, in particular in 1982-87 and 1992-96. Since it is politically easier
to cut back on investment spending than on current expenditures (which include for instance
transfers and government wages), tight fiscal policy very often involves strong cuts in public
investment. Figure 3 shows that real public investment in Belgium fell back from 4.63% of
(business sector) GDP in 1981 to less than 1.75% in 1989. Fiscal consolidation in the 1990s
was realised mainly by increases in taxes, leaving current expenditures and investments
largely unaffected.
Figure 3 Real public investments (% of business sector GDP) and real public capital stock
(in billions) under the alternative investment policy
In this section, we analyse how the economy would have evolved if the strong decline in
public investments during the period 1982-89 had not occurred. Special attention is paid to
labour market implications. As an interesting by-product, the simulations allow for a time
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series test of the well-known hypothesis that in order to be successful, fiscal consolidation
should not rely on cutting public investment.
The alternative public investment series (Ig_sim) is obtained by fixing the share of public
investment in (business sector) GDP on its 1981 level during the period 1982-89. From 1989
onward, the simulated investment rate is again allowed to vary - starting form its higher 1989
level - with the actual rate. From the alternative investment series, we then calculate the
corresponding public capital stock (Kg_sim) using the perpetual inventory method used by the
Belgian Federal Planning Bureau in the calculation of the original capital stock series. Figure
3 compares the actual and the alternative series. Under the alternative investment policy there
is clearly no strong decline in the growth rate of the public capital stock. In 1996, the
hypothetical public capital stock would be 28.5% higher than observed in reality.
Inserting Ig_sim and Kg_sim, the model is dynamically simulated over the period 1970-1996.
Figure 4 reports the simulation results for the key endogenous variables (indicated with
‘_sim’). Concerning the impact of higher public capital spending on private sector
performance, a number of interesting observations stand out. (i) Although public capital is
cost saving, a shock to public capital investment does not lower the volume of private sector
cost. In contrast, 1996 costs are 2.6% higher than the benchmark simulation. (ii) The cost
shares of labour and materials decrease slightly, in favour of a higher cost share of private
capital. Given the small increase in total costs, the 1996 private sector capital stock is 13.2%
larger, while the volume of imported materials is largely unaffected (graphs not reported). (iii)
Compared to the benchmark simulation, 1996 real private sector output is 5.7% higher. (iv)
The average annual growth rate of private sector labour productivity over the period 1982-
1996 equals 2.5% compared to 1.6% in the benchmark simulation. (v) The average annual
growth rate of nominal wages is 0.3% point higher, resulting in a 6.8% higher nominal wage
in 1996. As consumer prices are largely unaffected, the increase in the nominal wage implies
a similar increase in the real wage. (vi) Given the moderate increase in cost, the decrease in
the cost share of labour combined with the increase in wages implies a decrease in private
sector employment with 162000 units. As a result, the 1996 unemployment rate has increased
from 11.8% in the benchmark simulation to 15.6%, an increase with 3.8% points. (vii) As
higher output has been produced with more or less stable costs, profits have increase strongly
from 12.7% of GDP in the benchmark simulation to 16% of GDP under the alternative public
investment policy (graph not reported).
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Figure 4 Simulation under the alternative public investment policy (1970-96)
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In order to give a better insight in how the reported results are produced, figure 5 outlines the
major channels of influence of a shock to public capital spending on private sector
performance, with special attention to the evolution of private sector input factors. Generally
speaking public capital affects private sector inputs through three different channels: (i)
complementary or substitution effects for given output, (ii) effects from changes in aggregate
demand and the level of output (iii) effects from changes in real wages. Each of these
channels can be subdivided in a ‘direct’ effect through changes in factor cost shares (for given
total costs) and an ‘indirect’ effect through changes in total costs (for given factor cost
shares).
As for the first channel, the simulations of the cost function show that direct complementary
or substitution effects [2] account for a 0.4% and 1.8% point decrease in the cost shares of
labour and materials respectively. The cost share of private capital increases with 2.2% points.
For given cost, the decrease in the labour cost share implies a decrease in private sector
employment with 23000 units. Given the statistically significant positive shadow price of
public capital, 1996 total cost (for given output, wages and prices) decreases with 5% [3]. For
given cost shares, this reduction in total cost implies a decrease in private sector employment
with 118000 units [4]. The total effect of complementary or substitution effects on the
unemployment rate through the combination of relations [2], [3] and [4] - measured by the
factor bias of labour with respect to public capital reported in table 3 - is plotted in the left-
hand side panel of figure 6. In 1996, substitution of labour for public capital accounted for a
3.3% point increase in unemployment. Public capital and private capital were found to be
complements, i.e. the 1996 private capital stock has increased (for given demand and wages)
by 8.5% in response to the shock to public investment.
The second channel concerns the effect of public capital on factor inputs through changes in
aggregate demand. In the first place, aggregate demand increases due to the increase in public
investment [5], accounting for a 1.4% increase in 1996 real output compared to the
benchmark simulation. As the effects of the increase in the public capital stock propagate
through the system, output is further affected by changes in private sector investment and
private consumption10. Private sector investment, calculated from changes in the private
sector capital stock [8], contributed 2.9% to the increase in output. Private domestic
                                                                
10 Note that exports are not affected by the change in public investment as they are sold on the export market at
an exogenously determined price.
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consumption, affected by household disposable income [11] and the aggregate domestic price
level [16], contributed another 1.4%. As a result, the total increase in 1996 output amounts
5.7%. The simulations of the cost function show that this increase in aggregate demand [6]
implies a 2.0% and 0.2% point reduction in the cost shares of labour and capital respectively.
The cost share of imported materials increases with 2.2% points. For given cost, the decrease
in the labour cost share implies a decrease in private sector employment with 148000 units.
Given a cost flexibility of output of 0.92, the increase in private sector output implies an
increase in 1996 total cost of about 5.2% [7]. For given cost shares, this increase in total cost
implies an increase in private sector employment with 154000 units [4]. Taking into account
the decrease in the labour cost share, this leaves a positive net effect on employment - as
measured by the factor biases with respect to output reported in table 3 – of 6000 units or a
decrease in the unemployment rate with 0.13% point (see figure 6). Although the idea that
employment and output are independent in the long run is consistent with a-priori
expectations, one would expect to find a (considerable) positive impact in the short run. The
small short-run impact implied by the estimates is most probably due to the specification of
the dynamic cost function implying a significant amount of common response of factor shares
to shocks. As we have mentioned before, the resulting speed of adjustment towards the
equilibrium appears to be overestimated.
Figure 5 Impact of shocks to public investment on private sector performance
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Finally, real wages are indirectly affected by an increase in the public capital stock through
changes in labour productivity [9], changes in the unemployment rate [10] and changes in the
aggregate domestic price level [16]. As prices are largely unaffected, they do not have a
significant effect on wages.
Figure 6 Deviation of the unemployment rate and the government budget (% of GDP) from
their benchmark simulation, split-up according to explanatory factors
Due to higher output being produced with less labour, 1996 labour productivity is 13.3%
higher compared to the benchmark simulation. As only 74% is transmitted into wages, the
impact of the increase in productivity on wages amounts 9.8% in 1996. The question is how
an increase in real wages due to productivity growth affects employment. Since in the model
outlined in section 3 both workers and firms have market power, each group will attempt to
obtain a particular share of the economy’s product. The unemployment rate reconciles the real
wage that is claimed by wage bargainers and the real wage that is consistent with the price
setters’ profit aspirations. As a rise in the bargained real wage in line with increasing labour
productivity is not inconsistent with the real wage from the price setters’ profit aspirations,
there is at first sight no need for unemployment to change as there are no competing claims to
reconcile. In principle, the growth rate in real wages falling behind productivity growth
should even bring about increasing employment. However, one should keep in mind that the
rise in the real wage induces, ceteris paribus, an increase in the relative factor cost of labour.
The degree to which relative factor costs affect employment depends on the elasticities of
substitution between labour on the one hand and capital and imported materials on the other.
In the absence of substitution between factor inputs, labour demand is unaffected. If there is
scope for substitution, though, firms will respond by substituting labour for the relatively
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cheaper capital and materials.11 By doing so firms are able to increase their profits by
appropriating a larger part of the benefits of the initial increase in labour productivity. Given a
price elasticity of labour with respect to wages of about -0.23, the 9.8% increase in wages due
to higher productivity growth accounts for – through the combined effect of relations [12],
[13] and [4] - a decrease in 1996 private sector employment with 2.3% or 50000 units.
As the increase in labour productivity and the substitution of labour for public capital have,
ceteris paribus, raised the unemployment rate, the full impact of wages on employment
depends on how unions react to the higher rate of unemployment. If the responsiveness of real
wages to unemployment is large enough, the increase in real wages due to higher labour
productivity will be overruled by the negative effect of unemployment on real wages. Given
the estimated low responsiveness of real wages to unemployment, the increase in
unemployment has offset only part of the rise in real wages, though, leaving a net positive
effect of 6.8%. This 6.8% increase in wages accounts for a decrease in 1996 private sector
employment with 1.4% or 31000 units. To contribution to the change in unemployment
amounts 0.7% points in 1996 (see figure 6).
Besides the impact on private sector performance, the simulations also allow to detect the
effect of higher public investment on the government budget. Figure 4 shows that the gross
government budget balance worsens considerably during the years of the fixed public
investment rate (1982-89), reaching a maximum increase in the deficit of 2.9% of (business
sector) GDP in 1990. From 1991 onwards the budget improves. As a result, the increase in the
deficit has declined to 0.8% of GDP in 1996. Although this is still a significant burden on the
government’s financial balances, extrapolation of the evolution of the government budget
suggests a decrease, relative to the benchmark simulation, in the deficit from about 1998
onwards. These results confirm the well-known hypothesis from the literature on the success
and failure of fiscal consolidation that in order to be successful, i.e. leading to a permanent
reduction in government debt and deficit ratios, fiscal consolidations should not rely on cuts
in public investment. The observation that it takes quite some time for increases (decreases) in
investment spending to feedback to the government budget through beneficial (harmful)
growth effects, also suggests why governments are tempted to reduce investment spending
                                                                
11 Note that the substitution of labour for capital and materials – for a given output – in the second round further
increases labour productivity. As a result, the unemployment rate will increase further.
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during periods of fiscal consolidation and why they might be reluctant to reinstate investment
rates at their old levels once the budgetary position has improved.
The right-hand side of figure 6 graphs the break-down of the total change in the government
budget (reported as a percent of business sector GDP) into its main components, i.e. (i) public
investment, (ii) unemployment benefits and taxes on labour (iii) indirect taxes and taxes on
profits and (iv) interest payments on government debt. Changes in these components are
measured as a percentage of the benchmark business sector GDP. The contribution of the rise
in business sector GDP is taken as a separate explanatory variable (labelled output growth).
The break-down shows that the worsening of the gross government budget over the period
1982-89 is mainly due to the increase in the gap between realised and simulated public
investments. In 1989, higher public investments imply a burden on the budget of 2.8% of
GDP. In real terms, this gap no longer widens from 1989 onward. In nominal terms, there is a
further increase cumulating to an increase in nominal expenditures of 3.2% of GDP in 1996
compared to the benchmark simulation. The government’s financial balance also experiences
negative effects from rising unemployment due to (i) lower receipts from taxes on labour and
(ii) higher expenditures on unemployment benefits. This negative effect reaches a maximum
of 1.2% of GDP in 1992. Due to the positive effect of the increase in wages, the negative
effect of higher unemployment has decreased to 0.5% in1996. As economic growth
accelerates with the building up of the public capital stock, indirect tax and profit tax receipts
slowly increase. Starting from 0.1% of GDP in 1982, these tax gains increase to reach 4.0% of
GDP in 1996. Further, for a given deficit higher economic growth implies an ‘accounting’
gain as the deficit is expressed as a percentage of GDP. This accounting effect amounts to a
0.8% point decrease in the deficit in 1993. As the government budget deficit decreases
strongly from 1994 onward, this gain has largely disappeared in 1996. Finally, by increasing
gross government debt, the cumulation of deficits implies additional interest payments,
amounting about 1.4% of GDP in 1996.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper analyses the impact of public capital on private sector performance in Belgium, in
particular employment. We estimate a dynamic structural model which explains – among
other variables – private output, private cost, private employment, private capital formation,
wage bargaining and price setting. The estimates show that services from public capital
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significantly reduce private sector total cost (for given output and wages). An increase in the
public capital stock with 1 EURO reduces long-run private sector cost with 0.24 EURO. The
output elasticity of public capital implied by these estimates equals 0.31, confirming the value
found in our earlier research (Everaert and Heylen, 2000). As for the impact on private sector
inputs, the results suggest that public capital and labour are substitutes. Public capital and
private capital are found to be complements.
To find out whether the negative relationship between public capital and employment is
altered once the effect of a change in public capital on aggregate demand and wages is taken
into account, the model is simulated for 1970-96 under the assumption that the strong decline
in public investment in 1982-89 did not occur. Due to direct substitution of labour for public
capital, the private sector unemployment rate would have been 3.3% points higher under this
alternative investment policy. Possible positive effects on employment might derive from the
increase in aggregate demand resulting from the increase in public investment. As labour
demand was found to be largely insensitive to changes in aggregate demand, the benefits in
terms of employment are very moderate, accounting for only a small decrease in the
unemployment rate. One should be very cautious in interpreting this result, though. As
suggested in section 5, the very small impact of output on labour market performance is most
probably due to the estimates of the dynamic cost function implying a very fast adjustment of
factor shares toward their long-run equilibrium. Further, real wage demands increased due to
a strong rise in labour productivity. As the employment share in cost was found to be
independent of public capital, the productivity benefits resulting from an increase in the
public capital stock can - for given costs - only be incorporated in real wages at the expense of
lower employment. Therefore, the increase in real wages has induced a further rise in the
unemployment rate. The combined effect accounted for a 3.8% point increase in the 1996
unemployment rate.
These results suggest that the strong positive correlation between trend public capital growth
and the employment rate observed in figure 1 is produced by the evolution in a third factor,
affecting public investment and employment simultaneously, rather than resulting from a
direct causal relation running from public capital to employment. One possible candidate is
the massive build-up of government debt since the 1970s – whatever its cause – triggering
fiscal responses that negatively affected the structural characteristics of the labour market
(e.g. higher taxes on labour) and ‘forced’ the government to cut investment spending.
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Finally, our simulations confirm the hypothesis from the literature on the success and failure
of fiscal consolidation that – in order to be successful - fiscal consolidations should not rely
on cuts in public investment. Although the government deficit widens considerably during the
first years of the increase in investment, the budget improves as the positive growth effects of
a higher public capital stock slowly increase tax receipts. In 1996, the increase in the
government deficit still amounted 0.8% of GDP. As the higher public capital stock will
continue to spur economic growth, the deficit will most probably decrease – relative to the
benchmark simulation - from the end of the 1990s onward, though.
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APPENDIX A: DATA DESCRIPTIONS
The data are taken from various sources: OECD Economic Outlook (EO), OECD Business
Sector Data Base (BSDB), OECD Data Extraction Service DES, National Accounts data from
the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau and foreign trade data from the National Bank of
Belgium. For data taken from OECD sources, the relevant OECD code is reported between
square brackets. Variables that can be calculated from the identities outlined in section 2 are
not included.
G1 Share of business sector profits paid to households as dividends.
(Source: Belgian Federal Planning Bureau)
dK Depreciation rate for private capital. In order to match the retirement pattern of assets
implied by the perpetual inventory method used in the calculation of the private sector
capital stock, dk is variable over the sample period.
(Source: Belgian Federal Planning Bureau)
A Knowledge stock, cumulated from data for patents granted by the US Patent and
Trademark Office.
(Source: Everaert and Heylen, 2000)
Bc Business cycle, calculated as deviation of business sector GDP from its Hodrick-
Prescott trend.
B Nominal unemployment benefit.
(Source: RVA jaarverslag, several issues)
Brr Benefit replacement rate, overall average.
(Source: OECD Database on Benefit Entitlements and Gross Replacement Rates)
Cg Real government non-wage consumption [CGNWV] (million 1990 prices).
(Source: OECD EO)
Cp Real private consumption expenditures [CPV] (million 1990 prices).
(Source: OECD EO)
E Private sector dependent employment [EEP].
(Source: OECD BSDB)
Eg Government employment [EG].
(Source: OECD EO)
EXPw Real world imports (1990=1), calculated as an (export-) weighted average of real imports
of our 7 most important trade partners.
(Source: OECD EO & National Bank of Belgium)
G Total Government outlays [YPG+IGG]
(Source OECD EO)
Ig Capital formation by the government.
(Source: Belgian Federal Planning Bureau)
Ih Capital formation by households [IH].
(Source: OECD EO)
IM Imported aggregate volume of final goods and services (million 1990 prices).
(Source: National Bank of Belgium)
Is Stockbuilding [ISK].
(Source: OECD EO)
K Private sector capital stock (million 1990 prices).
(Source: Belgian Federal Planning Bureau)
KG Public sector capital stock (million 1990 prices).
(Source: Belgian Federal Planning Bureau)
Ls Labour force [LF]
(Source: OECD EO)
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M Imported intermediate inputs (million 1990 prices).
(Source: National Bank of Belgium)
oil Oil prices (in US$), deviation from sample average.
(Source: IMF International Financial Statistics)
P* Price of foreign final products on the world markets (1990=1), calculated as an (export-)
weighted average of prices on the domestic markets of our 7 most important trade
partners.
(Source: OECD EO & National Bank of Belgium)
Pd Price of domestic production sold on the domestic market (1990=1).
(Source: National Bank of Belgium)
Pf Price of domestic production sold on the world market (1990=1).
(Source: National Bank of Belgium)
Pim Price of imported final products on the domestic market (1990=1).
(Source: National Bank of Belgium)
Pinv Deflator of private investments (1990=1).
(Source: Belgian Federal Planning Bureau)
PM Deflator for imported intermediate inputs (1990=1).
(Source: National Bank of Belgium)
Rn Nominal long-term interest rate [IRL].
(Sources: OECD EO)
R Real long-term interest rate, calculated as the nominal long-term interest rate [IRL] minus
expected inflation in investment prices. The latter is calculated as the growth rate of the
trend in Pinv.
(Sources: OECD EO & Belgian Federal Planning Bureau)
T Total Government receipts [YRG+CFKG+KTRRG]
(Source: OECD EO)
tbd Tax rate on profits to be paid by the firm [TYB/(Pn-P0)]
(Source: OECD EO)
tbs Tax rate on labour to be paid by the firm [TRPBSH/(WSSS-CGW-TRPBSH)].
(Source: OECD EO & OECD DES)
tc Tax rate on households’ capital income, fixed at 15%.
tind The rate of indirect taxes [(TIND-TSUB)/(CPAA+CGNW+IT-TIND-TSUB)].
(Source: OECD EO)
tw Tax rate on gross wages to be paid by employees, calculated by dividing total direct
taxes on gross wages to be paid by employees [TRPESH] through by total gross wages
[WSSS-TRPBSH-TRPGSH].
(Source: OECD EO)
u Unemployment rate [UNR].
(Source: OECD EO)
Ubs Union membership as a percentage of the labour force.
(Source: Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1990 )
W Wage rate in the business sector calculated by dividing gross wages in the private sector
[WSSS-CGW-TRPBSH] through by private sector dependent employment [EEP].
Notice that the contribution of employers to pension funds [TRPBPH] is included in W.
(Sources: OECD EO, OECD BSDB & OECD DES)
Wg Wage rate in the public sector calculated by dividing gross wages in the public sector
[CGW-TRPGSH] through by government employment [EG]. Notice that the
contribution of the government to pension funds [TRPGPH] is included in Wg.
(Sources: OECD EO & OECD DES)
Xf Domestic output sold on the world markets (million 1990 prices).
(Source: National Bank of Belgium)
Yc Capital income received by households.
(Source: Belgian Federal Planning Bureau)
Ydis Household disposable income [YDH].
(Source: OECD EO)
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APPENDIX B: DERIVATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM WAGE EQUATION
As we have explained in the main text, the nominal gross wage is assumed to result from the
maximisation of the following Nash-bargaining maximand:
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Rewriting (15’) in logs, we obtain:
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For a maximum of this function with respect to the wage (and noting that for individual
bargaining units tax rates and aggregate prices are exogenous), it is required that:
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with: eE,W the absolute value of the wage elasticity of employment.
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P
+
+=
- X
bs
WE zP
tEW
HW
W )1(
,re (B3)
where PX stands for the output price (see main text). Both multiplying and dividing the second
term on the right-hand side of this equation by real value added (Y) we obtain that
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with: SL the share of real labour cost in real value added,
p real profit per unit of real value added.
                                                                
12 Eg is constant, i.e. no hiring by the public sector.
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To proceed from (B4) we shall first - following Nixon and Urga (1999) - assume that in the
long-run equilibrium employment is no longer an argument in the union’s utility function (i.e.
r goes to 0). Replacing H by equation (16) and rearranging this gives:
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Second, we plausibly assume that all private sector bargaining units show the same optimising
behaviour, implying that 
-
= WW . The first order condition for wage setting then becomes:
LS
z
W
BWuf p
=
- ))(( 
)( 
1
ufS
z
W
B
L
p
-= (B6)
where B/W stands for the unemployment benefit replacement rate.
As a further step, one should note that for realistic values of B/W (and thus also the right-hand
side of equation B6), the following close approximation exists:
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Finally, assuming that f(u)=ug , with g > 0, and noting that:
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with Q representing the productivity of labour (Q=Y/E), equation (B7) can be rewritten as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )zt
W
B
a
uQP
a
a
W bsX lnln)1ln(ln
1
)ln(lnlnln
11
2 +++-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ+-++-= pg (B8)
Equation (17) in the main text is a somewhat more flexible representation of this long-run
equilibrium relation. Flexibility concerns the parameters to be estimated and the fact that in
Belgium nominal wages are automatically indexed to aggregate consumer prices.
                                                                
13 To give an example, approximation is very close for B/W between 0.5 and 0.8 when a1=0.5 and a2=-1.
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Infrequent large shocks to unemployment
- New evidence on alternative persistence perspectives -
GERDIE EVERAERT*
September 2000
ABSTRACT: This paper tests whether the observed high persistence of unemployment rates in most
OECD-countries is due to (full) hysteresis against the alternative that it is caused by
adjustment toward an increased natural rate. The analysis relies on standard univariate
unit root tests. Usually such tests cannot reject the presence of a unit root in the
unemployment rate, pointing to full hysteresis. This paper shows that once we allow
for infrequent level-shifts, the unit root hypothesis can clearly be rejected in almost all
of the 21 considered OECD-countries. The paper also suggests how to reconcile
infrequent large shocks with the natural rate hypothesis.
KEYWORDS: Unemployment, persistence, unit root, infrequent large shocks, natural rate .
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important challenges for future macroeconomic policy in the European
Union is the dismantlement of mass unemployment. While unemployment rates rise sharply
in all OECD-countries during cyclical downturns, a more acute problem experienced
especially in the European countries is that unemployment shows a strong tendency to remain
close to the newly attained higher level despite subsequent cyclical recoveries. Starting from
about 2% in the 1960s, European unemployment has risen to a rate of 10% in 1999. In the US
in contrast the unemployment rate has fluctuated around a stable level of about 6% over the
last 4 decades, reaching an historically low level just above 4% at the end of the 1990s.
Generally spoken, three alternative persistence perspectives have been put forward. The first
hypothesis argues that the rise in unemployment rates is caused by adjustment to an
underlying long-run equilibrium (natural) rate of unemployment which has increased in
response to changes in structural characteristics of the labour market. This hypothesis actually
dates back to models of the 1960s and 1970s, where the unemployment rate was assumed to
converge to an exogenously determined constant natural rate. In more recent years, this
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natural rate has been endogenised in terms of structural characteristics of the economy
affecting the interaction of wage bargaining by unions and employers and price and
employment determination by firms (see e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991; Phelps,
1994). Possible examples of such structural factors are the generosity of the unemployment
benefit system, the tightness of employment protection legislation and the wedge between real
wage costs and the real after tax consumption wage - all affecting wage bargaining - and
capital costs affecting the demand for labour. A second explanation that has attracted a lot of
attention since the mid 1980s is the existence of hysteresis effects. Hysteresis arises when the
medium-term equilibrium rate of unemployment is path-dependent, i.e. it depends on the
history of unemployment. One can show that in this case also the current level of
unemployment will depend on its own history. Hysteresis effects may stem from a variety of
microeconomic foundations: insider behaviour, outsider ineffectiveness and negative duration
effects, capacity scrapping (see e.g. Lindbeck and Snower, 1988; Carlin and Soskice, 1990).
In this interpretation, by increasing actual unemployment cutbacks in aggregate demand are
responsible for an increase in the medium-term equilibrium rate of unemployment, heralding
a period of persistent higher unemployment. In the case where the medium-term equilibrium
rate eventually converts back toward the long-run natural rate of unemployment, there is only
partial hysteresis. In the extreme case where each change in the actual rate of unemployment
completely feeds through into the long-run equilibrium rate, the traditional concept of the
natural rate disappears. This case is generally known as full or pure hysteresis. This is our
third hypothesis.
The policy implications of the alternative hypotheses are fundamentally different especially
concerning the effects of demand side policies. Since changes in the unemployment rate are
permanent if the labour market is characterised by full hysteresis, stabilisation policy is not
only very important - to avoid increases in the actual rate of unemployment - but also very
effective for it has permanent effects. If the unemployment rate converges toward a natural
rate in contrast, the prime concern of the government should be to keep this natural rate as
low as possible by affecting the structural characteristics of the economy. Depending on the
observed degree of medium-term persistence, demand side policies will only have temporary
effects in this case.
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As noted by Elmeskov and Macfarlan (1993), a direct methodology for assessing the nature of
unemployment persistence is analysing the time-series properties of the unemployment rate.
In standard (Dickey-Fuller) unit root tests, the null hypothesis of a unit root corresponds to
full hysteresis, while the alternative hypothesis implies reversion to a natural rate with the
observed degree of hysteresis depending on the speed of the convergence process.
Implementing these tests for 23 OECD-countries, Elmeskov and Macfarlan show that a unit
root cannot be rejected in any of the considered countries if stationarity is the alternative
hypothesis. When this alternative hypothesis includes a linear trend - which should capture a
slowly increasing natural rate - there is weak evidence of trend-stationarity only in three
countries. These results clearly favour the full hysteresis hypothesis in most countries.
Roughly the same conclusion is drawn by - among others - Mitchell (1993), Leslie et al.
(1995) and Song and Wu (1998).
These results should be interpreted with great care though. Leslie et al. (1995) show that in
small samples, standard unit root tests generally have low power against stationary
alternatives even if this alternative has a root far from unity. Since the null hypothesis is the
existence of a unit root, rejecting non-stationarity needs strong evidence against it. Given the
relatively small samples usually available, this might be an arduous thing to do. In order to
avoid the problem of low power, Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) have developed an alternative
test, which takes (trend-) stationarity as the null hypothesis. However, using this alternative
test, Leslie et al. (1995) are still not able to provide convincing evidence against the unit root
hypothesis. In an alternative attempt to raise power, Song and Wu (1998) proceed to use
panel-based unit root tests. The increased power of the test is mainly due to cross-equation
restrictions imposing an equal root in all countries. In contrast to univariate tests, a unit root
can be rejected once the data are pooled over countries. However, the degree of persistence
remains very high - i.e. higher than 95% in all specifications. From a policy perspective, this
result has highly similar implications as the finding of a unit root for it takes about 45 years to
reverse 90% of a shock to unemployment.
Besides the low power of standard univariate unit root tests, the incapacity to reject the null of
a unit root might be caused by mis-specification of the alternative hypothesis (Elmeskov and
Macfarlan, 1993). Perron (1989) has pointed out that standard tests of the unit root hypothesis
against (trend-) stationary alternatives are biased toward non-rejection of the unit root if the
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true data generating process includes breaks in its deterministic components. This implies that
if the actual rate of unemployment reverts to a variable natural rate, traditional unit root tests
will be biased toward non-rejection of the full hysteresis hypothesis.
The possibility of a single break in the deterministic component of unemployment rates in the
OECD countries was first tested by Mitchell (1993), who allowed for a segmented linear
trend. Still, the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected in almost all countries. However, as
noted by the author, these results should be interpreted with great care for the determination
of the timing of the break points was the result of an unsatisfactory ‘eye-balling’ exercise.
Endogenising the timing of the break date, Arestis and Mariscal (2000) are able to reject the
unit root hypothesis in 9 out of 22 countries.
The results in both Mitchell (1993) and Arestis and Mariscal (2000) rely on the assumption
that only a single break has occurred. In this paper, I allow for multiple breaks in the mean of
the unemployment rate. The actual specification of the alternative hypothesis is data-
dependent, relying on Tsay’s (1988) outlier detection algorithm, which is designed to identify
significant outliers in the unemployment series. Especially level-shifting outliers are of
particular importance for they imply infrequent permanent shocks to the mean of the
unemployment rate. Balke and Fomby (1991) show that although measures of persistence are
the same regardless of the frequency of permanent shocks, this frequency has important
implications for how one should interpret the long-run persistence in time series. If level-
shifting innovations occur with high frequency - i.e. in every period - and with ‘low’ variance,
unemployment contains a unit root. Since a unit root implies that all individual innovations
are permanent, unemployment persistence is caused by full hysteresis. If the unemployment
rate is characterised by infrequent permanent shocks with ‘high’ variance, only a small
number of significant economic events have permanent effects. Since most innovations have
only temporary effects, the full hysteresis hypothesis must be rejected in this case.
The results show that infrequent large shocks are indeed responsible for the apparent unit
root in unemployment rates. Once these infrequent large shocks are controlled for, there is
good evidence against the unit root hypothesis in most countries. A similar argument, albeit
completely different in methodology, has been made by Belke and Göcke (1996), who argue
that the rejection of a cointegrating relationship between employment and real wages - among
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some other variables - is not due to ‘unit root persistence’ in unemployment - implying a
degeneration of the adjustment toward the equilibrium - but must be attributed to structural
breaks in the cointegrating relationship due to serious economic shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reproduces the results from
traditional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. To make sure that the finding of
full hysteresis is not due to the lack of power of ADF-tests in small samples, I also run two
alternative tests taking stationarity as the null hypothesis. Section 3 outlines the procedure for
detecting infrequent large shocks and reports the results for the unemployment rate in the
considered 21 OECD-countries. The identified shocks are then used to estimate intervention
models from which the unit root hypothesis can be tested. Section 4 concludes by discussing
how one can interpret infrequent large shocks in terms of the alternative persistence
hypotheses.
2. STANDARD UNIT ROOT TESTS
Before estimating intervention models allowing for infrequent large shocks, some results from
standard unit root tests are reported for comparison. Columns 2 and 3 of table 1 report the
results from running Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on the unemployment rate (u) with the
following standard specification:
0 1 1
p
t t i t i ti
u u u ur a e- -=D = + + D +å (1)
under the null hypothesis (r = 0) we have a unit root corresponding to full hysteresis while
the alternative hypothesis (r < 0) implies adjustment to a constant natural rate (-u0/r) with the
degree of hysteresis depending on the persistence of deviations from this natural rate.
At the 5% level, the ADF test cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root in any of the
considered countries. If we reject with 90% confidence, a unit root can be rejected in only two
countries, i.e. Portugal and the US. Consistent with the conclusion of Elmeskov and
MacFarlan (1993), the results do not support the hypothesis of mean reversion to a constant
natural rate. Dickey-Fuller tests including a linear trend in the alternative hypothesis yield
similar results. They are not included in table 1, though. The main reason is that I’m not
convinced that trend-stationarity is a relevant alternative hypothesis. Not only is trend-
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stationarity impossible for a bounded series like the unemployment rate1, a linear trend would
also imply a fixed yearly increase in the natural rate, which is hard to reconcile with the true
evolution of structural characteristics of the economy.
Table 1 Testing stationarity of unemployment rates (1960-99) a
Augmented Kwiatkowski et al. test
c
Leybourne and Persistence
d
Dickey-Fuller testb McCabe testc
Lag truncation parameter q
Countries Lags tm 2 4 6 8 Lags sb
Australia p = 0 -1.31 1.26** 0.80** 0.61** 0.50** p = 0 3.41** 0.89(0.07)
Austria p = 1 -0.33 1.19** 0.76** 0.57** 0.47** p = 0 3.41** 0.99(0.05)
Belgium p = 2 -1.11 1.23** 0.78** 0.59** 0.50** p = 1 3.11** 0.95(0.05)
Canada p = 1 -1.84 0.97** 0.65** 0.51** 0.43* p = 0 2.64** 0.98(0.04)
Denmark p = 1 -1.57 1.13** 0.72** 0.55** 0.46* p = 0 3.13** 0.91(0.06)
Finland p = 2 -0.96 0.97** 0.65** 0.53** 0.48** p = 2 2.71** 0.90(0.08)
France p = 1 -0.92 1.38** 0.87** 0.65** 0.54** p = 1 3.57** 0.98(0.03)
Germany p = 1 -0.78 1.33** 0.86** 0.66** 0.55** p = 0 3.64** 0.99(0.04)
Greece p = 1 -1.31 0.86** 0.56** 0.43* 0.37* p = 2 2.41** 0.92(0.09)
Ireland p = 1 -1.52 1.01** 0.64** 0.49** 0.41* p = 0 2.81** 0.89(0.08)
Italy p = 1 -0.64 1.33** 0.85** 0.65** 0.54** p = 0 3.69** 0.99(0.04)
Japan p = 1 -0.46 1.22** 0.80** 0.63** 0.53** p = 0 3.30** 0.99(0.06)
Netherlands p = 1 -2.13 1.00** 0.65** 0.50** 0.42* p = 2 2.53** 0.91(0.06)
New Zealand p = 1 -1.14 1.21** 0.77** 0.59** 0.49** p = 0 3.38** 0.95(0.05)
Norway p = 1 -1.86 0.99** 0.64** 0.50** 0.43* p = 0 2.72** 0.89(0.08)
Portugal p = 1 -2.63* 0.74** 0.52** 0.43* 0.39* p = 4 1.52** 0.77(0.11)
Spain p = 1 -1.51 1.27** 0.80** 0.61** 0.50** p = 1 3.38** 0.97(0.04)
Sweden p = 1 -1.83 0.84** 0.58** 0.48** 0.44* p = 0 2.25** 0.86(0.10)
Switzerland p = 1 -1.83 0.94** 0.63** 0.50** 0.45* p = 2 1.43** 0.98(0.06)
UK p = 2 -1.22 1.04** 0.68** 0.52** 0.44* p = 2 2.75** 0.88(0.08)
US p = 1 -2.60* 0.30 0.22 0.19 0.18 p = 1 0.83** 0.50(0.15)
Notes: a Unemployment rates (commonly used definitions) are taken from the OECD Statistical compendium
1998/2. Data for 1998 and 1999 are based on estimates and projections.
b The critical values are equal to 3.61, 2.94 and 2.61 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance
respectively (MacKinnon, 1991).
c The critical values are equal to 0.739, 0.463 and 0.347 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance
respectively (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992).
d The persistence measure equals the estimated AR(1) coefficient in an ARMA(1,q) model for
unemployment, with the number of MA-components q determined such that any significant serial
correlation in the residuals was removed (Barro, 1988). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
** (*) rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% (10%) level of significance.
In order to deal with the low power of the Dickey-Fuller test, Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) have
developed an alternative test which takes (trend-) stationarity as the null hypothesis. The
                                                                
1 Leslie et al. (1995) argue that while the unemployment rate cannot permanently have a linear trend, a time
trend is still possible as long as the time domain is bounded.
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general idea is to express a series as the sum of a deterministic component, a random walk
and a stationary error term. The null hypothesis can be rejected if the variance of the random
walk component is significantly different from zero. In order to correct for serial correlation
in the error term, Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) use the Newey-West procedure to adjust the
standard errors.
A second test which takes (trend-) stationarity as the null hypothesis has been proposed by
Leybourne and McCabe (1994). The main difference with the test suggested by Kwiatkowski
et al. lies in the correction for serial correlation in the error term. While Kwiatkowski et al.
apply the Newey-West correction, Leybourne and McCabe proceed along the same lines as
the ADF test, including a specific parametric autoregressive structure, i.e. an ARIMA(p,1,1)
representation, in the model. Both simulation and theoretical evidence (Leybourne and
McCabe, 1994) reveal two important advantages of the latter approach. First, the outcome of
the test is found to be less sensitive to fitting redundant AR components, making it more
robust. Second, the test seems to have greater power to reject a false null hypothesis of (trend-
) stationarity.
Columns 4 to 9 of table 1 report the results from running both alternative testing procedures,
with stationarity as the relevant null hypothesis. The Leybourne and McCabe test clearly
rejects the hypothesis of stationarity in all countries. The evidence from the Kwiatkowski et
al. test is less straightforward. The main problem is that the results are highly sensitive to the
choice of the truncation lag, included to pick up autocorrelation in the error term (Newey-
West correction). Following the suggestions of Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), we consider values
for the lag truncation parameter up to eight, which is a trade-off between size and power of
the test2. In 10 out of the 21 considered countries, the hypothesis of stationarity can only be
rejected at the 10% level for q equal to 8. In Greece and Portugal, the same conclusion holds
for q equal to 6. In all other specifications, the null hypothesis is rejected except for the US
where the test results clearly point to stationarity in all specifications. Note that the fact that
stationarity cannot be rejected (with 90% confidence) for ‘large’ values of q might be due to
the decreasing power of the test as q grows.
                                                                
2 A large value for q, needed to avoid size distortions, significantly reduces the power of the test in small
samples. In a sample of about 50 observations, the test has reasonable power for q=4, while in order for the
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The overall picture that stems from the three different testing procedures is that there is
considerable evidence in favour of the hypothesis of a unit root in the unemployment rate of
all considered countries except the US where the results point - although the evidence is weak
- in the direction of stationarity. The fact that the results from the Dickey-Fuller tests are
confirmed by the alternative Leybourne and McCabe test - and to a lesser degree by the
Kwiatkowski et al. test - suggests that the lack of power of standard unit root tests is not the
main reason for the non-rejection of the unit root hypothesis. The results from the unit root
tests are confirmed by estimating the persistence in unemployment rates from simple ARMA
models. Measured persistence is close to - and not significantly different from - one in all
countries except the US (and maybe Portugal) where we have clear mean reversion.
However, these results do not allow to conclude that the major part of the OECD-countries
are plagued with full hysteresis in their labour markets. Although Dickey-Fuller tests are
asymptotically robust in uncovering I(1) behaviour, they are unable to distinguish between
two alternative sources of this non-stationarity, i.e. whether shocks occur each period or
infrequently (Balke and Fomby, 1991)3. This frequency of shocks is crucial for the
interpretation of long-run persistence in time series, though. Non-rejection of a unit root is
evidence in favour of full hysteresis only if permanent innovations to the unemployment rate
occur every period. If the non-stationarity is caused by infrequent shifts in the deterministic
component of the unemployment rate, full hysteresis must be rejected. In the next section, we
check whether infrequent large shocks are responsible for the apparent non-stationarity of
unemployment rates.
3. INFREQUENT LARGE SHOCKS AND THE UNIT ROOT HYPOTHESIS
The major problem with the tests in section 2 is that they cannot identify the source of non-
stationarity in the unemployment rate, making them unable to distinguish between the three
alternative persistence perspectives outlined in the introduction. In this section, we use Tsay’s
(1988) outlier detection algorithm to identify infrequent large shocks to the unemployment
rate. Three alternative shocks are considered: additive outliers (AO), innovational outliers
(IO) and level-shifting (LS) outliers. With level data, both innovational and additive outliers
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
test to have more or less correct size, q should be raised to about 12.
3 The unemployment rate is I(1) regardless of the frequency of permanent shocks.
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imply temporary changes in unemployment, while level-shifting outliers represent permanent
shocks to the level of unemployment. Innovational and additive outliers are of interest mainly
because their occurrence can cause serious inference problems in standard unit root tests
while level-shifts are of particular interest for they may be responsible for the apparent I(1)
behaviour of unemployment rates. To check whether a unit root remains present in the data
once we control for infrequent large shocks, we estimate intervention models including
intervention dummies to capture the identified outliers.
3.1. Identifying infrequent large shocks
An iterative procedure for detecting outliers in univariate time series was developed by Tsay
(1988). His methodology is based on an unobserved components model in which the regular
series Zt is disturbed by an outlier component f(t)
( )Y Z f tt t= + . (2)
with Zt being described by a autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model
( ) ( )F L Z Lt t= +q q e0 , (3)
with F(L) and q(L) polynomials in L of degrees p and q respectively and e t an independent
Gaussian variate with mean zero and variance s²a. Tsay considers different types of outliers
nested in the following general specification for f(t)
( ) ( )f t B L Tbd= w 0 (4)
with w0 a constant denoting the initial impact of the disturbance, B(L) a polynomial in L
representing the dynamic effect of the outlier on Yt and Tbd indicating the timing of the
disturbance (i.e. Tbd  = 1 if t = d and zero otherwise). This paper considers three alternative
classes of outliers4:
(i) Additive Outliers  (AO): B L( ) = 1  => Only Yd is affected by the outlier. An
additive outlier occurs when the observation for a particular year is extreme but
subsequent observations remain unaffected. The standard example is a measurement
error.
                                                                
4 The model in (2)-(4) can easily be extended to allow for other types of disturbances.
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(ii) Innovational Outliers  (IO): ( ) ( )B L L L( ) = q F  => Dynamic effect on Yt from time
d onward. An innovational outlier occurs when a large innovation, e.g. an oil price
shock, propagates in the unemployment rate through the dynamics of the model.
(iii) Level-shifting Outliers  (LS): ( )B L L( ) = -1 1  => Permanent effect on Yt from time
d onward. A level-shift occurs when a large innovation induces a permanent increase
in the unemployment rate.
Defining ( ) ( )y L L Yt t= F q , ( ) ( )p q( )L L L= F  and ( ) ( )( ) 1L L Lh p= - , Tsay proposes to
use the following test statistics to identify the three alternative outliers:
( )
( )
l s w s
l r p r s w r s
l r h r s w r s
IO t t a IO t a
AO t A t t i t ii
T t
A t a AO t A t a
LS t L t t i t ii
T t
L t a LS t L t a
y
y y
y y
, ,
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
= =
= - =
= - =
+=
-
+=
-
å
å
2
1
2
1
(5)
with ( )r pA t iiT t,2 21
1
1= +
=
- -å  and ( )r hL t iiT t,2 21
1
1= +
=
- -å . The numerator of these tests
reflects the size of the outlier while the denominator captures its standard error. The critical
values for these test statistics are based on simulation results of Chang (1982), suggesting a
critical value in the range of 4.0 to 3.0. Consistent with other applications, we set the critical
value equal to 3.0.5 By using the lower end of the range, a larger number of outliers will be
identified. The significance of these outliers will be tested in the intervention models
estimated in the second part of this section.
In practice, outliers are identified through running a sequential detection algorithm, consisting
of an outer and an inner iteration. In the outer iteration an ARMA(p,q) model is estimated,
extracting the residuals and computing their variance. The results from the outer iteration are
then used in the inner iteration in which outliers are identified using the test statistics
described in equation (5). If an outlier is detected, it is removed from the series, recalculating
the residuals and their variance using the parameters of the ARMA(p,q) model estimated in
the outer iteration. In the same manner, identify and remove new outliers in the adjusted
residuals until no more significant ones are found. Next return to the outer iteration in which
the ARMA(p,q) model is re-estimated and start the inner iteration again. Proceed iterating
until no more significant outliers are found.
                                                                
5 Intuitively, this means that errors are labelled outliers only if their value exceeds three standard deviations.
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Following Balke (1993), we use a small modification of this algorithm starting the outlier
search process with an ARMA(0,0) model in the first outer iteration and proceeding with the
standard procedure in subsequent outer iterations. The justification of the approach lies in the
fact that series containing level-shifts are to some degree observationally equivalent with
series characterised by a high degree of persistence. In this case, estimating the initial
ARMA(p,q) model in the way proposed by Tsay might imply that the residuals will not reflect
the true nature of the level-shift outlier, i.e. level-shift outliers can be misidentified as
innovational outliers or might not be identified at all.
Table 2 presents results from this outlier detection algorithm applied to the unemployment
rates of 21 OECD-countries. Three important conclusions stand out. First, positive level-shifts
are detected in all countries except the US. Second, the timing of the level-shifts over the
considered countries is clustered in three periods: 1975-77, 1980-83 and 1992-94 (i.e. 39 out
of the 50 identified level-shifts occur in these three periods). Third, in only two countries -
Ireland and Norway - a negative level-shift is detected, occurring in the late 1990s.
3.2. Estimating intervention models
The outliers identified in section 3.1 can now be used to allow for a more sophisticated
specification of the deterministic alternative in standard unit root tests, embedded in the
following general intervention model.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
1 0
p p
t t i t i t i tt t i
i j S j I j A i
u u u j LS j j IO j j AOa r b d g l e- - -
= = = = =
D = + + D + + + +å å å åå (6)
with S, I and A denoting the number of level-shifting, innovational and additive outliers
respectively. LS is equal to zero before the level-shift and one afterwards. Both IO and AO
have a value of one at the time of the outlier and are zero otherwise.
The results from estimating the intervention models are reported in table 3. Initially all
outliers identified in the previous section were included. Subsequently, the intervention
models were pared down by removing insignificant outliers. Also notice some small
adjustments to the timing of some of the outliers identified by the algorithm in the previous
section.   Although   the    modified   outlier   detection   algorithm   is   much   better   capable of
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Table 2 Outlier detection analysis for unemployment rates, 1960-1999a
Iteration Parametersb Outliersc,d
outer inner Model cst F1 F2 Date Type wi,t |li,t | $s a
Australia I ARMA(0,0) 5.53 3.12
1 (0.49)  1982   LS 2.94 4.0 1.99
2  1977   LS 1.41 3.4 1.46
II ARMA(1,0) 3.62 0.76 0.90
(0.61) (0.10)
Austria I ARMA(0,0) 3.21 1.83
1 (0.29)  1986   LS 2.23 4.5 0.98
2  1982   LS 0.90 3.9 0.64
3  1993   LS 0.92 3.8 0.49
II ARMA(1,0) 1.82 0.64 0.37
1 (0.17) (0.12)  1986   IO -1.37 3.7 0.29
III ARMA(1,0) 1.89 0.82 0.28
(0.26) (0.09)
Belgium I ARMA(0,0) 7.37 4.51
1 (0.71)  1981   LS 4.26 4.1 2.69
2  1977   LS 2.03 3.6 1.84
3  1976   LS 1.19 3.2 1.41
4  1993   LS 1.61 3.0 1.20
II ARMA(1,0) 3.12 0.79 0.75
1 (0.57) (0.10)  1981   AO -1.84 3.1 0.65
III ARMA(2,0) 3.27 1.15 -0.35 0.60
1 (0.51) (0.16) (0.16)  1975   IO 1.81 3.0 0.52
2  1983   IO 1.57 3.0 0.44
3  1977   AO -0.88 3.1 0.38
IV ARMA(2,0) 2.84 1.33 -0.55 0.37
(0.28) (0.14) (0.14)
Canada I ARMA(0,0) 7.69 2.34
1 (0.37)  1982   LS 2.04 3.7 1.63
II ARMA(2,0) 6.66 1.29 -0.48 0.71
(0.64) (0.15) (0.15)
Denmark I ARMA(0,0) 5.98 3.74
1 (0.59)  1981   LS 3.29 3.8 2.50
2  1975   LS 1.68 3.4 1.82
II ARMA(2,0) 3.40 1.22 -0.37 0.78
(0.88) (0.16) (0.16)
Finland I ARMA(0,0) 5.91 5.07
1 (0.80)  1992   LS 9.18 5.1 2.24
2  1977   LS 1.43 3.1 1.76
Continued
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Table 2 Continued
II ARMA(1,0) 3.24 0.66 1.34
1 (0.64) (0.13)  1992   AO -3.93 3.5 1.11
2  1991   IO 3.75 3.4 0.93
III ARMA(1,0) 2.96 0.83 0.89
(0.87) (0.10)
France I ARMA(0,0) 6.42 4.04
1 (0.80)  1984   LS 4.33 4.3 2.35
2  1979   LS 1.91 3.7 1.60
3  1992   LS 1.98 3.3 1.31
4  1975   LS 0.79 3.0 1.04
II ARMA(1,0) 2.96 0.75 0.65
1 (0.43) (0.10)  1984   IO -2.28 3.5 0.53
III ARMA(1,0) 3.29 0.87 0.51
(0.67) (0.07)
Germany I ARMA(0,0) 4.82 3.70
1 (0.58)  1983   LS 3.79 4.2 2.17
2  1993   LS 3.32 4.0 1.56
3  1975   LS 1.03 3.3 1.15
II ARMA(1,0) 2.16 0.76 0.76
1 (0.51) (0.11)  1982   AO 2.17 3.6 0.61
2  1993   IO -1.97 3.2 0.52
III ARMA(1,0) 2.61 0.89 0.50
(0.81) (0.08)
Greece I ARMA(0,0) 5.92 2.85
1 (0.45)  1983   LS 2.80 4.1 1.80
2  1993   LS 2.64 3.9 1.33
II ARMA(2,0) 4.12 1.15 -0.32 0.60
1 (0.58) (0.16) (0.16)  1992   AO 1.21 3.2 0.50
2  1982   AO 1.10 3.4 0.42
III ARMA(2,0) 4.09 1.47 -0.60 0.39
(0.50) (0.13) (0.13)
Ireland I ARMA(0,0) 9.44 4.44
1 (0.70)  1983   LS 4.43 4.1 2.75
2  1981   LS 1.97 3.1 2.18
3  1997   LS -3.76 3.0 1.90
4  1976   LS 1.17 3.0 1.51
II ARMA(1,0) 6.13 0.76 1.00
(0.69) (0.11)
Italy I ARMA(0,0) 6.93 3.11
1 (0.49)  1986   LS 3.71 4.5 1.73
2  1982   LS 1.52 3.7 1.20
3  1994   LS 1.72 3.5 0.96
Continued
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Table 2 Continued
II ARMA(1,0) 4.76 0.76 0.62
1 (0.43) (0.11)  1986   IO -1.87 3.0 0.54
III ARMA(1,0) 5.02 0.86 0.53
(0.61) (0.08)
Japan I ARMA(0,0) 2.08 0.75
1 (0.12)  1994   LS 1.23 4.0 0.54
2  1978   LS 0.41 3.5 0.38
3  1975   LS 0.23 3.0 0.30
II ARMA(2,0) 1.65 1.23 -0.38 0.13
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Netherlands I ARMA(0,0) 4.42 3.09
1 (0.49)  1981   LS 2.76 3.9 2.01
2  1975   LS 1.18 3.0 1.62
II ARMA(2,0) 2.47 1.24 -0.43 0.73
1 (0.62) (0.15) (0.15)  1982   IO 3.00 4.1 0.53
2  1983   IO 1.72 3.3 0.43
III ARMA(2,0) 1.83 1.20 -0.47 0.43
(0.27) (0.15) (0.15)
NewZealand I ARMA(0,0) 3.23 3.33
1 (0.53)  1988   LS 4.35 4.5 1.87
2  1981   LS 1.60 3.7 1.29
II ARMA(1,0) 1.23 0.75 0.85
1 (0.55) (0.11)  1988   AO -2.16 3.2 0.72
2  1991   IO 2.65 3.7 0.58
3  1983   IO 1.86 3.2 0.49
4  1995   IO -1.61 3.3 0.42
III ARMA(1,0) 1.00 0.81 0.42
(0.36) (0.09)
Norway I ARMA(0,0) 2.72 1.48
1 (0.23)  1989   LS 2.10 4.7 0.78
2  1982   LS 0.58 3.2 0.62
3  1998   LS -1.43 3.3 0.53
4  1988   LS 0.47 3.1 0.43
II ARMA(1,0) 1.79 0.60 0.36
(0.15) (0.14)
Portugal I ARMA(0,0) 5.18 2.39
1 (0.38)  1977   LS 1.64 3.3 1.80
II ARMA(1,0) 4.42 1.30 -0.51 0.74
1 (0.59) (0.14) (0.14)  1970   IO -2.60 3.5 0.60
2  1976   AO 1.09 3.1 0.52
III ARMA(1,0) 4.67 1.47 -0.64 0.51
(0.48) (0.12) (0.12)
Continued
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Table 2 Continued
Spain I ARMA(0,0) 11.07 8.12
1 (1.28)  1982   LS 8.33 4.4 4.41
2  1980   LS 3.87 3.9 2.82
3  1993   LS 3.78 3.5 2.22
II ARMA(1,0) 4.78 0.77 1.41
1 (1.01) (0.10)  1981   AO 4.56 4.1 1.05
III ARMA(1,0) 4.66 0.86 -0.64 1.03
(1.24) (0.08) (0.12)
Sweden I ARMA(0,0) 3.12 2.21
1 (0.35)  1992   LS 4.14 5.3 0.81
2  1993   LS 1.11 3.7 0.62
II ARMA(1,0) 2.09 0.51 0.55
1 (0.18) (0.15)  1992   AO -1.67 3.4 0.46
III ARMA(1,0) 2.10 0.74 0.44
(0.27) (0.12)
Switzerland I ARMA(0,0) 1.09 1.69
1 (0.27)  1993   LS 3.47 5.4 0.56
2  1991   LS 0.77 4.1 0.39
3  1992   IO 1.47 3.8 0.31
II ARMA(1,0) 0.27 0.72 0.22
1 (0.12) (0.12)  1997   AO 0.60 3.4 0.18
2  1995   AO -0.52 3.5 0.15
III ARMA(1,0) 0.25 0.88 0.14
(0.19) (0.08)
UK I ARMA(0,0) 5.77 3.54
1 (0.56)  1981   LS 3.24 4.0 2.23
2  1980   LS 1.55 3.1 1.77
II ARMA(1,0) 3.61 1.40 -0.64 0.69
(0.47) (0.13) (0.13)
US I ARMA(0,0) 6.04 1.45
(0.23)
II ARMA(1,0) 6.00 0.80 0.90
1 (0.72) (0.10)  1975   IO 2.77 4.0 0.77
2  1982   IO 2.43 3.1 0.65
III ARMA(1,0) 5.36 0.72 0.65
(0.38) (0.11)
a A RATS-procedure implementing Tsay’s algorithm is available from the author on request.
b Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
c Level-shifts identified in the first year of the sample are not reported for they cannot be considered real
outliers as they imply an adjustment in the mean of the entire series. They are handled by re-estimating the
mean of the series.
d i = IO, AO, LS.
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identifying level-shifts compared to the algorithm initially proposed by Tsay, it appears to
have some trouble picking the exact date of the shift. This problem becomes apparent if one
analyses the timing of innovational and especially additive outliers identified in the second
outer iteration. In a large number of cases these outliers are clustered around the timing of the
level-shifts identified in the first outer iteration, indicating that the timing of the level-shift is
suboptimal6. A clear example is Germany. In the first outer iteration, a level-shift is identified
in 1983 to which a 1982 additive outlier - of more or less comparable size - is added in the
second outer iteration. This suggests that the level-shift has occurred in 1982 in stead of 1983.
A similar argument applies to level-shifts in Belgium, Finland, Greece and Portugal.
In three cases, we also exogenously intervened in the number of level-shifts included in the
intervention model. The first case is again Germany where the positive level-shift in 1993
combined with the negative innovational outlier in the same year suggests that an additional
level-shift has occurred later on in the 1990s. Adding a shift in 1996 indeed contributed
greatly to the fit of the intervention model. In Denmark and Italy a level-shift was added in
1997 and 1975 respectively. Although such a shift is identified by the outlier algorithm, it is
not reported in table 2 for both test statistics were lower than the critical value of three. They
are nevertheless included in the intervention models as both turn out to be highly significant
and contributing to the significance of the other outliers.
As the specification of the deterministic term has changed, the test statistic for the null
hypothesis of a unit root (r = 0) in the intervention model obviously has a different
distribution than the one based on standard Dickey-Fuller tests. Therefore, table 3 includes for
each country critical values generated by Monte Carlo simulations. Inspired by Bradley and
Jansen (1995) we generate two different sets of critical values. The first set relies on the
procedure found in Balke and Fomby (B-F) (1991), generating 20 000 replications of a
random walk with i.i.d. N(0,1) innovations 7 and estimating for each replication the specific
intervention model used for the country under consideration. The only difference with the B-F
procedure is that the number of lagged first-differences (p) in each estimation is not
exogenously set equal to zero but chosen endogenously using a t-test on the last coefficient
                                                                
6 The problem is most probably caused by the lack of dynamics in the ARMA(0,0) model estimated in the first
outer iteration.
7 Although the finite sample distribution of the test statistic depends on the correlation structure in the data,
Perron and Vogelsang (1992) argue that this specification of the sequence of innovations implies no loss in
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(see also Perron and Vogelsang (1992))8. This small modification raises critical values with
about 0.3 on average. The second set uses a procedure similar to the one outlined by Bradley
and Jansen (B-J) (1995) generating 10 000 replications of a time series containing a unit root
and matching the sample characteristics (i.e. error variance and number of lagged first-
differences) of the unemployment rate of the country under consideration. Subsequently
Tsay’s (modified) outlier detection algorithm is applied to each replication in order to identify
the outliers to be included in the intervention model. Both procedures clearly have different
implications. Under the first method, the critical values for a specific country depend on the
number and timing of the outliers identified in section 2. Under the second method, critical
values only depend on the characteristics of the original series.
The most important conclusion that emerges from table 3 is that the unit root hypothesis can
strongly be rejected in most countries once we allow for level-shifts in the deterministic
component of the data generating process. For a lot of countries, we can even reject with more
than 99% confidence. In Canada the evidence is weak, though. A unit root can be rejected - at
the 10% level - only if the B-F critical values are used. In the US, the unit root hypothesis can
be rejected at the 5% level if we use the B-F critical values but it cannot be rejected using the
B-J simulation results. Since only innovational outliers and no level-shifts have occurred, the
B-J critical values might be too restrictive though.
The overall picture that emerges from table 3 is that the apparent I(1) behaviour of
unemployment rates is not due to a unit root but is caused by a limited number of permanent
shocks to the mean of unemployment rates. Once these infrequent shocks are controlled for,
measured persistence in unemployment rates drops significantly in most countries, ranging
from to 0.25 in Switzerland to 0.85 in Spain. These results imply that 90% of a shock to
unemployment in Switzerland is reverted in less than 2 years, while in Spain it still takes
about 14 years. Together with Greece, Spain is a clear outlier though. In most countries,
reversion takes about 3 to 6 years.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
generality as additional lags of first-differences serve to eliminate this dependency.
8 The maximum value of p was set equal to five.
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Table 3 Intervention models for unemployment rates, 1960-1999a
Australia Austria Belgium
parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat.
c 1.23 3.85 c 0.62 4.68 c 0.87 5.65
UNR(-1) -0.56 -4.60 UNR(-1) -0.38 -5.23 UNR(-1) -0.39 -7.64
d(UNR(-1)) 0.52 3.60 LS1982 1.24 6.21 d(UNR(-1)) 0.63 7.66
LS1977 2.07 3.55 LS1993 0.50 2.82 LS1975 1.74 6.27
LS1982 1.43 2.87 LS1981 1.71 5.14
LS1993 0.42 2.05
critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J
1% -4.89 -5.18 1% -4.95 -5.32 1% -5.36 -4.71
5% -4.01 -4.26 5% -4.08 -4.34 5% -4.48 -3.83
10% -3.57 -3.79 10% -3.65 -3.85 10% -4.03 -3.43
persistence 0.48(0.14) persistence 0.59(0.08) persistence 0.58(0.06)
Canada Denmark Finland
parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat.
c 2.15 3.46 c 0.85 3.25 c 1.03 5.35
UNR(-1) -0.36 -3.62 UNR(-1) -0.51 -4.79 UNR(-1) -0.43 -9.71
d(UNR(-1)) 0.50 3.46 d(UNR(-1)) 0.28 2.05 d(UNR(-1)) 0.66 9.60
LS1982 1.39 2.99 LS1975 2.56 4.37 LS1977 1.09 3.89
LS1981 1.48 2.66 LS1991 3.81 8.19
LS1997 -1.52 -2.80
critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J
1% -4.54 -5.27 1% -5.14 -5.30 1% -4.94 -4.22
5% -3.76 -4.29 5% -4.25 -4.28 5% -4.16 -3.45
10% -3.37 -3.81 10% -3.79 -3.81 10% -3.75 -3.04
persistence 0.44(0.11) persistence 0.47(0.11) persistence 0.72(0.09)
France Germany Greece
parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat.
c 0.90 4.48 c 0.65 4.54 c 0.78 3.73
UNR(-1) -0.40 -4.81 UNR(-1) -0.66 -6.85 UNR(-1) -0.21 -4.16
d(UNR(-1)) 0.30 2.13 d(UNR(-1)) 0.37 3.33 d(UNR(-1)) 0.59 5.01
LS1975 1.14 3.89 LS1975 1.84 5.61 LS1982 0.75 2.79
LS1979 1.00 2.93 LS1982 2.35 5.76 LS1991 0.65 2.76
LS1984 0.93 2.58 LS1993 1.14 3.41
LS1992 0.74 2.88 LS1996 1.34 3.51
critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J
1% -5.61 -5.36 1% -5.49 -4.96 1% -4.95 -4.76
5% -4.65 -4.34 5% -4.54 -4.05 5% -4.07 -3.87
10% -4.21 -3.82 10% -4.06 -3.58 10% -3.64 -3.46
persistence 0.55(0.09) persistence 0.40(0.11) persistence 0.77(0.08)
Continued
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Table 3 continued
Ireland Italy Japan
parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat.
c 2.64 4.27 c 1.88 4.67 c 0.41 3.99
UNR(-1) -0.50 -4.31 UNR(-1) -0.48 -4.87 UNR(-1) -0.32 -4.23
d(UNR(-1)) 0.45 3.47 d(UNR(-1)) 0.48 3.61 d(UNR(-1)) 0.21 1.51
LS1976 1.08 2.01 LS1975 0.79 3.73 LS1975 0.37 4.00
LS1981 1.79 2.51 LS1982 1.09 3.20 LS1994 0.36 3.72
LS1983 1.83 1.79 LS1986 0.98 2.88
LS1997 -2.92 -4.05 LS1994 0.84 2.81
critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J
1% -5.15 -5.14 1% -5.60 -5.22 1% -4.90 -5.30
5% -4.30 -4.20 5% -4.67 -4.22 5% -4.03 -4.22
10% -3.87 -3.73 10% -4.20 -3.73 10% -3.61 -3.75
persistence 0.47(0.12) persistence 0.60(0.09) persistence 0.64(0.08)
Netherlands New Zealand Norway
parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat.
c 0.45 3.06 c 0.25 2.49 c 0.85 5.37
UNR(-1) -0.32 -5.13 UNR(-1) -0.36 -5.92 UNR(-1) -0.50 -5.95
d(UNR(-1)) 0.45 3.86 d(UNR(-1)) 0.33 3.53 d(UNR(-1)) 0.37 3.07
LS1975 0.82 2.93 LS1981 1.02 3.58 LS1982 0.47 2.59
LS1981 0.80 2.48 LS1988 1.44 4.77 LS1988 1.19 4.63
IO1982 1.66 2.99 IO1983 1.62 3.60 LS1998 -0.91 -2.93
IO1983 1.87 3.20 IO1991 2.41 5.49
IO1995 -1.13 -2.38
critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J
1% -4.87 -4.76 1% -4.82 -5.29 1% -4.94 -5.06
5% -4.02 -3.87 5% -3.96 -4.28 5% -4.11 -4.12
10% -3.60 -3.46 10% -3.52 -3.82 10% -3.67 -3.68
persistence 0.60(0.10) persistence 0.69(0.08) persistence 0.50(0.09)
Portugal Spain Sweden
parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat.
c 0.85 4.30 c 0.80 3.21 c 1.11 5.76
UNR(-1) -0.24 -4.50 UNR(-1) -0.20 -4.36 UNR(-1) -0.51 -6.17
d(UNR(-1)) 0.68 7.90 d(UNR(-1)) 0.64 6.23 d(UNR(-1)) 0.41 3.67
LS1975 0.73 2.77 LS1980 2.96 3.98 LS1992 2.55 5.64
IO1970 -2.57 -4.70
critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J
1% -4.38 -4.82 1% -4.50 -4.17 1% -4.35 -5.02
5% -3.62 -3.93 5% -3.74 -3.42 5% -3.54 -4.08
10% -3.24 -3.51 10% -3.34 -3.04 10% -3.15 -3.62
persistence 0.71(0.11) persistence 0.85(0.04) persistence 0.46(0.10)
Continued
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Table 3 continued
Switzerland UK US
parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat. parameters coeff. t-stat.
c 1.23 4.93 c 1.01 4.55 c 1.52 3.23
UNR(-1) -0.59 -5.20 UNR(-1) -0.37 -5.93 UNR(-1) -0.28 -3.70
d(UNR(-1)) 0.42 3.92 d(UNR(-1)) 0.74 7.25 d(UNR(-1)) 0.23 1.96
LS1991 0.97 2.10 LS1980 2.28 5.23 IO1975 2.72 4.19
LS1993 2.05 2.53 IO1982 2.61 4.01
IO1992 1.29 1.94
critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J critical values B-F B-J
1% -4.35 -4.51 1% -4.52 -4.68 1% -3.95 -5.36
5% -3.55 -3.65 5% -3.75 -3.82 5% -3.16 -4.27
10% -2.14 -3.22 10% -3.37 -3.41 10% -2.79 -3.81
persistence 0.25(0.10) persistence 0.71(0.10) persistence 0.64(0.11)
a A RATS-procedure calculating critical values is available from the author on request.
b Similar to the calculation in section 2, the persistence measure equals the estimated AR(1) coefficient in an
ARMA(1,q ). The only difference is that the regressions now also include the identified outliers.
4. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
This paper tests three competing explanations for the large persistence in most OECD
unemployment rates. The first hypothesis states that the observed persistence is caused by
adjustment toward an underlying natural rate of unemployment which has increased in
response to changes in the structural characteristics of the labour market. The other two
hypotheses argue that unemployment persistence is due to hysteresis effects, meaning that
present structural unemployment depends on past actual unemployment. When this
dependence eventually decays as time elapses, the unemployment rate converges toward a
fixed natural rate, implying only partial hysteresis. When the increase in actual unemployment
permanently feeds through in structural unemployment, the labour market is characterised by
full hysteresis.
One line of research has tested the relevance of the last two hypotheses using standard
univariate unit root tests. The results clearly point to full hysteresis in most OECD-countries.
The hypothesis of adjustment to an increased natural rate has not yet been properly included
in these tests, though. In this paper I extend standard unit root tests by allowing for level shifts
under the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. Since level shifts allow the unemployment
rate to be stationary around a variable mean, this alternative hypothesis should be able to deal
with variation in the natural rate of unemployment. The identification of level-shifts is based
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on the outlier detection algorithm developed by Tsay (1988). Once level-shifts are allowed
for, univariate unit root tests strongly reject the null of a unit root in almost all OECD-
countries.
In terms of the alternative persistence hypotheses outlined in the introduction, this result is in
favour of the hypothesis that the rise in OECD unemployment rates is due to adjustment to an
increased natural rate. Nevertheless, it would be hard to advocate that the identified level-
shifts in the actual unemployment rate coincide with shifts in the natural rate. Two
observations underpin this reluctance. (i) As noted in the previous section, the timing of most
of the level-shifts in the considered countries is clustered in three time periods. It would at
least be surprising to find that shifts in the natural rate of unemployment - caused by changes
in structural characteristics of the economy – have occurred at more or less the same time in
all countries. (ii) Each of these periods can be linked to large temporary demand or supply
shocks. The level-shifts in the periods 1975-77 and 1980-83 reflect the upshot in
unemployment in the aftermath of the two oil price shocks while the period 1992-94 coincides
with a recession in most European countries. Without full hysteresis - which has been rejected
in the previous section - such ‘temporary’9 shocks generally do not have the power to shift the
long-run equilibrium (natural) rate of unemployment. Rather than reflecting shifts in the
natural rate, the infrequent large shocks must in my opinion be interpreted as jumps - caused
by extreme adverse shocks to the unemployment rate - in the direction of a natural rate, which
might have increased years before the upshot in actual unemployment.
A theoretical model that is able to account for this feature can be found in Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998). They develop a general equilibrium search model in which workers
accumulate skills on the job and lose skills during unemployment. Since unemployment
benefits are determined by workers’ past earnings, unemployed workers face increasing
difficulties of finding a job that they prefer to their unemployment compensation as their
skills deteriorate. The main implication of this model is that even with such unfavourable
labour market characteristics, low unemployment is sustainable as long as the economy is not
subject to any major adverse shocks. The intuition behind this result is that the availability of
a lot of ‘good jobs’ counteracts the adverse effects of generous unemployment benefits. When
the economy is hit by a severe adverse shock, generous benefits erode the ability of the labour
                                                                
9 Although lasting longer than the average business cycle, the increase in the oil prices during the oil shocks of
the 1970s was largely undone by the reverse shock in 1986.
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market to adjust, though. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) argue that in this interpretation, the
smooth performance of the European economies in the 1950s and 1960s concealed an
inherent instability. Their model implies that the gradual build-up of the welfare state –
implying unfavourable labour market characteristics like higher direct taxes on labour and
generous unemployment benefits – was a virtual ‘time bomb’ waiting to explode.
The conclusion that the adjustment of actual unemployment toward its natural rate is mainly
driven by infrequent large shocks can also explain why a lot of empirical research has
troubles detecting a strong causal relation between changes in labour market characteristics
and the actual unemployment rate. The OECD (1994) for instance argues that a generous
unemployment benefit system does have a negative impact on employment but only with a
lag ranging from 5-20 years. In the interpretation of Ljungqvist and Sargent, these lags are
purely coincidental as they are driven by the timing of adverse shocks hitting the economy.
Although these results take the edge off the hypothesis of full hysteresis, a fairly large amount
of persistence remains in some countries, implying not only slow convergence to the variable
natural rate but also partial hysteresis after shocks to aggregate demand. In Spain for instance,
it takes about 14 years to revert 90% of a shock to unemployment. In most countries however,
this reversion takes about 3 to 6 years, implying only moderate hysteresis.
The main policy implication of these results is that the battle against high and persistent
unemployment can only be won if governments focus on structural labour market reform. The
moderate amount of medium-term persistence which remains in the unemployment rate of
most OECD-countries after controlling for the evolution of the natural rate reduces the scope
for demand side policies, although they might be very useful as attendant measure with
structural reforms, for they can speed up the convergence to a lower natural rate.
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Appendix A: A note on the construction of capital stock data
The measurement of capital is one of the
nastiest jobs that economists have set to statisticians.
(Hicks 1981, p. 204)
A.1. INTRODUCTION
A lot of critical assumptions underpin the construction of capital stock data. Unfortunately,
the validity of some of them is not immediately clear. Therefore, this appendix will try to
identify the most crucial assumptions and analyse to what extent small modifications affect
the estimated size of the public capital stock.
The remainder is organised as follows. Section A.2. first outlines an important difference
between two alternative capital stock measures, i.e. gross versus net valuation. Section A.3.
sets out the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM), a methodology developed to compile
investment data into capital stock measures. Since most of the work in this thesis is based on
Belgian data only, we will restrict our attention to the methodology used by the Belgian
Federal Planning Bureau. Section A.4. reports the results from a sensitivity analysis
estimating the size of the Belgian public capital stock under a set of different assumptions.
A.2. GROSS VERSUS NET VALUATION
Generally spoken, there are two alternative aggregate capital stock measures. Gross capital
stocks on the one hand are defined as the cumulative value of past investment less discarded
investments. This calculation relies on the assumption that the efficiency of the included
assets remains at about the same level regardless of their age. Maintenance is assumed to be
sufficient to keep performance of assets steady until the moment they are liquidated. Net
capital stocks on the other hand are constructed assuming some steady decline in the value of
the assets, reflecting the steady decay in discounted future income streams.
While net capital stocks are mostly used to measure value to asset holders, gross capital
stocks are more appropriate as indicators of the value of the capital stock as a factor of
A note on the construction of capital stock data
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
5.2
production (OECD, 1993). Since our focus is on production analysis, we will concentrate on
the construction of gross capital stock data.
A.3. THE PERPETUAL INVENTORY METHOD
A.3.1. General functional form
Given the definition in the previous section, the gross capital stock (GCS) can be calculated as
(see Gilot and Floridor, 1993):
GCS s It i t i
i
m
= -
=
å
0
(A.1)
with It-i investment in period t-i, in prices of a selected base year
si share of assets installed in period t-i that are still productive at time t
i age of the asset
m maximum economic lifetime of assets, set equal to 2´ T, with T the average
lifetime
Equation (A.1) states that the gross public capital stock at a given moment is simply the sum
of all investments that are still productive at that time. Calculation of (A.1) requires
information on nominal investment, the evolution in asset prices and the lifetime during
which these assets are productive. Recent data on capital formation and asset prices are
readily available and thought to be quite accurate1. However, equation (A.1) reveals that the
construction of long time series requires information - depending on the assumed lifetime of
the considered asset - on even longer series on capital formation. An average lifetime of 60
years, which is commonly used for buildings for instance, implies historical data on
investment and investment prices dating back 120 years. Such data are generally less easy to
collect and often of low quality2. However, the impact on the accuracy of capital stock
measures of these ‘low quality’ data declines over time by the retirement of assets (OECD,
1993).
                                                                
1 Reliable data are available in the National Accounts from 1953 onwards.
2 For public investments over the period 1896-1929, De Biolley and Gilot (1987) have to fix the annual growth
rate at 2%, with zero growth during world war I. Prior to 1896, the growth rate was assumed to equal 1.5%.
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Much more crucial for accuracy over the whole time interval is the assumption on the period
during which assets are kept in the capital stock. Usually such information is scantly available
(OECD, 1993), though. The choice of the lifetime of assets can be subdivided in the average
service live and the distribution of liquidations around this average. The concrete
implementation of these assumptions in Belgian is the subject of the following two sub-
sections.
A.3.2. Average service lives
Average economic lifetimes used in Belgium are fixed over the whole period but vary across
sectors and assets (see Gilot and Floridor, 1993). Assets are split up in three different types:
equipment, vehicles and buildings. In principal, information on lifetimes is based on
depreciation rates specified by tax authorities. However, in some cases lifetime was increased
in order to match the values calculated by Paccoud (1983) for a number of European
countries3. For public capital investment, this results in average service lifetimes equal to 15,
7 and 60 years for equipments, vehicles and buildings respectively.
A simple comparison of service lives used in a number of OECD countries (see OECD, 1993)
reveals a considerable variability, raising doubts about the reliability of the assumed lifetimes.
Concerning public investments in equipment, there are generally spoken two groups. The
first, including Belgium, assumes an average service life of 15 years. The second sets service
lives equal to 20 years. For buildings and other constructions works of the public
administration, the average service life ranges between about 50 and 80 years. The lifetime of
vehicles finally, lies between 7 and 14 years. An analysis of the sensitivity to alternative
assumptions about average lifetimes is provided in section A.4.
A.3.3. Distribution of retirements around the average: mortality functions
Apart from being a crude approximation, the lifetimes reported above are only averages. In
reality, some assets will remain productive far beyond their average lifetime while others may
be withdrawn much earlier. This problem is usually tackled by simulating retirement patterns
                                                                
3 This was for instance the case for equipment for which the lifetime was increased from 10 to 15 years
A
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based on some kind of mortality function. A wide range of straightforward calculable
retirement patterns is available;
(i) Linear retirement assumes equal amounts to be liquidated from the first year after
installation onwards.
(ii) Delayed linear retirement is conceptual very similar to linear functions but assumes
retirements over a shorter interval, constructed symmetrically around the average
lifetime.
(iii) Declining-balance functions use a constant depreciation rate, implying the largest
retirements in the early lifetime of the assets.
(iv) Simultaneous exit assumes all assets to be retarded at their average lifetime.
(v) Bell-shaped mortality functions allow for a smooth retirement pattern with the
largest discards concentrated around the average lifetime. In addition, the degree of
skewness and kurtosis can be adjusted in order to match observed retirement
patterns more closely.
Figure A.1 plots a number of the suggested retirement patterns for an asset with an average
lifetime of 15 years. The delayed linear retirement pattern assumes assets to be discarded over
the period -25%/+25% of the average lifetime. The declining balance methodology uses the
double declining balance formula which sets the yearly depreciation rate equal to 2/T (Hulten,
1990). The bell-shaped mortality function is taken from Gilot and Floridor (1993), who use
the following quasi-logistic specification:
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(A.2)
with c parameter which determines the degree of kurtosis.
a and b parameters determining the degree of skewness.
Figure A.1 shows huge differences between the alternative retirement patterns. Linear and
declining-balance functions for instance produce very divergent retirement patterns. The
OECD (1993) has argued however that “... the bell-shaped function is really the only
A
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plausible candidate.” Especially linear and declining-balance functions suffer some important
drawbacks. Contrary to common sense, both methods imply large retirements in the early
lifetime of the assets. Under certain conditions, simultaneous exit and delayed linear functions
are relevant approximations to the bell-shaped function and therefore also plausible
candidates (OECD, 1993).
Figure A.1 Alternative retirement patterns
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A.4. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we assess the impact on public capital stock estimates if some small changes
are made to the assumptions underlying the calculation of official data.
A.4.1. Sensitivity to changes in assumed service lives
In order to check the sensitivity of public capital stock measures to changes in assumed
average service lives, we construct two alternative measures. In the first one, the lifetime of
buildings is reduced from 60 to 50 years. Given that Belgium is at the low end of the range of
assumed lifetimes for vehicles and equipment, these values are not reduced. The second
measure extends the lifetime of buildings from 60 to 70 years. For vehicles and equipment,
A
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average service lives are fixed at 20 and 14 years respectively. The results are shown in figure
A.2.
Figure A.2 Sensitivity of the public capital stock (billion 1985 BEF) to alternative
average lifetimes
Sources:Own calculations on investment data provided by the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau.
Changing average lifetimes clearly has important implications for the estimated size of the
capital stock. In 1996, the estimate based on longer lifetimes lies about 6% higher than the
official number. The proposed reduction in service lives even implies an estimate which lies
15% below the official number, a difference worth more than 800 billiards of Belgian francs.
A.4.2. Sensitivity to changes in mortality functions
Figure A.3 plots the total gross public capital stock in Belgium constructed using five
alternative mortality functions. Delayed linear, linear and declining balance retirement
patterns are as specified in section A.3.3. The exact specification of the quasi-logistic
mortality function is taken from Gilot and Floridor (1993), who set the parameter determining
the degree of kurtosis (c) equal to 2.2´m. The parameters determining the degree of skewness
(a and b) are both fixed at 0.5 for vehicles and equipment, yielding a symmetric mortality
function. For buildings, a=0.4 and b=0.6, implying left skewness or a larger part of
investments that is retired after their assumed average lifetime.
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Figure A.3 Sensitivity of the public capital stock (billion 1985 BEF) to alternative
mortality functions
Sources:Own calculations on investment data provided by the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau.
Figure A.3 reveals the sensitivity of capital stock data to changes in assumed retirement
patterns. The declining balance methodology - an inventory method frequently encountered in
the literature - and linear retirement clearly yield much smaller estimates of the public capital
stock. Given the objections raised above, one should be very cautious with results based on
these methodologies. The bell-shaped mortality function, simultaneous exit and delayed linear
retirement give very similar results. Note that the similarity between simultaneous exit and
bell-shaped mortality functions also indicates that the public capital stock is fairly insensitive
to possible measurement errors in historical data4.
The results from a final sensitivity exercise are shown in figure A.4, reporting public capital
stock series based on three alternative specifications of the quasi-logistic mortality function.
The first, which is the same as the one reported in figure A.3, is based on the official
specification, fitting a left-skewed mortality function for buildings. The second assumes a
symmetric mortality function for the three different types of assets. The third measure is
constructed by increasing the parameter determining the degree of kurtosis from 2.2´m to
3.5´m, implying a larger fraction of assets to be liquidated at about their assumed average
                                                                
4 By assuming that some assets are liquidated long after they have reached their average lifetime, bell-shaped
mortality functions rely much more on historical data than simultaneous exit.
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lifetime. The results show that small changes to the specification of the quasi-logistic
mortality function do not have a large impact on the estimated size of the capital stock.
Figure A.4 Sensitivity of the public capital stock (billion 1985 BEF) to alternative
specifications of the quasi-logistic mortality function
Sources:Own calculations on investment data provided by the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau.
A.5. CONCLUSION
Calculation of gross capital stock data requires information on capital formation, the
evolution in asset prices and the lifetime during which these assets are thought to be
productive. Unfortunately, reliable information concerning the period during which assets are
kept in the capital stock is scantly available. In order to check the sensitivity of the estimates
to the choice of service lives, alternative public capital stock measures were calculated under
alternative assumptions about average assets’ lifetime and retirement patterns, describing the
distribution of liquidations around the average. On the one hand, the size of capital stock
estimates is found to be fairly insensitive to plausible alternative retirement patterns. On the
other hand, the results vary considerably when using different average lifetimes. Further,
linear retirement and declining-balance functions are shown to yield unreliable results.
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